網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

Secretary Weinberger has stated that there is no need for clarification of the role of the Secretary of Defense:

The chain of command is clear....the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands are fully and directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for carrying out their assigned responsibilities. This role is well understood and does not require statutory clarification. (Answers to Defense Authorization Report Questions).

• Option 1C -establish a position for a second Deputy Secretary of Defense who would be responsible for assisting the Secretary of Defense on military operational matters

Traditionally, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have divided their responsibilities so that the Secretary focused on external (White House, Congress, alliances, etc.) matters and on operational matters while the Deputy Secretary focused on internal DoD management. A second Deputy Secretary focusing on operational matters would, therefore, assume responsibilities currently borne by the Secretary.

On the positive side, a second Deputy Secretary would ensure more attention by a senior civilian official to operational matters. He may be able to lessen the three problems associated with a continuing role for the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command: (1) relative inexperience; (2) limited time; and (3) inadequate staff support. A second Deputy Secretary could become a specialist on operational matters and devote his full attention to these issues. He may also be able to ensure that the Secretary receives a broader and more balanced set of inputs than currently available from the JCS system. He might also become the focal point for OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans.

On the negative side, a second Deputy Secretary would add an additional layer through which the advice of the JCS would be filtered. This might be seen as a further erosion of military representation in DoD decision-making. In addition, the creation of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense and a staff to support him would add to a bureaucracy which may already be too large and cumbersome. A fundamental issue regarding this option is whether the JCS system as currently formulated has served the Secretary of Defense as an effective military staff on operational matters or, if not, whether alternative arrangements for the JCS system could result in more effective staff support for the Secretary. While the evidence clearly suggests that the Secretary has been poorly served by the JCS system on operational matters, the preferable approach would be to correct deficiencies in the JCS system rather than to add a new senior civilian official in an attempt to overcome these shortcomings. A second Deputy Secretary of Defense would perpetuate the long history of creating civilian offices to do the work that joint military offices have failed to effectively perform.

Regarding the relative inexperience and limited time of the Secretary of Defense, the most useful approach may be to lessen other demands on the Secretary's attention to enable him to devote more time to his important chain of command duties. This could be done by (1) reducing his span of control; (2) providing more effective staff support for his mission integration responsibilities which could

permit more effective delegation of decision-making authority; and (3) lessening congressional demands on the Secretary's time.

• Option 1D-place the JCS Chairman in the chain of command Proposals to place the JCS Chairman in the chain of command are based upon (1) concerns about the relative inexperience and limited time of the Secretary of Defense; (2) the utility of having a single military point of contact and a single command voice of higher authority within the Washington headquarters of DoD on operational matters; (3) the need for formal military representation in the Washington headquarters portion of the chain of command; and (4) concerns that command by a committee (the JCS) violates the principal of unity of command.

In a letter dated April 18, 1983 accompanying a legislative proposal, DoD justifies its recommendation that the JCS Chairman be placed in the chain of command in order "to make explicit his functions as a link between the Secretary of Defense and the unified and specified commands." Expanding on this point, the letter adds: "The practice has been for the Secretary of Defense to communicate with the combatant commands through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the proposed legislation would formalize this arrangement..." This is a rather modest rationale for making such a significant change in the chain of command. DoD's rationale encompasses only the second of the four reasons, presented in the preceding paragraph, for placing the JCS Chairman in the chain of command.

There is substantial evidence that command by committee has resulted in inappropriate emphasis on Service interests in the formulation of operational plans. The current limits on the authority of the JCS Chairman preclude him from developing recommendations on operational matters that set aside undue Service parochialism in the search for effective courses of action. Placing the JCS Chairman alone in the chain of command may give him the stature and independent authority necessary to rise above Service parochialism. It may be possible for the Chairman to make objective recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, as a member of the chain of command, the JCS Chairman would clearly become the focal point within the Washington headquarters of DoD for the operational commanders on operational matters. He could also become their advocate on policy and resource allocation issues although that possibility is separate from consideration of the operational chain of command.

Arguments against this option also have merit. Key among these is the view that putting the JCS Chairman in the chain of command would weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense. This option could lead to circumvention of the Secretary and to insulation and isolation of the Secretary from the operational commanders. Should these negative predictions occur, the Secretary's ability to effectively manage DoD would be impaired and civilian control of the military would be weakened.

A second negative argument is that the Secretary of Defense would receive advice only from one uniformed official rather than the multi-Service input from the entire JCS. Given the complexity of the many facets of modern warfare, it would be detrimental to

unnecessarily limit the range of opinions that the Secretary would receive. General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) also argues: "it would be relatively easier to overrule a single military voice than to deal with the concerns of the different Services." (The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future, page 47). Furthermore, a JCS Chairman would come to his position with all of the biases that would result from a lengthy career in one of the four Services. The validity of this argument is somewhat weakened by the fact that the Joint Staff with officers from all Services would continue to raise and address issues from a multi-Service perspective.

A third negative argument is that the Service Chiefs are the most knowledgeable officials on the full spectrum of the capabilities of the forces of their Services. This knowledge can be an important input in the formulation of recommendations on military operational matters. This input would be diminished if only the JCS Chairman were placed in the chain of command even if the JCS Chairman consulted the Service Chiefs before making his recommendations.

