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This option would clearly be desirable. The absence of civilian guidance for contingency planning has been a major shortcoming. While it might be possible to provide such guidance without a formal document, it would appear to be more useful to transmit this important information in writing. Moreover, many of the users of this guidance would be located in operational command headquarters which are far removed from Washington.
In concluding that policy guidance for military crisis planning is needed, the National Security Policy Integration study states:
Effective military crisis planning requires higher government levels to select situations to be planned for, to provide the planners with realistic assumptions and objectives, and to
conduct a critical review of the resulting plans. (page 36) The Chairman's Special Study Group also supports this concept:
... The important iterative process by which the civilian and military leadership settle on military objectives and on the political assumptions important to contingency planning should be enhanced. The JCS must be furnished clearly defined objec
tives by the civilian leadership. (page 61) Besides providing a framework for contingency planning, promulgation of a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have numerous benefits: (1) result in increased attention to contingency planning; (2) lead to a useful questioning of assumptions; (3) help sharpen perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives; (4) ensure that political assumptions are consistent with national security policy; (5) highlight planning guidance issues that need attention; and (6) help connect the PPBS process and contingency planning
There are two possible problems with this option. First, the guidance may be overly specific and unnecessarily constrain or complicate the work of contingency planners. Second, this guidance document would contain extremely sensitive information which, if leaked, might cause serious political problems or embarrassment. These concerns relate to implementation of this option and not to the concept itself. Clearly, a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have to be carefully prepared and protected. • Option 3B — develop a continuing exercise program to test the
adequacy of major contingency plans While increased attention by civilians and the JCS system to the review of contingency plans would be beneficial, it cannot substitute for the actual exercising of plans. Only through such tests can the quality of the plans be assessed and important lessons learned. The National Security Policy Integration study supports this view:
...military plans should be exercised periodically. Nifty Nugget underscored the need for such exercises, with highlevel government participation, both to discover shortcomings in planning and to test the capabilities and resources needed to
execute existing plans. (pages 36 and 37) The disadvantage of this option is the cost of these exercises and the commitment of substantial time by senior civilian and military officials that is required to make the exercises effective. These financial and manpower costs are modest when compared to the substantial benefits of such tests. While planning and preparing for the future are important, senior officials must not neglect preparation for today's and tomorrow's crises. As the Chairman's Special Study Group has stated:
.. One cannot overdramatize the fact that while the peacetime management of military activities is an important matter, preparedness for war management is the overriding imperative. That type of preparedness is the best possible deterrent to actual conflict, and provides the best assurance of success if deterrence
fails. (page 65) G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).
Conclusions 1. The JCS is unable to ade
quately fulfill its responsibility to provide useful and timely unified military advice to the President, National Security Council,
and Secretary of Defense. 2. Deficiencies in JCS advice
have encouraged senior civilian officials to rely on civilian staffs for counsel that should be provided by professional military officers.
3. The conflict of interest in- 3A. Disestablish the JCS and,
herent in the dual responsi- therebypermit the Service bilities of the Service Chiefs Chiefs to dedicate all their time is the primary cause of defi- to Service duties. ciencies in JCS performance; furthermore, Service 3B. Establish a Joint Military AdviChiefs do not have suffi- sory Council consisting of cient time to perform both Chairman and a 4-star military roles.
officer from each Service on his last tour of duty.
3C. Reduce the Service staffs that
work on joint matters to no more than 25 military officers for each Service.
Recommendations 4. Removing the
the Service 4A. Establish the Defense ReChiefs from the institution sources Board in statute with apthat provides unified mili- propriate Service representation. tary advice increases the importance of the Defense Resources Board as a forum for the formal presentation of Service views.
5. The JCS Chairman's poten- 5A. Authorize the Chairman of the
tial effectiveness as the Joint Military Advisory Council principal spokesman for the to provide military advice in his joint perspective is cur- own right. tailed by his limited independent authority.
5B. Authorize the Chairman of the
Joint Military Advisory Council to independently manage the Joint Staff.
6. There is an important need 6A. Designate one of the members
for continuity in the posi- of the Joint Military Advisory tion of the senior spokes- Council, from a different Service man on joint matters.
pair than the Chairman, as Deputy Chairman.
7. The desire for unanimity 7A. Specify that one of the respon
has not only forced JCS sibilities of the Joint Military advice to the lowest Advisory Council is to inform common level of assent, but higher authority of all legitimate also has greatly limited the alternatives. range of alternatives offered to the Secretary of Defense.
8. The closed staff characteris- 8A. Specify in statute the relation
tics of the OJCS have inhib- ship between the Secretary of ited important interactions Defense and the Joint Military between the OJCS and Advisor Council and between the OSD.
Joint Staff and OSD.
8B. Make the Joint Military Advi
sory Council and the Joint Staff part of OSD.
9. JCS members have tradi- 9A. Require that members of the
tionally not had a strong Joint Military Advisory Council background of joint service. have substantial joint experi
Recommendations 10. The cumbersome staffing 10A. Authorize the Chairman of
procedures of the OJCS the Joint Military Advisory have greatly reduced the Council to specify the staffing quality of JCS advice.
procedures of the Joint Staff.
11. The quality of the OJCS
staff and other joint staffs is inadequate.
12. For the most part, mili- 12A. Authorize the Chairman of tary officers do not want to the Joint
Joint Military Advisory be assigned to joint duty; Council to develop and adminisare pressured or monitored ter a personnel management for loyalty by their Services system for all military officers while serving on joint as- assigned to joint duty. Establish signments; are not prepared procedures, as part of this sysby either education or expe- tem, to ensure that joint college rience to to perform their
graduates actually serve in joint joint duties; and serve for duty assignments. only a relatively short period once they have 12B. Establish in each Service a learned their jobs.
joint duty career specialty.
12C. Strengthen the requirement
for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank.
12D. Authorize the Secretary of De
fense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation.
12E. Remove the distinction
beween the Joint Staff and other OJCS military officers, eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff, and redesignate the OJCS staff as the Joint Staff.
13. DoD has not rigorously 13A. Require the Secretary of De
evaluated the General Staff fense to undertake a comprehenconcept.
sive study of the General Staff concept.
14. The OJCS does not suffi
ciently review and oversee contingency plans.
Conclusions 15. There is no civilian guid
ance being used in developing contingency plans.
Recommendations 15A. Recommend to the Secretary
of Defense that a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning be annually promulgated, and a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans be developed.