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ice Chiefs, they are accorded no role in the chain of command. In reality, however, they have substantial influence over the operational commanders. The forces of each operational command are dominated, or nearly so, by units of one of the Services. In each case, the operational commander is normally appointed from the Service with the dominant forces. The only exception to this rule is the U.S. Central Command where command alternates between the Army and Marine Corps. Given his substantial dependence on one Service for resources necessary to execute his missions, an operational commander can be greatly influenced by the Chief of Staff of that Service.

For example, it is highly unlikely that the Commanders of the U.S. Atlantic Command or the U.S. Pacific Command would take a potentially controversial action in peacetime without conferring with the Chief of Naval Operations. Likewise, the Commander of the U.S. European Command would probably seek, at least, the Army Chief of Staff's informal approval before taking any action affecting Army divisions forward deployed in Europe. Therefore, while the Chiefs of the respective Services are not formally in the chain of command as individuals, by virtue of the fact that they control the resources, they certainly are key participants in operational command matters.

2. WEAK AUTHORITY OF UNIFIED COMMANDERS OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

Within the unified commands, the chains of command vary. In four of the six commands, the unified commander deals only with Service component commands. In USLANTCOM and USPĂCOM, however, the unified commander deals not only with Service component commanders, but also with commanders of subordinate unified (sub-unified) commands. However, for the most part, all units below the unified commanders, including the sub-unified commands, are essentially single Service commands.

The authority of unified commanders over their Service component commands is weak. There are two basic causes of this problem: (1) restrictions placed upon the authority of unified commanders in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) and (2) dependence of the Service component commands on their Services for resources.

a. Restrictions of UNAAF

The origins of today's UNAAF lie in the Key West Agreement of 1948. At that time, the abiding interest of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was to protect the integrity of their Service operations in the multi-Service operational commands. The particular device adopted to protect Service integrity was the "Service component command." The authorities of the Service component commander versus those of the unified commander, as spelled out in 1948, have survived essentially unchanged in today's UNAAF.

The language of limitation on the authority of the unified commander is pervasive in UNAAF. Key among examples of limitation is the following:

...Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the Service component commanders...or through the commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the Service components or other subordinate commands. In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service component commanders....Commanders of Service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of Service on matters which are the responsibilities of the Military Department and Services. (page 46)

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Retired) in his book, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, comments on the impact of the UÑAAF's limitations on the unified commanders:

Service component commanders, supported by the Service staffs who largely retain the abiding concerns of the 1940s for protecting their Service's integrity and, supported by UNAAF, become powers with whom the multiservice commander conducts negotiations as equals more than as subordinates. (page 3-58)

The Conference Committee Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1985 (Report No. 98-1080) posed a number of questions to be answered by the six unified commanders. Answers were forwarded to the Senate Committee on Armed Services by Secretary Weinberger on March 5, 1985. Given the substantial evidence of UNAAF restrictions on the authority of the unified commands, one of the questions was:

Does UNAAF overly-restrict your authority over your Service component commanders?

Four of the unified commanders (Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), and Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH)) answered this question in the negative. In contrast, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) responded as follows:

JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), establishes the organization for unified commands. Although this organization is intended to optimize wartime employment of combat forces furnished by the Services, it does go to some length to protect the integrity of individual Service operations within multi-Service operational commands. In doing so, it places certain limits on the authority of the unified commander that could affect efficient operations (combat or otherwise). Similarly, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCRED) stated:

UNAAF philosophically emphasizes Service vice joint matters and therefore, results in optimization of Service roles and missions. The results of Service organization, training, and equipping of their forces may not meet operational requirements of the CINC, a situation which is exacerbated by our strategic planning arrangements.

b. Dependence of the Service Component Commanders on Their Services for Resources

Concerning the logistical chain of command, UNAAF provides as follows:

The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of unified and specified commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. This chain embraces the preparation of military forces and their administration and support. (page 7)

The fact that the logistical chain of command runs around the unified commander greatly weakens his authority over his Service component commands. More specifically, Service component_commanders have divided loyalties: while they must fight the battle for the unified commander, they must work through their Services to provide, train, and equip the forces in their component commands. Dependence of a component commander on resource allocations from his Service produces close ties to that Service and strong loyalties to the Service and its Chief of Staff. In addition, future promotions and assignments of component commanders are determined by the Service Chiefs and not by the unified commanders. Therefore, a unified commander must depend on subordinate commanders who in reality have more than one superior.

