Second, by assigning the CINCs a greater role in determining the readiness and sustainability of their forces, the operations program and budget would help smooth the transition between the current peacetime dominance of the individual services and the expected wartime dominance of the operational commanders. Specifically, the readiness program and budget would allow resources to flow down the same channels as operational authority and responsibility without depriving the services of their primary role as the maintaining arm of the forces. (page 20)

Despite these arguments, it appears that the enhancement role for the operational commanders in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, as provided for in Secretary Taft's memorandum of November 14, 1984, offers great potential for increasing the visibility of the requirements of the operational commanders without the disruptions of this option.

Both this option and the newly established procedures have the same objective: to provide a better appreciation of the readiness and sustainability needs of the operational commanders. It appears desirable to evaluate the adequacy of the newly established procedures before implementing more drastic proposals.

• Option 3H -approve the use of the CINC Readiness Fund

The fundamental issue regarding the CINC Readiness Fund is whether Washington organizations (Congress, OSD, Military Departments) are prepared to relax their absolute control over resources and permit operational commanders some flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements. At present, resource allocations for very specific purposes are approved in advance. In addition, changing approved allocations involves a cumbersome set of procedures, both within DoD and between DoD and the Congress.

It is not possible to exactly forecast the funding requirements of the operational commands well in advance of the actual operating period as the current budget process requires. There appears to be a strong case to provide a CINC Readiness Fund to meet unforeseen requirements.

On the other hand, given the substantial demands for relatively scarce defense resources, there is a requirement to ensure that expenditures are made only for priority needs. Should the concept of the CINC Readiness Fund be approved, the Secretary of Defense will need to ensure that he develops procedures that provide sufficient oversight of expenditures while still being responsive to the urgent needs of the operational commanders.

4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSENCE OF UNIFICATION BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

• Option 4A-clarify appropriate command relationships within the unified commands, especially concerning the principle of unity of command

Clarification of appropriate command relationships would obviously be beneficial. If unity of command is to be the basic principle

for command relationships, this should be clearly communicated and implemented.

No valid disadvantages of this option have been identified.

• Option 4B -revise UNAAF to remove obstacles to the creation of additional sub-unified commands and other necessary subordinate joint organizations

The relative emphasis to be placed on joint organizations versus single-Service organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands involves the following considerations:

。 wartime effectiveness versus peacetime efficiency;

• joint requirements versus Service prerogatives; and

。 likelihood of theater-wide campaigns versus lesser crises. UNAAF's emphasis on a single-Service operational chain of command within the unified commands appears inappropriate in the current environment. As the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command has stated:

UNAAF's organizational approach, which preserves division by Service and Service components, plus the stated requirement to preserve uni-Service integrity in the organizational structure, needs to be reviewed in terms of today's required levels of integration and employment of modern weapons systems. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.) The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command has offered a similar recommendation:

We have now had considerable experience with the unified command system and from my parochial perspective I am not convinced that a federated system is as necessary as it once appeared....I would suggest that we should look closely at this arrangement to ensure that it reflects today's environment in terms of the required integration needed to conduct modern warfare and in terms of current political imperatives. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.)

Key among the advantages of this option is that it will enable the unified command system to more effectively meet today's crisis management requirements. In those crises in which the President must retain effective control, there may be a requirement to circumvent portions of the military chain of command. The creation of additional joint organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands may permit more effective military action under the direction of the National Command Authority.

• Option 4C -remove the Service component commanders from the operational chain of command

If the single-Service operational chains of command are an impediment to unification, the Service component commanders should be removed from the chain of command. Such an organizational change would have Service organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels of DoD responsible solely for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Operational matters would be handled solely by joint organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels.

Second, by assigning the CINCs a greater role in determining the readiness and sustainability of their forces, the operations program and budget would help smooth the transition between the current peacetime dominance of the individual services and the expected wartime dominance of the operational commanders. Specifically, the readiness program and budget would allow resources to flow down the same channels as operational authority and responsibility without depriving the services of their primary role as the maintaining arm of the forces. (page 20)

Despite these arguments, it appears that the enhancement role for the operational commanders in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, as provided for in Secretary Taft's memorandum of November 14, 1984, offers great potential for increasing the visibility of the requirements of the operational commanders without the disruptions of this option.

