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This option would clearly be desirable. The absence of civilian guidance for contingency planning has been a major shortcoming. While it might be possible to provide such guidance without a formal document, it would appear to be more useful to transmit this important information in writing. Moreover, many of the users of this guidance would be located in operational command headquarters which are far removed from Washington.

In concluding that policy guidance for military crisis planning is needed, the National Security Policy Integration study states:

Effective military crisis planning requires higher government levels to select situations to be planned for, to provide the planners with realistic assumptions and objectives, and to conduct a critical review of the resulting plans. (page 36) The Chairman's Special Study Group also supports this concept:

...The important iterative process by which the civilian and military leadership settle on military objectives and on the political assumptions important to contingency planning should be enhanced. The JCS must be furnished clearly defined objectives by the civilian leadership. (page 61)

Besides providing a framework for contingency planning, promulgation of a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have numerous benefits: (1) result in increased attention to contingency planning; (2) lead to a useful questioning of assumptions; (3) help sharpen perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives; (4) ensure that political assumptions are consistent with national security policy; (5) highlight planning guidance issues that need attention; and (6) help connect the PPBS process and contingency planning. There are two possible problems with this option. First, the guidance may be overly specific and unnecessarily constrain or complicate the work of contingency planners. Second, this guidance document would contain extremely sensitive information which, if leaked, might cause serious political problems or embarrassment. These concerns relate to implementation of this option and not to the concept itself. Clearly, a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have to be carefully prepared and protected.

• Option 3B -develop a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans

While increased attention by civilians and the JCS system to the review of contingency plans would be beneficial, it cannot substitute for the actual exercising of plans. Only through such tests can the quality of the plans be assessed and important lessons learned. The National Security Policy Integration study supports this view:

...military plans should be exercised periodically. Nifty Nugget underscored the need for such exercises, with highlevel government participation, both to discover shortcomings in planning and to test the capabilities and resources needed to execute existing plans. (pages 36 and 37)

The disadvantage of this option is the cost of these exercises and the commitment of substantial time by senior civilian and military officials that is required to make the exercises effective. These financial and manpower costs are modest when compared to the sub

stantial benefits of such tests. While planning and preparing for the future are important, senior officials must not neglect preparation for today's and tomorrow's crises. As the Chairman's Special Study Group has stated:

One cannot overdramatize the fact that while the peacetime management of military activities is an important matter, preparedness for war management is the overriding imperative. That type of preparedness is the best possible deterrent to actual conflict, and provides the best assurance of success if deterrence fails. (page 65)

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions

1. The JCS is unable to adequately fulfill its responsibility to provide useful and timely unified military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

2. Deficiencies in JCS advice have encouraged senior civilian officials to rely on civilian staffs for counsel that should be provided by professional military officers.

3. The conflict of interest inherent in the dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs is the primary cause of deficiencies in JCS performance; furthermore, Service Chiefs do not have sufficient time to perform both roles.

Recommendations

3A. Disestablish the JCS and, thereby, permit the Service Chiefs to dedicate all their time to Service duties.

3B. Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a 4-star military officer from each Service on his last tour of duty.

3C. Reduce the Service staffs that work on joint matters to no more than 25 military officers for each Service.

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Conclusions

15. There is no civilian guidance being used in developing contingency plans.

Recommendations

15A. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning be annually promulgated, and a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans be developed.

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