In his paper, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," Alexander L. George discusses the requirement for presidential control during crises:

That an in-built tension exists between political-diplomatic and military considerations in efforts to manage crises and, similarly, in efforts to keep limited conflicts from escalating has long been recognized. This problem was forced upon the consciousness of American leaders and strategic analysts during the course of the Korean War and quickly led to recognition of the necessity for maintaining presidential control and asserting political constraints on both the strategy and, often, the tactical operations of a theatre commander. The Korean War taught not only President Truman but all succeeding administrations as well that the president's responsibility does not stop with establishing the political objectives to be pursued in a conflict; he must also maintain firm control over the level of costs and risks that are acceptable in pursuing those objectives. To this end the president must be willing to intervene on a timely basis in the determination of operational military plans and in aspects of their implementation. This, in turn, raises the danger of 'micro-management' of crises and adds to the dilemmas of crisis management. (Survival, Volume 26, September/October 1984, page 224)

George also argues that one of the major lessons of the Cuban missile crisis was that

the requirements for prudent crisis management may indeed seriously conflict with and, in the interest of avoiding war, may have to be given priority over some of the standard requirements of conventional military strategy. (page 223) Essentially, the United States must seek to manage certain crises with a political-military strategy which differs in important respects from conventional military strategy.

Conventional military strategy focuses upon making the most efficient use of available military forces to achieve assigned military objectives. In contrast, a political-military, or coercive diplomatic, strategy seeks to achieve political objectives and uses some mix and sequencing of persuasion, coercive threats or actions, accommodative offers, and concessions. In his paper, George describes a coercive diplomatic strategy as follows:

Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the opponent to do something instead of bludgeoning him into doing so. Coercive diplomatic strategy focuses upon the task of affecting the opponent's will and his utility calculations rather than negating his military capabilities....Relying upon a combination of persuasion, accommodation, and coercion, diplomatic strategy offers the possibility of achieving one's objectives economically, with little bloodshed, fewer psychological and political costs, and often with much less risk of escalation. (page 225) While the need for a coercive diplomatic strategy and presidential control of its formulation and implementation is undeniable especially in crises involving, either directly or indirectly, the United

States and the Soviet Union, this requirement is little understood and often criticized when employed by the President. The criticisms focus upon the constraints that a coercive diplomatic strategy places upon execution of a conventional military strategy. In addition, there is also criticism —which is sometimes valid -of micro-management of tactical operations by the National Command Authority. While these criticisms may have some validity, the overwhelming evidence supports the need for increased presidential control in managing crises that involve the superpowers.

Criticisms of increased presidential control during the nuclear era -whether associated with conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere need to be placed in a historical context. Carl von Clausewitz's On War, first published in 1832, clearly indicates that "harmful political influence on the management of war" has been a contentious issue throughout modern history. Clausewitz found little logic in these criticisms of political influence.

Clausewitz's view of war as an instrument of policy are reflected in the following:

...war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.

...war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.

...The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. (On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, page 605)

...If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. (page 606)

Complementing these fundamental concepts, Clausewitz presents his views on political considerations in the conduct of war:

Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle. (page 606)

...We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice. But it makes even less sense for theoreticians to assert that all available military resources should be put at the disposal of the commander so that on their basis he can draw up purely military plans for a war or a campaign. It is in any case a matter of common experience that despite the great variety and development of modern war its major lines are still laid down by governments; in other words, if we are to be technical about it, by a purely political and not a military body.

This is as it should be. No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence

on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right-that is, successfulany intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong. (pages 607-608)

Clausewitz's views -written more than 150 years ago -appear to be focused on refuting criticisms of political influences on war that have been frequently and strongly voiced in the last 30 years. On War gives an important historical context to the current debate.

Although many of the issues associated with the effective exercise of this control by the President are beyond the scope of this study, the extent to which the unified commands are structured and prepared to effectively respond to current crisis management requirements is not. The major question which emerges is: has the unified command system, developed primarily in the late 1940's, adapted effectively to meet today's crisis management requirements? Subsequent portions of this chapter attempt to answer this question.

D. THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

As mentioned previously, there are ten U.S.-only operational commands in existence today. Due to its brief existence, the U.S. Space Command is not included in this discussion. Figure 5-1 is an unclassified representation of the current geographic boundaries of the nine U.S. commands. (The precise geographic boundaries found in the Unified Command Plan are classified.) In addition, the United States participates in four multinational operational commands.

1. Unified Commands

a. U.S. European Command

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is commanded by General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (USCINCEUR). General Rogers also commands the multinational command, Allied Command, Europe, with headquarters in Mons, Belgium. If a war were fought in Europe, the forces of all allied nations would be commanded by General Rogers as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); the U.S. force contribution would come from USEUCOM. As USCINCEUR, General Rogers has three Service component commands that report to him: U.S. Naval Forces, Europe; U.S. Army, Europe; and U.S. Air Forces, Europe. Chart 5-2 shows the command relationships for the U.S. European Command and the NATO responsibilities of these commands.