The Germans lost World War I, and they also lost World War II. These simple truths would seem to provide prima-facie evidence that German military "genius" whether personalized or institutionalized was not performing very well during those wars. (page 290)

The historical record does not support this argument. In both World Wars, the German Army under direction of the General Staff outperformed its opponents. Even Gary W. Anderson, a strong critic of the General Staff concept, admits this fact:

...The German army consistently performed better than any of its single opponents from 1866 until 1945. ("The Military Reformers' Prussian Model", The Washington Post, May 21, 1984, page 19)

Max Hastings reaches a similar conclusion about German military forces during World War II:

The inescapable truth is that Hitler's Wehrmacht was the outstanding fighting force of World War II, one of the greatest in history. For many years after 1945, this seemed painful to concede publicly, partly for nationalistic reasons, partly also because the Nazi legions were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time. ("Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army," The Washington Post, May 5, 1985, page C4) Colonel Dupuy agrees:

...Germany's involvement in, and loss of, the World Wars was in no way connected with the professional organization, indoctrination, or performance of the German General Staff. (A Genius for War, page 302)

f. Elitism

The second negative argument is the dangers associated with creating an elite military organization such as a General Staff. If the General Staff effectively performed the important role envisioned for it, it will almost certainly become an elite organization and attract many of the best military officers. This is not a reason, however, for precluding the search for a more effective central staff organization. In his paper, "Designing a U.S. Defense General Staff", John Kester counters the argument of elitism:

...The armed forces are supposed to reflect merit and achievement, not to be egalitarian. They do not exist to make people happy; they exist to do a job. It is not self-evident that feelings of jealousy or awe that might develop among some officers [if a General Staff were created] would be so debilitating as to offset the gains in influence and efficiency that could be expected to flow from a better staff organization. (Strategic Review, Summer 1981, page 43)

Kester adds to this:

Moreover, the services already have elites. The question is simply where the chosen shall serve. (page 43)

g. Militarism

Some of the past aversion to the creation of a General Staff has arisen from the concept's historical roots in Prussia and hence, its identification with "German militarism". While the association of the General Staff concept with militarism persists, there is no historical evidence to support it. The adoption of the General Staff concept by numerous democratic nations with no sign of militaristic tendencies may serve to place this argument in its proper context.

h. Alien to democratic societies

The fourth criticism of the General Staff is that it is alien to democratic societies. In 1956, Hubert Humphrey presented this view. In defending the JCS system, he criticized

...the form of highly centralized supreme general staff system which is anathema to every concept of democracy. Gary W. Anderson presents this argument as follows:

Strong general staffs, as they evolved in Russia and Germany, are manifestations of autocratic political systems that are essentially alien to the way we do things in our democratic republic. The American military machine is a servant of the state, not a partner in dictating political policy.

General staffs...have traditionally extracted a price for their services...an erosion of civilian control of the armed forces... ("The Military Reformers' Prussian Model", The Washington Post, May 21, 1984, page 19)

Dupuy counters the assertions in Anderson's article as follows:

Nothing that Anderson writes, nothing in the historical record, will support any one of those three sentences. France had a strong General Staff in 1914, and this is why fiercely democratic France was able to survive the Marne Campaign and-eventually, with its allies-win World War I. The U.S. Army has had two strong general staffs in its history: 1917– 1918, and 1942-1945. The performance of the U.S. Army during those two periods was up to the finest military traditions of our nation. Civilian control was exercised firmly and wisely by Woodrow Wilson, through Newton D. Baker, and by Franklin Roosevelt, through Henry L. Stimson.

