UNAAF's requirement that "within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through Service component commanders" (page 37) with certain exceptions is another inhibition on unification. By insisting on single-Service operational chains of command within the unified commands, UNAAF ensures that the unified commands will remain a loose confederation of single-Service forces.

In the questions in the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, the unified commanders were asked:

Does UNAAF create obstacles to greater and necessary unification in your command?

Despite substantial evidence that UNAAF is an obstacle to unification, four of the unified commanders answered no. In contrast, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command stated:

In essence, UNAAF provisions for single-Service operational chains of command within the unified commands require the unified command to remain a rather loose confederation of single-Service forces.

Similarly, the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command argues:

As derived from the law and presently constituted, UNAAF inhibits the unification of command demanded by modern ways and means of warfighting....UNAAF today is less relevant in that it contemplates:

a. A clear "peace/war" distinction (with limited CINC authority in "peacetime");

b. Conventional war only (the least prevalent form of conflict since World War II); and.

c. The Service structures fighting the war with unification only at the top.

While the Services have agreed to the concept of unified command, they have placed strict limits on how much unification could be achieved. Command by mutual cooperation among the Services continues to be the dominant arrangement in U.S. operational commands, just as it was prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

b. Absence of Agreement on Appropriate Command Relationships, Especially Concerning the Principle of Unity of Command

In his Maxims of War, Napoleon in 1831 stated: "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command". The literature of warfare is filled with similar references to the importance of unity of command. Despite substantial historical evidence, the Department of Defense has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command.

The lack of unity of command was a fundamental ingredient of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In response, the Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack listed as its first recommendation:

That immediate action be taken to ensure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts. (page 252)

The word "outposts" conveys the sense that the Congress meant unity at the level where an attack is possible. The Congress did not seem to mean unity only at some distant unified command headquarters.

Unity of command has been a principle of war in the U.S. Army since the early 1920's. While unity of command has often been identified as a fundamental principle for the joint employment of U.S. military forces, it remains a vague concept. For example, JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, does not define the term "unity of command." The JCS do, along with the Air Force, employ the term "unity of effort" while the Navy and Marine Corps do not refer to the concepts of unity of command or unity of effort in their doctrinal writings. Referring to the absence of explicit discussion of the concept of unity of command in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, has stated:

...Whereas unity of command is not explicitly treated in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, it is an underlying foundation. (Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, June 4, 1985)

Given the importance of the concept of unity of command, explicit and continuous reference to it in all doctrinal writings would appear to be highly desirable. The limited attention that unity of command receives in JCS and Service writings suggests that (1) it is not a fundamental principle for joint employment of U.S. forces or (2) there is disagreement on the meaning of this concept. The Army defines unity of command as follows:

For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander....This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the strategic level, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow there from. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.

In the tactical dimension, it is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal. (Field Manual 100-1, August 1981, page 16)

In their paper, Unity of Command-Does It Exist in the Field?, Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff examine the extent to which the concept of unity of command is being implemented in the field. Based upon inputs from 112 military officers within all six unified commands, the paper, published in April 1983, concluded that "unity of command does not exist in the field today." (page IV-2) This conclusion was supported by two findings: (1) unity of command is still seen as an essential concept in the field; and (2) despite its importance, most professionals feel that unity of command (UOC) is not widespread in their organizations. Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff add the following comments to these findings:

At least four major studies since 1974 have lamented the lack of UOC. Despite attention, the problem persists. During the field interviews, we heard considerable concern expressed about complicated command relationships, especially those deriving from "dual-hatted" sub-unified commands, and a lack of control over "in-support-of" forces. Recently, one CINC bluntly asserted UOC does not exist. "Without it," he continued, "the probability of effective wartime action is diminished." (page III-7)

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger reached a similar conclusion:

...In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of "unity of command" is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the Service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command. (page 187)

The concept of “in-support-of" forces deserves special attention because it appears to undermine the concept of unity of command. JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines "in support of" as follows:

Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control. (page 176) While "in-support-of" forces could be those of any Service, only U.S. naval forces have traditionally used this concept. Naval forces have not been placed under the operational control of the commander of the joint operation, but rather have been "in-support-of" the joint operation. This concept essentially means divided command.

In sum, the doctrinal writings of the U.S. military do not clarify or emphasize the concept of unity of command. Furthermore, by embracing the concept of "in-support-of" forces, doctrinal writings undermine unity of command. Reflecting these conceptual disagreements, there is evidence that unity of command does not exist within the six unified commands. In this regard, it is absolutely clear that the congressional recommendation "that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts" has not been implemented.

5. ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The fifth problem area is the current operational command configuration. As mentioned previously, the President has the statutory authority to establish unified and specified commands-"combatant" commands in the words of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. The current operational command arrangement is essentially an evolutionary one, building on the base that existed at the end of World War II. As U.S. worldwide national security interests have waxed and waned, old commands have been eliminated and new commands created. If one were to ignore the current Unified Command Plan and start from scratch to design a new plan, it might well differ significantly from the one that exists today. Clearly, today's worldwide strategic environment is drastically different from the one that existed at the end of World War II.

Many factors must be taken into consideration when contemplating what the operational command structure might look like. Management principles such as a clear chain of command, span of control, organizational layering, grade structure, and combat to support ratio must be considered. The political dimension-international treaty arrangements, the perceptions of foreign governments, world opinion, and the inevitable interservice rivalriesmust inevitably receive great weight.

Many issues have been raised throughout the literature as various authors have analyzed the current Unified Command Plan:

• Should USEUCOM's responsibilities in the Middle East and Africa be assigned to other commands?

• Does USREDČOM have a valid mission?

• Should USREDCOM be assigned responsibility for large land areas (e.g., Africa and South America)?

• Should USLANTCOM and USPACOM be eliminated?

• Should Alaska be assigned to USPACOM?

• Should the geographical boundaries between USPACOM and USCENTCOM be adjusted to give USCENTCOM responsibility for the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean?

• Should the geographical boundaries between USLANTCOM and USSOUTHCOM be adjusted to give USSOUTHCOM responsibility for the Caribbean?

• Should the Navy's strategic submarine forces and the Army's ballistic missile defense effort be combined with SAC to create a unified Strategic Command?

• Should a Military Transportation Command be created as a unified command?

While these issues may be important, it is not the intent of this study to analyze or reach any conclusions on them. There are more appropriate fora in the Executive Branch for such efforts.

The problem with the Unified Command Plan (UCP) arises because UCP issues are not receiving an objective review in the Executive Branch. There are two causes of this problem: institutional deficiencies of the JCS system and limited review of the UCP by OSD and the National Security Council (NSC).

a. Institutional Deficiencies of the JCS System

The only forum which actively reviews the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the JCS. As in other areas with important multiService considerations, the JCS are incapable of non-parochial evaluation of the UCP. The inability of the JCS to objectively review command arrangements for the Southwest Asia region is a recent example of their failure to adequately address difficult unified command issues. In this instance, the members of the JCS were apparently more interested in protecting parochial Service interests than in devising the most effective command arrangements for defense of Southwest Asia. The Army and Air Force wanted the new command to be a sub-unified command under USEUCOM. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps wanted the new command to be a subunified command under USPACOM. The Secretary of Defense rejected these parochial positions and created a new, separate unified command, the U.S. Central Command.

Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier have commented on the negative effect of the institutional deficiencies of the JCS on the review of the UCP:

Historically, within the military bureaucracy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has usually been reluctant to open the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to change because of the concern that it could result in dysfunctional battles between the Services as they attempt to stake out positions. Only role and mission battles have proven to be more divisive. Thus, it can be anticipated that suggestions for bold innovative changes will not only encounter the normal bureaucratic resistance, but will also be subject to highly emotional, however wellmeaning, attacks by the military hierarchy. Of perhaps even more concern is the fact that it will be difficult to differentiate between valid criticism and criticism based on a desire to protect parochial or bureaucratic interests. (page 12)

b. Limited Review of the UCP by OSD and NSC

As the UCP is a formal document prepared by the JCS, OSD and NSC have played only a limited role in reviewing the work of the JCS. Given the inability of the JCS system to objectively review the UCP, the passive role of OSD and NSC precludes a more useful and comprehensive consideration of UCP issues.

6. UNNECESSARY MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING CRISES The convergence of two trends addressed in Section C of this chapter has contributed to this problem area. Specifically, improvements in communications capabilities and the requirement for increased presidential control during certain crises have created an environment that promotes micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the National Command Authority (NCA). There has also been an occasional problem within the NCA when the Secretary of Defense has been circumvented, usually by presidential advisors, on operational command matters. For simplicity, micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the NCA will often be termed "overinvolvement" in the remainder of this subsection.