While Options 1B and 1F would solve the problem of the confused chain of command, they would not clarify how the Secretary of Defense would exercise his command authority. This option proposes that the Secretary would use the JCS Chairman as his principal military advisor on operational matters. Furthermore, the JCS Chairman would solely be responsible for transmitting the orders of the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense to the operational commanders. Despite these responsibilities, it would be absolutely clear that the JCS Chairman would not be part of the operational chain of command. He would provide advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, but the command line would run directly from the Secretary to the operational commanders.

In prescribing the duties of his principal military advisor on operational matters, the Secretary of Defense may or may not want to designate the JCS Chairman as the focal point in the Washington headquarters of DoD for the operational commanders on operational matters.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2-WEAK AUTHORITY OF UNIFIED COMMANDERS OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

Five options have been developed to strengthen the authority of the unified commanders over their Service component commands. The first would revise JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), to lessen the restrictions placed upon the authority of the unified commanders. The second option would authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders. The third option would place the unified commander in the logistical chain of command. The fourth option would be to eliminate the Service component commands and to make them part of the joint staff serving the unified commander. The last option is to colocate the unified commander and his Service component commands.

• Option 2A -revise UNAAF to lessen the restrictions on the authority of the unified commanders

This option would require an extensive revision of UNAAF to give the unified commanders authority over their Service component commands that is consistent with their mission responsibilities and with the concept of unified command.

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• Option 2B -authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders

Currently, the unified commanders have minimal, if any, input into the assignment of their Service component commanders. These assignments are made by the Services. Under this option, the unified commanders would be given the authority to select their Service component commanders and to replace them should the need arise.

• Option 2C-require the Service component commands to communicate with their Service headquarters on critical resource issues through their unified commander

Under this option, the unified commander would be placed in the logistical chain of command on critical issues. The link between the Washington headquarters of the Military Departments and Service

component commands would be weakened, and the unified commander would have greater control and influence over his subordinate commands.

• Option 2D -eliminate the Service component commands and make them part of the joint staff serving the unified command

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If less drastic changes would not provide the unified commander with sufficient authority over his Service component commands, it may be necessary to consolidate these commands with the joint staff of the unified commander.

The Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel made this exact recommendation:

The Unified Commanders should be given unfragmented command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders of component commands should be redesignated Deputies to the commander of the appropriate Unified Command, in order to make it unmistakably clear that the combatant forces are in the chain of command which runs exclusively through the Unified Commander. (page 57)

The Final Report of the Defense Organization Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), entitled Toward a More Effective Defense, made the same recommendation:

The component commanders should not be service representatives with independent authority. Instead, the relationship between a unified commander and his service component commanders should be that of a commander and his deputies for air, land, and sea operations. (page 21)

• Option 2E -colocate the unified commander and his Service component commands

The geographic separation of the unified commander and his Service component commands serves to lessen his authority and control over them. Colocation could be an effective means of strengthening the authority of the unified commander.

3. PROBLEM AREA #3-IMBALANCE BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER RESOURCE DECISIONS

The principal thrust of efforts to correct this problem is to strengthen the role of the unified commanders in policymaking and resource allocation. This idea has been presented in a number of studies. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended that:

The Unified Commanders should be given express responsibility and capability for making recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations, for operational capabilities objectives and for allocations of force structures needed for the effective accomplishment of the missions assigned to their Commands. (page 5)

Similarly, the National Military Command Structure Study recommended:

That the role of the CINCS be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of forces under his command. (page 38)

While there is general agreement on the need to strengthen the link between the unified commanders and the DoD policymaking level, how such a proposal could be implemented has not been discussed in previous studies.

The eight options developed to lessen this problem area can be grouped into four categories: (1) increase the stature of the unified commanders; (2) strengthen the ability of the JCS system to represent the unified commanders; (3) strengthen the ability of OSD to represent the unified commanders; and (4) develop new procedural mechanisms to augment the influence of the unified commanders over resource allocations or to increase the level of resources directly under the control of the unified commanders.

• Option 3A-increase the stature of the unified commanders by making them more senior in order of rank than the Service Chiefs

The U.S. military establishment has often had difficulty, especially in wartime, in determining the relative power and influence that should be assigned to Service Chiefs and to field commanders. At present, the Service Chiefs are more senior than the unified commanders. This relative order of rank may lessen the authority of the unified commanders and contribute to the problem of insufficient authority over resource decisions.

This option would alter the relative order of rank. The JCS Chairman would continue to be the most senior U.S. military official. The unified commanders would be next in terms of order of rank. The Service Chiefs would follow the unified commanders in seniority. The status of the specified commanders in order of rank would not change under this option.