A fourth major negative argument is the risks to civilian control that arise from placing one uniformed officer in command of the vast majority of U.S. operational military forces. General Smith sees a greater risk:

The greatest drawback to a single military chief is not, however, that without countervailing forces a "man on horseback" would arise. Rather it is the danger of the politization of the office of the Chairman....The temptation would be for him to be seen too much the spokesman of an Administration in power rather than of the professional military. (The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future, page 47).

• Option 1E -place the JCS in the chain of command

This option would formally recognize the actual implementation of the ambiguous situation created by DoD Directive 5100.1. The JCS, as a corporate body, do now, in the view of many observers, act as a full-fledged member of the operational chain of command. This option would merely legitimize the current situation.

In general, the pros and cons of this option are the exact opposite of those for Option 1D. Arguments in favor of this option include (1) the need to have a multi-Service input on operational matters; (2) the value of involving the most knowledgeable officials on Service capabilities in decisions on operational matters; and (3) the maintenance of a system of checks on the authority of any single military official which would help ensure civilian control.

The negative arguments include (1) violation of the principle of unity of command; (2) the failure of the JCS committee to provide objective advice on military operations; and (3) inappropriate emphasis on Service interests in the formulation of operational plans. There is one negative argument against this option which also applies against Option 1D: putting the JCS in the chain of command would weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense. This is clearly evident at present. The Secretary of Defense is now often insulated and isolated from the operational commanders.

Furthermore, the JCS system has failed to sufficiently interact with the Secretary and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on operational matters. This has ensued from the closed staff nature of the JCS system which results in part from the dual responsibilities of the Service members of the JCS.

• Option 1F-remove the JCS, including the Chairman, from the chain of command

This option would return to the statutory scheme for the chain of command. The operational commanders would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

The arguments in support of this option include (1) strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense which has been diminished by the current role of the JCS in the chain of command; (2) strengthening of civilian control of the military; and (3) improving the link between the Secretary of Defense and the operational commanders.

The negative arguments include: (1) the inexperience of the Secretary of Defense in the command role; (2) limits of the time that the Secretary can devote to this responsibility; and (3) the removal of all formal military representation from the chain of command at the DoD policymaking level.

• Option 1G -make the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system

This option would be based upon the following arguments:

。 the Secretary of Defense should remain in the chain of command and his role therein should be clarified;

o the JCS, including the Chairman, should be removed from the chain of command because a formal role for the corporate body or the Chairman would weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense;

o it would be useful to have a single military point of contact and a single command voice of higher authority within the Washington headquarters of DoD on operational matters;

o there currently is inappropriate emphasis on Service interests in the formulation of operational plans;

o designation of the JCS Chairman as the Secretary of Defense's principal military advisor on operational matters will increase his stature and independent authority and enable him to rise above Service parochialism in rendering advice on operational matters;

o the increased authority of the JCS Chairman will come at the expense of the Service Chiefs and not at the expense of the Secretary of Defense; and

• given the predominance of the JCS system on operational matters, appropriate military representation on operational matters at the policymaking level of DoD is assured even without formal representation in that portion of the chain of command. The Steadman Report made a recommendation similar to this option in support of which it argued:

...a committee structure is not effective for the exercise of military command or management authority. Such authority could be more effectively exercised by the Chairman, who in being so empowered, should also be directed to act in consultation with the other JCS members when time permits. (page 35) There are several arguments in opposition to this option. First, with his increased authority, the JCS Chairman may be able to more effectively compete with the Secretary of Defense for power and influence. The concentration of power in the hands of one senior military official, according to this argument, would curtail the system of checks inherent in the JCS.

This argument seems to have little merit. It appears to say in analogy: don't create a Deputy Secretary of Defense because he would become a competing force to the Secretary of Defense. Obviously, the personal relationship established between the Secretary and the JCS Chairman would be the key ingredient in determining the utility of this organizational approach.

Other negative arguments are that (1) the Secretary of Defense may not consistently receive a multi-Service input from the entire JCS; (2) the Service Chiefs, who are the most knowledgeable officials on the full spectrum of the capabilities of the forces of their Services, would have a diminished input on operational matters; and (3) the position of JCS Chairman could become politicized.

2. OPTIONS For Dealing WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE WEAK AUTHORITY OF UNIFIED COMMANDERS OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

• Option 2A -revise UNAAF to lessen the restrictions on the authority of the unified commanders.

While there are disagreements as to whether JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), overly restricts the authority of the unified commanders, the more convincing arguments are that it does. As UNAAF delineates the purpose and basis on which unified commands are formed, it is the starting point for improved command relationships within the unified commands.

The basic relationships in UNAAF have not been altered since the Key West Agreement of 1948. Given the experience with unified command since that time, a careful examination of UNAAF seems appropriate.

• Option 2B -authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders

The advantage of this option is that it is more likely to ensure subordinate commanders who are fully supportive and capable of successfully interacting with the unified commander. Given the importance of these relationships, the unified commander should be given wide discretion in selecting his immediate subordinate commanders.

On the negative side, the Services may lose the influence associated with independent appointments of Service component_commanders. Moreover, the unified commander may select subordinates who share his biases and thus may be offered less than the full range of opinions on issues affecting the unified command.

« 上一頁繼續 »