the German case, because Germany had been overwhelmingly a land power, the Army had always been the dominant service, and therefore the German Army's General Staff, which provided that Army's elite leadership, ended up dominating German military institutions. Germany, however, never institutionalized a joint general staff, and therefore by definition never had a single chief of staff for all three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force).

Some major subordinate military commands of the only two powers-the United States and Great Britain-in which the army, for geostrategic reasons, is not the overwhelmingly dominant service, have had truly joint general staffs. Examples include the major Allied theater commands in World War II (European, Mediterranean, Central Pacific, and Southwest Pacific theaters), the United Nations Command/U.S. Far Eastern Command during the Korean War, and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during the Vietnam War. Current United States geographicallybased unified commands (European, Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, and Central Commands) have interservice joint general staffs along functional lines described above.

III. THEMES IN CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD A GENERAL

STAFF, 1903-1985 23

The legislative histories of the six most important Army and defense organization-related statutes of the 20th Century were reviewed to determine congressional attitudes toward a general staff. These statutes are:

-Act of February 14, 1903 (39 Stat. 830, ch. 553; Public Law 88, 57th Congress). This Act established the modern U.S. Army General Staff.

-National Defense Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 166; Act of June 3, 1916; Public Law 85, 64th Congress). The National Defense Act of 1916 created the basic tripartite structure of the Army that still exists in 1985-the active Army, the National Guard with a continuing State role but trained and equipped to Federal standards and with Federal service obligations; and a purely Federal Army Reserve.

-National Defense Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 759, Act of June 4, 1920; Public Law 242, 66th Congress). The National Defense Act of 1920 strengthened and reaffirmed the basic structure provisions of the 1916 Act in the context of World War I experience. -National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, Act of July 26, 1947; Public Law 253, 80th Congress). This Act establishes a separate U.S. Air Force; unified the Armed Forces under a National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense; and provided a statutory basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

-National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 578; Act of August 10, 1949; Public Law 216, 81st Congress). The 1949

23 For a listing of all congressional documents consulted in which relevant material was found, see the Appendix. Footnotes in this chapter cite direct quotations from congressional primary sources only.

Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 changed the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense; strengthened authority of the DoD over the individual military services; and established the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

-Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 514; Act of August 6, 1958; Public Law 85-599). The 1958 DoD Reorganization Act strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense; clarified the role of the unified and specified commands in the national military chain of command, and clarified the duties and organization of the Joint Staff.

In addition, legislative activity which led up to the comparatively minor Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization enacted in 1984 was revised (98 Stat. 2611; Sec. 1301, P.L. 98-525; Act of October 19, 1984; Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985), as well as some floor debates running into 1985. (The legislative history of the Act of October 21, 1977; P.L. 95-140; Stat. 1172, which changed the number of Deputy and Under Secretaries of Defense and made some other modifications in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, contained no references to the general staff concept.)

All available hearings, reports, and floor debates on the above statutes were surveyed for any references to the term "general staff." Such references were scattered, frequently made only in passing, and often made in a context other than actual legislative consideration of matters affecting the U.S. Army General Staff. Taken as a whole, however, they enable an analyst to acquire a reasonable understanding of how congressional attitudes toward a general staff have evolved since the U.S. Army General Staff was established in 1903.

The survey which follows is thematic and topical within broad chronological lines. Sections on pre- and post-World War II congressional attitudes toward the general staff concept are followed by sections on the reasons for the change in these attitudes after World War II.

PRE-WORLD WAR II CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

Congressional attitudes toward a general staff before World War I, as exemplified in action on the Acts of 1903, 1916, and 1920, revolved around two basic themes. First, it was acknowledged by almost all members of Congress that the United States Army should have a general staff, but a functional one only-not an elite branch of officer corps along German lines. Second, there was ongoing debate over the nature of the relationship between the traditional adminstrative and support bureaus of the Army and the modern Army General Staff established by the Act of 1903.

The Army General Staff was, for example, subjected to explicit congressional revilement during debate over the National Defense Act of 1920 for allegedly trampling over traditional Army administrative practices during World War I. In a comment echoed by many other members of Congress during debate over the National

Defense act of 1920, Representative Dent stated on the floor of the
House that: 24

... the General Staff in Washington is too large and the
powers of the General Staff should be curbed and restored
to the duties of its original creation. The original General
Staff was provided for the purpose of studying plans of the
Army, studying ideas as to how the Army should be orga-
nized and equipped. But the General Staff has gone beyond
its function and has reached out into the various bureaus
and different departments of the Army and taken charge
of the administrative functions of the Army which hereto-
fore have been operated by the different bureaus charged
specifically with that purpose.

Indeed, after World War I there was so much congressional concern that the Army General Staff had, during the war, trespassed on the prerogatives of the Army's administrative bureaus-Adjutant General's, Medical, Supply, Ordnance, and similar departments that the National Defense Act of 1920 specifically stated that after the Act's enactment Army General Staff officers: 25

shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus of offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.