Moreover, Service component commanders have one great advantage over their unified commander, who is nominally their superior: they control Service resources in personnel and money. By comparison, the unified commander's resources are few. This makes it difficult for the unified commander to influence the development of the capabilities of the forces of his command.

Thus, while the unified commanders are the only military commanders who devote full time to "joint" command, they are sandwiched between powerful structures above and below that encourage single-Service perspectives over a multi-Service approach. As a result, unified commanders have no authority to override any strongly held, single-Service positions even if such is necessary in the interests of the multi-Service, unified command mission.

3. IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER RESOURCE DECISIONS

The unified commanders have limited ability to influence the allocation of resources either to their commands or within their commands. From the perspective of the unified commanders, the resource allocation process is essentially executed by the Services. The unified commander must plan to accomplish his mission with resources provided by the Services through a process defended and

executed by the Services. In Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, General Cushman succinctly states this problem:

Responsible senior officers who are in the operational chain of command below the President and the Secretary of Defense, and who will be held accountable in the event of command and control failure, have not been given the means necessary to meet their responsibility and accountability. (page 1-21) While General Cushman refers only to resources for the command and control function, the absence of influence by the unified commanders applies to all resources allocated to their commands.

The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 noted the limited influence of the unified commanders in the resource allocation process:

Today, the CINCs are at best only superficially involved in many things critical to their commands. They play almost no role in the programming and budgeting process (though they recently were invited by the Secretary to participate occasionally in meetings of the Defense Resources Board) and have little influence in the JCS force allocation process. In addition, they are not strongly supported by either the Services or the Joint Staff. (page 32)

The limited input of unified commanders in policy and resource allocation decisions is also addressed in the chapter dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In that context, this limited input from the mission-oriented unified commanders reduces the integrating staff support readily available to the Secretary of Defense.

In the answers_submitted to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, the majority of the unified commanders held that there was an imbalance between their responsibilities and accountability and their influence over resource decisions. Only the Commander of the Central Command stated that such an imbalance did not exist while the Commnders of the Atlantic and Southern Commands state that Secretary Taft's new initiatives in the Defense Resources Board program review and Program Objective Memoranda (POM) development process should help redress previous imbalances. These initiatives are discussed in a subsequent portion of this section. The three other unified commanders state:

Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command: Yes, there is an imbalance between my responsibilities and accountability as a unified operational commander and my influence on resource decisions.... The degree of effectiveness we have in readiness, sustainability, and transition to war is in substantial part, a matter of resources.

Commander in Chief of the European Command: On occasion the results of major Service decisions, not previously coordinated with me, have affected my ability to execute USPACOM strategy. In some instances I have learned about Service initiatives, which ultimately impacted on PACOM's war fighting capabilities, after the fact during POM deliberations....In essence, some Service POM decisions altered or affected my strategy without adequate concern for PACOM's overall theater requirements.

Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command: There is an imbalance between my operational responsibilities and influence over resource decision. . . . USCINRED has limited influence on resource allocations and limited control over operations funds, particularly crucial in the area of training.

Influence over resource decisions is not a problem for the specified commanders because their requirements are directly incorporated into the Air Force POM where they have direct influence. This fact was confirmed by the answers provided by the Commanders in Chief of the Aerospace Defense Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the Strategic Air Command to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985. There are essentially four causes of the problem of the imbalance between the responsibilities and influence of the unified command

ers.

a. Difficulty of the Unified Commanders to Influence the Policymaking Level of DoD

In order to influence the allocation of resources to his command and policies affecting his command, a unified commander must work through the Military Departments, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The geographic separation of the unified commanders from the policymaking level of DoD makes them dependent upon other officials to represent their views. They have had little success in obtaining adequate representation. As General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, USCINCEUR, expressed in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on November 3, 1983:

The cross-service or joint views have a smaller constituency and limited formality of expression in the current system. (Part 7, page 278)

The current Administration, recognizing the inadequacy of unified command representation in the Pentagon, has improved the situation by giving the operational commanders a direct voice in the policy and resource allocation processes. The operational commanders now formally participate in the PPBS process by appearing twice a year before the Defense Resources Board. While this biannual input from the operational commanders is a new dimension in the policy and resource allocation processes, it falls far short of providing the unified commanders with a substantial and continuing influence in the allocation of resources to their commands.

Recognizing this fact, Secretary Taft issued on November 14, 1984 a memorandum on "Enhancement of the CINCs' Role in the PPBS". Secretary Taft's memorandum directs the following actions:

• preparation by the operational commanders of their high priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints;

• direct communications between the operational commanders and the Military Departments to resolve problems and concerns during the development of Program Objective Memoranda (POM's);

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