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APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF DOD ORGANIZATIONAL

PROBLEMS

This appendix presents six brief historical examples of organizational problems that have plagued U.S. military operations. The appendix includes two examples-the Spanish-American War and Pearl Harbor-from the period before the application of the concept of unified command. The other four examples are from the post-unified command period of U.S. military history: the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the capture of the Pueblo, the Iran hostage rescue mission, and the Grenada operation.

Most of these historical examples have been described and analyzed in much more detail elsewhere; nonetheless, the short papers in this appendix succintly explain the organizational shortcomings that hampered U.S. forces. A final consideration in the preparation of these papers was the necessity to use only unclassified information. This constraint was, of course, most important in preparing the examples on the Iran hostage rescue mission and the Grenada operation.

A. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The Spanish-American War of 1898 provides a classic example of the consequences of lack of unity of command and inadequate inter-Service cooperation on American conduct of a military operation. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. military establishment consisted of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy-both of which operated with little Presidential guidance. The Spanish-American War witnessed not only the failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate on military planning, but also the lack of coordination within the Military Departments themselves. The following examples will serve to illustrate the extent of the problems faced by the operational commanders.

Command of American naval forces in the Caribbean was divided between Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. A sharp personality conflict between Sampson and Schley exacerbated the problems that the lack of unity of command permitted. Since the commanders could not agree on where the Spanish fleet would strike, Sampson blockaded Havana while Schley remained at Key West. Even after the Spanish fleet headed for Cuba, the two commanders further disagreed on where in the Caribbean the Spanish would go for reinforcements-resulting in Sampson heading for Santiago, Cuba while Schley moved his fleet to guard another Cuban port, Cienfuegos. The net result of this internal naval disagreement was that each part of the American fleet was out of

reach of the other and, therefore, in danger of being destroyed piecemeal by the Spanish fleet.

The failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate was vividly illustrated by the one substantial joint campaign of the war, that of Santiago. Admiral Sampson had taken control of the fleet once Commodore Schley had reached Santiago. Sampson's Army counterpart was General Shafter. Sampson and Shafter repeatedly disagreed on the best tactic to defeat the Spanish. Shafter insisted that the Navy force the entrance to the harbor of Santiago and aid the Army in the capture of the city. Sampson refused to enter the mine-infested harbor, insisting instead that the Army attack the formidable forts guarding the entrance to the harbor so that his forces could safely remove the mines before entering the harbor.

In the end, Shafter's troops captured Santiago with only minimal naval assistance in the form of a blockade by Sampson's forces from outside the harbor. Army-Navy relations were so strained by the end of the Santiago campaign that General Shafter refused to allow Admiral Sampson's representative to sign the surrender document.

The final conflict between the Army and the Navy occurred after the Spanish capitulation. The Army, believing that it had contributed the most to the victory, took charge of the surrender and claimed all captured weapons-including the remaining Spanish naval forces. The Navy opposed the latter move and the conflict was settled in Washington, allowing the Navy to take charge of the Spanish vessels.

Despite the U.S. victory on the battlefield, the Spanish-American War was a failure for the U.S. military establishment. Public criticism resulting from the realization that there had been no plan, either of mobilization or operations, for the conduct of the war led to the creation of the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.

B. PEARL HARBOR

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was an overwhelming success, taking both policymakers in Washington as well as commanders in Hawaii totally by surprise. Although many factors contributed to this disaster, the structure of the chain of command was a major problem.

There were two chains of command originating from Pearl Harbor-one for the Army, the other for the Navy. The Army chain of command ran from Lt. Gen. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to Secretary of War Stimson and finally to President Roosevelt. The Navy chain of command went from Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to Navy Secretary Knox and ultimately to the President. Therefore, below the Presidential level, no one exercised authority over both commanders at Pearl Harbor.

The problems inherent in this command structure become evident when one analyzes the reasons for the total surprise achieved by the Japanese forces. The absence of adequate intelligence in the weeks leading up to the attack can be at least partially blamed on

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