Both this option and the newly established procedures have the same objective: to provide a better appreciation of the readiness and sustainability needs of the operational commanders. It appears desirable to evaluate the adequacy of the newly established procedures before implementing more drastic proposals.

• Option 3H -approve the use of the CINC Readiness Fund

The fundamental issue regarding the CINC Readiness Fund is whether Washington organizations (Congress, OSD, Military Departments) are prepared to relax their absolute control over resources and permit operational commanders some flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements. At present, resource allocations for very specific purposes are approved in advance. In addition, changing approved allocations involves a cumbersome set of procedures, both within DoD and between DoD and the Congress.

It is not possible to exactly forecast the funding requirements of the operational commands well in advance of the actual operating period as the current budget process requires. There appears to be a strong case to provide a CINC Readiness Fund to meet unforeseen requirements.

On the other hand, given the substantial demands for relatively scarce defense resources, there is a requirement to ensure that expenditures are made only for priority needs. Should the concept of the CINC Readiness Fund be approved, the Secretary of Defense will need to ensure that he develops procedures that provide sufficient oversight of expenditures while still being responsive to the urgent needs of the operational commanders.

4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSENCE OF UNIFICATION BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

• Option 4A -clarify appropriate command relationships within the unified commands, especially concerning the principle of unity of command

Clarification of appropriate command relationships would obviously be beneficial. If unity of command is to be the basic principle

for command relationships, this should be clearly communicated and implemented.

No valid disadvantages of this option have been identified.

• Option 4B -revise UNAAF to remove obstacles to the creation of additional sub-unified commands and other necessary subordinate joint organizations

The relative emphasis to be placed on joint organizations versus single-Service organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands involves the following considerations:

。 wartime effectiveness versus peacetime efficiency;

• joint requirements versus Service prerogatives; and

o likelihood of theater-wide campaigns versus lesser crises.

UNAAF's emphasis on a single-Service operational chain of command within the unified commands appears inappropriate in the current environment. As the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command has stated:

UNAAF's organizational approach, which preserves division by Service and Service components, plus the stated requirement to preserve uni-Service integrity in the organizational structure, needs to be reviewed in terms of today's required levels of integration and employment of modern weapons systems. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.) The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command has offered a similar recommendation:

We have now had considerable experience with the unified command system and from my parochial perspective I am not convinced that a federated system is as necessary as it once appeared....I would suggest that we should look closely at this arrangement to ensure that it reflects today's environment in terms of the required integration needed to conduct modern warfare and in terms of current political imperatives. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.)

Key among the advantages of this option is that it will enable the unified command system to more effectively meet today's crisis management requirements. In those crises in which the President must retain effective control, there may be a requirement to circumvent portions of the military chain of command. The creation of additional joint organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands may permit more effective military action under the direction of the National Command Authority.

• Option 4C -remove the Service component commanders from the operational chain of command

If the single-Service operational chains of command are an impediment to unification, the Service component commanders should be removed from the chain of command. Such an organizational change would have Service organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels of DoD responsible solely for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Operational matters would be handled solely by joint organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels.

There may, however, be instances in which the unified commander may want to place one or more of his Service component commanders in the chain of command. The CSIS recommendation offers greater flexibility in this regard; it would authorize the unified commander to specify his chain of command depending on the situation. This approach may suffer from its ad hoc nature. While the chain of command could be structured to best meet the situation at hand, there may be drawbacks to having different reporting relationships during crises.

• Option 4D-place greater emphasis on joint training within the unified commands

This option, by itself, is likely to accomplish little. Increased joint training is likely to result only through changes that augment the influence of the unified commanders on resource allocations.

5. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

• Option 5A -correct the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system

This option is the principal focus of Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, therefore, will not be evaluated here.

• Option 5B-seek increased attention to the UCP by OSD and NSC

This is essentially a management issue. If the senior leadership of OSD and NSC do not see the need for or validity of civilian oversight of the Unified Command Plan, there is little that can be done.

• Option 5C -require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on the UCP

A one-time Presidential report on the UCP may or may not prove useful. If the civilian officials responsible for preparing or, more likely, reviewing this report devoted sufficient time and critical attention to the relevant issues, the UCP might receive an objective review. If, however, they merely saw this as another congressional reporting requirement to be met with as little energy as possible, nothing would be gained.

This option also poses the potential for undesirable congressional meddling on UCP issues.

H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the unified and specified commands. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section E (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section G (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).