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Conclusions

Recommendations 1. The Congress is empowered

by the Constitution to specify the chain of command.

2A. Clearly assign to the Secretary 2. The chain of command of Defense the role of command

from the Commander in er of the operational commandChief to the operational ers. commanders is confused, primarily due to uncertain- 2B. Specify in statute the Secretary ty about the roles of the of Defense's authority “to comSecretary of Defense and mand". the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chain of command is 2C. Specify that the Secretary of further confused by the de Defense is the principal contact facto influence that individ- in the DoD policymaking level ual Service Chiefs retain for the operational commanders. over the operational commands.

2D. Remove the JCS, including the

Chairman, from the chain of command.

2E. Make the JCS Chairman the

principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system while ensuring absolute clarity that the JCS Chairman is not part of the chain of command.

3. The concept of unified com

mand, as formulated in the immediate post-World War II period and as articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been implemented.

4A. Revise UNAAF to make it con

sistent with the concept of unified command.

4. Provisions of JCS Publica

tion 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), are inconsistent wit the concept of unified command.

Conclusions

Recommendations 5. The authority of the unified 5A. Revise UNAAF to lessen the

commanders over their restrictions on the authority of Service component com- the unified commanders. mands is weak.

5B. Authorize the unified com

manders to select and replace their Service component commanders.

5C. Require the Service component

commands to communicate with their Service headquarters on critical resource issues through their unified commander.

6. There is an imbalance be 6A. Increase the stature of the uni

tween the responsibilities fied commanders by making and accountability of the them more senior in order of unified commanders and rank than the Service Chiefs. their influence over resource decisions.

6B. Strengthen the capabilities of

the Joint Staff to do resource analysis.

6C. Have OSD mission-oriented of

fices represent the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues.

6D. Approve_the use of the CINC

Readiness Fund.

7. The Department of Defense

has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command; the congressional recommendation "that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts" has not been implemented.

Conclusions

Recommendations 8. There is an absence of uni- 8A. Clarify appropriate command

fication below the level of relationships within the unified the unified commander and commands, especially concerning his staff; as a result, com- the principle of unity of command by mutual coopera- mand. tion—the basic U.S. military doctrine prior to World 8B. Revise UNAAF to remove obWar II-remains the order stacles to the creation of addiof the day at subordinate tional sub-unified commands and levels of the unified com- other necessary subordinate joint mands.

organizations.

8C. Remove the Service component

commanders from the operational chain of command.

9. There is no objective review 9A. Seek increased attention to the

of the Unified Command UCP by OSD and NSC. Plan (UCP).

9B. Require the submission by the

President to the Congress of a one-time report on the UCP.

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF DOD ORGANIZATIONAL

PROBLEMS

This appendix presents six brief historical examples of organizational problems that have plagued U.S. military operations. The appendix includes two examples—the Spanish-American War and Pearl Harbor-from the period before the application of the concept of unified command. The other four examples are from the post-unified command period of U.S. military history: the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the capture of the Pueblo, the Iran hostage rescue mission, and the Grenada operation.

Most of these historical examples have been described and analyzed in much more detail elsewhere; nonetheless, the short papers in this appendix succintly explain the organizational shortcomings that hampered U.S. forces. A final consideration in the preparation of these papers was the necessity to use only unclassified information. This constraint was, of course, most important in preparing the examples on the Iran hostage rescue mission and the Grenada operation.

A. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR The Spanish-American War of 1898 provides a classic example of the consequences of lack of unity of command and inadequate inter-Service cooperation on American conduct of a military operation. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. military establishment consisted of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy-both of which operated with little Presidential guidance. The Spanish-American War witnessed not only the failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate on military planning, but also the lack of coordination within the Military Departments themselves. The following examples will serve to illustrate the extent of the problems faced by the operational commanders.

Command of American naval forces in the Caribbean was divided between Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. A sharp personality conflict between Sampson and Schley exacerbated the problems that the lack of unity of command permitted. Since the commanders could not agree on where the Spanish fleet would strike, Sampson blockaded Havana while Schley remained at Key West. Even after the Spanish fleet headed for Cuba, the two commanders further disagreed on where in the Caribbean the Spanish would go for reinforcements-resulting in Sampson heading for Santiago, Cuba while Schley moved his fleet to guard another Cuban port, Cienfuegos. The net result of this internal naval disagreement was that each part of the American fleet was out of

reach of the other and, therefore, in danger of being destroyed piecemeal by the Spanish fleet.

The failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate was vividly illustrated by the one substantial joint campaign of the war, that of Santiago. Admiral Sampson had taken control of the fleet once Commodore Schley had reached Santiago. Sampson's Army counterpart was General Shafter. Sampson and Shafter repeatedly disagreed on the best tactic to defeat the Spanish. Shafter insisted that the Navy force the entrance to the harbor of Santiago and aid the Army in the capture of the city. Sampson refused to enter the mine-infested harbor, insisting instead that the Army attack the formidable forts guarding the entrance to the harbor so that his forces could safely remove the mines before entering the harbor.

In the end, Shafter's troops captured Santiago with only minimal naval assistance in the form of a blockade by Sampson's forces from outside the harbor. Army-Navy relations were so strained by the end of the Santiago campaign that General Shafter refused to allow Admiral Sampson's representative to sign the surrender document.

The final conflict between the Army and the Navy occurred after the Spanish capitulation. The Army, believing that it had contributed the most to the victory, took charge of the surrender and claimed all captured weapons-including the remaining Spanish naval forces. The Navy opposed the latter move and the conflict was settled in Washington, allowing the Navy to take charge of the Spanish vessels.

Despite the U.S. victory on the battlefield, the Spanish-American War was a failure for the U.S. military establishment. Public criticism resulting from the realization that there had been no plan, either of mobilization or operations, for the conduct of the war led to the creation of the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.

B. PEARL HARBOR The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was an overwhelming success, taking both policymakers in Washington as well as commanders in Hawaii totally by surprise. Although many factors contributed to this disaster, the structure of the chain of command was a major problem.

There were two chains of command originating from Pearl Harbor-one for the Army, the other for the Navy. The Army chain of command ran from Lt. Gen. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to Secretary of War Stimson and finally to President Roosevelt. The Navy chain of command went from Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to Navy Secretary Knox and ultimately to the President. Therefore, below the Presidential level, no one exercised authority over both commanders at Pearl Harbor.

The problems inherent in this command structure become evident when one analyzes the reasons for the total surprise achieved by the Japanese forces. The absence of adequate intelligence in the weeks leading up to the attack can be at least partially blamed on

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