• Option 3B -strengthen the capabilities of the Joint Staff to do resource analysis

Part of the inability of the JCS to make meaningful programmatic inputs results from a lack of Joint Staff capabilities for independent resource analysis. Strengthened Joint Staff capabilities in this area may permit a more persuasive input from the JCS system in support of the unified command perspective. An initiative to provide for improved resource analysis capabilities has already been taken in the Joint Staff through establishment of the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency.

• Option 3C-enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman

The thrust of this option is to enable the JCS Chairman to be better able to represent cross-Service issues that are of great importance to the operational commands, especially the unified commands. Specific actions to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman are presented in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• Option 3D more clearly link the JCS Chairman with the operational commanders

This could be done by clarifying the operational or administrative chain of command and associated responsibilities. The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 amended section 124 of title 10, United States Code, to strengthen the role of the JCS Chairman as the spokesman for the operational commanders. The specific language was:

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Chairman acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements. (page 126)

• Option 3E -create OJCS offices to represent the unified commanders on a day-to-day basis on policy and resource allocation issues

If the OJCS were organized on a mission basis (Option 1K of Chapter 4), the mission-oriented offices could perform this task. If not, new offices, similar to the now abolished Washington Liaison Office of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, would have to be created within OJCS. To be able to effectively represent the unified commanders, these offices would require unimpeded access to the JCS Chairman.

• Option 3F have OSD mission-oriented offices represent the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues If new OSD mission-oriented offices headed by under or assistant secretaries were created, the unified commands would have a single point of contact within OSD on policy and resource allocation issues. Under this option, the policy and resource allocation inputs of the unified commands would be directed to principal OSD advisors of the Secretary of Defense who would share a mission and multi-Service perspective with the unified commands.

• Option 3G -have the operational commanders submit operational Program Objective Memoranda

Currently, the resource allocation process is centered around Program Objective Memoranda (POM's) submitted by the Military Departments. This option proposes the submission of POM's by the operational commanders identifying primarily the readiness and sustainability resource needs of their entire commands. These POM's could also focus on procurement requirements that cross Service lines, such as communications programs. These POM's would represent a formal input by the operational commanders and would highlight cross-Service considerations to counterbalance the single-Service perspective of the Military Department POM's. The CSIS report, Toward a More Effective Defense, includes this option in its recommendations:

The military division of labor between force-maintaining and force-operating structures should be reflected in the programming and budgeting processes. Specifically, we propose that a separate program and budget be established for the operational forces that would be prepared and executed by the unified and specified commanders under the supervision of the chairman of the JCS. Under this proposal, each service would continue to produce its program and budget for procurement, re

search and development, training, and associated operational and personnel costs. But, many of the in-theater operating costs of the service components of the unified and specified commands would be shifted to a new joint account. This separate "readiness" program and budget would include such items as operating and maintenance expenses, in-theater training and exercise costs, certain military construction costs (ammunition storage, for example), and some family housing costs. The specific items that would be included in the new account would be determined on the basis of a line-by-line review of current department accounts. (page 19)

• Option 3H -approve the use of the CINC Readiness Fund

In both fiscal years 1983 and 1984, the Department of Defense requested, but the Congress denied, funding of $100 million for the CINC Readiness Fund. The CINC Readiness Fund was intended to provide unified commanders with a source of funds to meet_unanticipated, unprogrammed, urgent, near-term readiness and warfighting requirements. DoD's rationale for such a fund was based upon the financial dependence of the unified commands on Service components to meet their unprogrammed requirements and upon the difficulties associated with the reprogramming and supplemental processes.

In fiscal year 1985, a similar funding request for $50 million was made by DoD under a program entitled JCS Special Fund. This funding request was also denied by the Congress. However, the Congress did provide authority for the Secretary of Defense to make available from Operation and Maintenance authorization funds sums necessary to meet the contingency requirements of the unified and specified commands. Specifically, Section 304 of the DoD Authorization Act, 1985 provides:

CONTINGENCY FUNDS FOR THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

Sec. 304. The Secretary of Defense may make available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, out of any funds appropriated pursuant to the authorizations contained in section 301 for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, such sums as may be necessary to meet unforeseen and contingent requirements of the unified and specified commands of the Armed Forces. While this provision is a recognition that the unified commands are too dependent on the independent programmatic and financial decisions of their Service components, it also represents an indication that the Congress is not convinced of the need for separate and distinct appropriations to meet the unprogrammed requirements of the operational commanders.

This option would endorse the concept of the CINC Readiness Fund/JCS Special Fund as a means of providing the operational commanders with greater influence over resources.

4. PROBLEM AREA #4-ABSENCE OF UNIFICATION BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

Four options have been developed to lessen this problem area.