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In general, the current operational command structure remains basically the one that emerged from World War II with some consolidation taking place and with new commands added to meet emerging requirements. Chart 5-1 shows the history of these changes.

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2. Broadening of the Missions of the Operational Commands

The operational commands were formed at a time when security threats to the United States were clear and few in number. The international security environment has become much more complex since 1947 due to the buildup and growing reach of Soviet military power, a proliferation of threats to Western interests, and a diffusion of power and influence in the world. These trends have made today's task of protecting U.S. worldwide interests which in themselves have grown considerably exceedingly more complex and demanding than in the immediate postwar period. As a result, the operational commands have experienced a substantial broadening of their missions. Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier summarize this trend in their paper, "Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System":

Today, however, neither the objectives nor the threat can be so clear and so direct; therefore, a unified commander must maintain both the flexibility and the capability to orchestrate warfare throughout the conflict spectrum. (page 5)

In today's world, the missions of the operational command encompass a wide spectrum, from emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals to the launching of nuclear weapons. This broadening of missions is a trend of considerable significance in the examination of (1) the adequacy of the operational command structure and (2) the organization and command arrangements of the operational commands. Changes in the international security environment that have led to a broadening of operational command missions are briefly described below.

a. Widening Geographic Extent of the U.S.-Soviet Military Competition

The growth of Soviet military power is the most ominous trend in the international security environment that faces the United States. During the past two decades, the military dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power have shifted adversely for the United States.

The geographic scope of challenges to U.S. and Western security interests has expanded substantially over the past decade, due in part to the growing reach of Soviet military power. The competition for power and influence between the United States and the Soviet Union has become truly global in nature. A new boldness and adventurism in Soviet policy toward the Third World has resulted in the proliferation of threats to U.S. interests in distant world areas which are outside the traditional system of Western alliances. In addition, while the improved ability of Soviet forces to operate in non-contiguous areas heightens the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations, more immediate threats to U.S. interests have risen from the aggressive behavior of Soviet clients such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya.

b. Proliferation of Threats to Western Interests

The proliferation of relatively inexpensive, highly destructive, and effective weapons to Third World countries has increased the likelihood and intensity of regional conflicts. Given modern tech

nologies, states involved in regional rivalries and terrorist groups may find it easier to use force. Such relatively low intensity conflicts as the war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war may be the most likely future challenge to U.S. military forces.

For a variety of reasons, the Third World is increasing its purchases of sophisticated military equipment and, in the process, is becoming more heavily and lethally armed. This spread of military technology means that the United States may face increasingly effective military threats from a variety of Third World sources.

Economic issues have always played an important role in a nation's security policy. The trend over the past decade toward increased economic interdependence leaves national economies more vulnerable to the workings of the international economy. Short of costly neo-mercantilist strategies, this increasing economic interdependence will continue to make the free flow of raw materials and trade of significant importance to the Western World.

c. Diffusion of Power and Influence in the World

Against a backdrop of rising militarism, increasing instability, and economic interdependence, the past 20 years have witnessed a significant diffusion of political, military, and economic power and influence in the world. This diffusion has contributed to an overall weakening of the international order.

The gradual weakening of the political cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance is one example of this process; another very different example is the growing signs of serious political strains and popular discontent in the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In the past 20 years, the world's economic order has also changed. Most notable in this regard has been the new economic strength of oil-rich nations and the influence that they have over the world's economy.

Adding to the diffusion of power has been the rise in the political influence and military strength of a growing number of regional powers including India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa. Within their immediate areas, these regional powers can exert considerable influence on regional policies and actions at the expense of the superpowers and other leading nations.

An increase in nationalism in Third World countries has also served to lessen traditional influences. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, which tragically found expression in the revolution in Iran, has produced another force which often conflicts with Western interests.

In general terms, given this diffusion of power and influence, the traditional instruments of power, force, and economic inducements have become more costly and difficult for great powers, particularly democratic ones, to apply. The increased complexity of world politics has reduced the potential of any one country to exercise control over the whole system.

3. Effect of Improved Communications Capabilities on Command and Control Centralization

The original postwar concept for the unified commands envisioned decentralized execution of joint military operations. However, improvements in communications capabilities have, in recent

years, enabled the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense) to effectively control forward deployed military forces.

Improved communications have led to operational centralization that was not anticipated at the time that the unified command concept was developed. Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier comment on this trend:

the unified command has become the conduit for centralized ad hoc control from Washington over even the most minute aspect of tactical execution. ("Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System", page 6)

They cite the experience of various crises in the mid-1970's Arab-Israeli War (1973), Mayaguez incident (1975), Korean tree cutting incident (1976), Lebanon evacuation (1977), and the Ethiopian evacuation (1977) -as corroboration of this conclusion. The most well-known instance of centralized control from Washington occurred after Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier had written their paper: the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980. The disastrous failure of this operation focused attention on the proper role of the National Command Authority in controlling tactical operations.

Another aspect of centralized control has been the occasional circumvention of portions of the military chain of command in the field. In certain crises, the National Command Authority has not made use of the intermediate echelons which are part of institutional command arrangements. The Steadman Report noted this

Occurrence:

communications capabilities have improved to a point where it now is possible for a remote decisionmaker to talk directly to an on-scene commander. Thus, it is relatively easy to by-pass the military chain of command. (page 28)

Judgments on the proper role of the National Command Authority in controlling tactical operations and on the circumvention of portions of the military chain of command will not be made here. It is sufficient to note that improved communications capabilities have shifted much of the initiative from the operational commands to Washington and has, therefore, often altered the role of the most senior elements of the operational commands.

4. Crisis Management Requirements

Of the key trends affecting the operational commands, perhaps the most significant is the emergence of a genuine requirement for increased presidential control in efforts to manage certain crises, primarily those with the potential for superpower confrontation. In today's international security environment, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union possess substantial nuclear arsenals and in which the two superpowers are locked in competition either directly or indirectly in numerous world areas, the need to manage and terminate confrontations before they escalate to war has become increasingly important. As a result, the tension between competing military and political-diplomatic considerations during crises has been considerably heightened in the last 30 years.

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