Ironically, modern scholarship agrees that the Army General Staff did indeed involve itself in detailed administrative work during World War I, rather than confine itself to broad planning and operational supervision. It did so, however, because the traditional administrative bureaus charged with support and logistics functions had, over the course of the preceding century, become so ossified and bogged down in petty peacetime routine that they could not function adequately in a modern industrial war. 26

The Army General Staff was also implicitly criticized by some Members of Congress for "interfering" with hitherto sacrosanct congressional prerogatives in what today would be termed Army tactical organization and force structure. Representative Dent further asserted on the floor of the House that under the National Defense Act of 1920: 27

Congress surrenders the right that it has always retained heretofore of fixing the size of the Army and the units of its organization. This principle is surrendered in this bill, and if the very first section of this bill is adopted, then the Congress of the United States leaves it to the

24 Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 9, 1920: 4072. 25 Sec. 5, Act of June 4, 1920; 41 Stat. 764.

26 See Weigley, History of the United States Army. pp. 364-370, 377-380.

27 Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 9, 1920. p.

General Staff to say how many regiments of Infantry you
shall have, how many regiments of Cavalry, and how
many regiments of Field Artillery.

Whenever you give the General Staff the power to organize the Army into units of organization as it sees fit, it inevitably follows that you must give to the War Department lump-sum appropriations.

Although not, for obvious reasons, alluded to directly on the floor of either the House or Senate, it appears that Members of Congress opposed to the Army General Staff were concerned that by its very competence, even in the fields of planning and coordination (rather than detailed administration) it was supposed to be confined to, it would interfere with direct, informal ties between influential Members of Congress and Army administrative bureaus. Such ties had developed throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and had often frustrated the Army commanding general and the Secretary of War in exerting centralized control over Army policies and procedures. 28

The Army General Staff was not, however regarded by the Congress as contributing to militarism of fundamentally erroneous concepts of defense strategy and organization. General staffs were usually regarded as necessary organizational components of a nation's military command structure, required by any modern armed force for overall planning and coordination of military policy. During the 1903 debates on the bill which established the modern U.S. Army General Staff, Representative Parker expressed this view: 29

Thus there are these two great duties of the General Staff.
First, to acquire the information and arrange it so that an
order can be intelligently made; and, second, when it has
been made, not to command, but to exercise supervision,
inform and advise all the different persons in command
and all the members of the various departments, so that
they shall work together in doing that work, reporting
meanwhile to headquarters, so that the Government can
find what has been done.

The whole civilized world has found out that a general staff is an absolute necessity.

In a similar vein, Representative McClellan asserted that: 30

the only civilized armies of the world which are not provided with general staffs are those of England and the United States. England's need for a general staff was emphasized in the South African War [the Boer War, 18991902].

28 Weigley, History of the United States Army. pp. 284-290, 326-333, has some examples of this tendency. Robert M. Utley. Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 18661891. New York, MacMillan, 1973. pp. 57-65, has some oblique mention of the issue.

29 To Increase the Efficiency of the Army. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 36, January 6, 1903. p. 537.

30 Ibid., p. 536.

In floor debate over the National Defense Act of 1916, Senator
Cummins was highly supportive of the Army General Staff: 31

Neither the [General Staff] nor any of its members as such
staff officers have any authority whatsoever. It is a board
created in order to exchange views, to discuss military af-
fairs, to look into the future, to apprehend military needs,
to provide in a broad way for the national defense. It is, I
think, an invaluable arm of the service. I think its exist-
ence has vindicated the wisdom of the men who not long
ago organized it, and I have no criticism upon it or quarrel
with what it is appointed to do.

Although the Army General Staff was criticized vehemently for intrusion into routine administrative work during World War I, after that war there remained a great deal of support for an Army General Staff confined to broad policy-related planning and coordinating duties. Representative Miller, endorsing the General Staff concept in 1920: 32

The bill provides for an effective General Staff Corps. I am a strong believer in a strong, effective, vigorous General Staff. Without it no Army, however well organized and equipped, can effectively operate. The staff is the planning section of the Army, as well as the coordinating. To give it administrative authority only as a "lastditch" expedient would tend to throw every other administrative branch to the wind. Our experience in the late war has demonstrated beyond all possible doubt the advantages of the staff principle. When we look about to locate the force, the organization that brought about the expansion of our establishment to meet the emergency of war, the eye, as well as the hand, rests upon the General Staff Corps. It must be retained to have an effective Army.

Representative McKenzie expressed similar views: 33

I appreciate the prejudice in the mind of the average man against what is known as the General Staff of the Army. It is a regrettable fact, and perhaps much of that prejudice is due to mistakes made by officers heretofore appointed to the General Staff. I say, and I speak to you in all sincerity, do not make a mistake. A general staff, and a general staff with troops, is the very foundation and bulwark of our Military Establishment. Do not fall into the error of believing that the functions of a general staff are not necessary. It was due to the fact that we did not have a large, able, efficient general staff when we got into this war that many mistakes were made, and another reason was due to the fact that civilians, dollar-a-day men, came into the city of Washington and pushed the General Staff of the Army off the map to a great extent.

31 To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 53, March 31, 1916. p. 5219.

32 Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 8, 1920. p.

33 Ibid., March 11, 1920. p. 4184.