There is no reason for the American military machine to change from being a servant of the state to being its master just because it achieves the efficiency that has been eluding it for centuries (with the brief exceptions for the Army noted above). In fact, the servant will be a useful one, instead of one (as it is now) of dubious utility. ("Military Reform: The Case for a Centralized Command", The Washington Post, June 9, 1984, page 19)

i. Removed from reality

One of the reasons for the rejection of a General Staff in the past has been that its officers might be too far removed from the field to be realistic planners. This argument is presented along the following lines. Although regular field assignments would alleviate the problem of unrealistic planning to a degree, the natural bent of

General Staff officers would be toward the theoretical. This inclination could lead to less than the most desirable staff advice, particularly in wartime. No matter how careful the selection process or how thorough the education system, the General Staff could become one step removed from reality and, hence, subject to serious blunders in both operational and resource allocation matters. The performance of the German General Staff does not support this point of view. The General Staff quickly analyzed technical developments in military equipment and prepared appropriate changes in doctrine and battle plans. The most prominent example of this capability was the development of the "blitzkrieg" doctrine. Dupuy describes the General Staff process that produced these results:

...Like qualified observers and critics of the Allies, the Germans observed the obvious "lessons" of World War I. Unlike the others, however, they had an institution [the General Staff] available to make the much more difficult analyses of these observations, to include assessments of the characteristics, limitations, and capabilities of weapons, and the implications of trends in weapons and technology. Following analytical concepts initiated by Scharnhorst and continued by his successors, that institution almost automatically made the even more difficult translation of the analytical results into doctrine, organization, the establishment of requirements for new or modified weapons and equipment, and development of new and revised operational and administrative techniques. (A Genius for War, page 255)

This process does not appear to fit an organizational concept that is criticized as removing itself from reality. Moreover, the German General Staff ensured that its officers continued to receive regular field assignments to maintain currency.

j. Incompetent in formulating strategy

The last argument against the German General Staff-that it failed to formulate grand strategy-appears to have more merit than any other. Captain Nolen comments:

...Hitler's emasculation of the German General Staff system prevented any systematic assessment of Germany's strategic options. For all of its tactical brilliance, the German officer corps was strategically barren. Strategic decisions were made without the benefit of interservice consultation and coordination, and without considering the relations among the several decisions. (Parameters, Volume XIV, No. 3, page 18)

Dupuy reaches a similar conclusion:

Thus, in essence, Prusso-German military successes were based upon a transitory technical mastery of war. The ultimate failure in both conflicts came because the German military system-unlike those of the Allies-was too narrowly specialized. (A Genius for War, page 292)

While the inability of the German General Staff to formulate strategy was a critical deficiency, the criticism for the World War II period must be tempered by the fact that the German General

Staff was only an Army organization and was, therefore, unable to formulate grand strategy involving all three Services. As Nolen notes: "No headquarters was in charge of overall strategy." (page 17)

During World War II, Germany's military effort suffered from four interrelated, organizational shortcomings: (1) the inability to create an effective Armed Forces General Staff and to bring the three Services under unified command; (2) the Services' desire to remain independent of centralized planning and control; (3) the inability to effectively coordinate the operations of the three Services; and (4) a failure to formulate military grand strategy. Nolen discusses these shortcomings as follows:

Those who see the German General Staff as a model of military efficiency should reconsider the evidence. The German General Staff never solved the problem of centralized command; it remained an army organization. Though amazingly efficient at managing army affairs, it never achieved the status of an armed forces staff with the more complex mission of managing all three armed services. The OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht], which might have performed such a role, was denied by Hitler the size, leadership, or authority to do so. However, Germany's failure to organize a strong armed forces staff was not the fault of Adolf Hitler alone. The armed forces must also bear part of the responsibility. The three services never willingly accepted subordination to a higher headquarters either to Blomberg's Wehrmachtamt or, after 1938, to Keitel's OKW. The services certainly had grounds to question the competence of these higher organizations. Yet one wonders how much of their resistance was for professional reasons and how much was due to organizational rivalries. (page 17)

To this, he adds:

...Clearly the absence of an armed forces staff compounded Germany's military deficiencies. Only such an organization could have provided a balanced view of military strategy and properly divided resources among the three services. (page 18) While the lessons of history concerning the General Staff concept remain debatable, the broader deficiencies in German military organization during World War II have been well and unambiguously documented. These lessons are relevant to the United States because the U.S. military establishment suffers at present from the four organizational deficiencies that plagued Germany during World War II.

• Option 21 -remove the distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS military officers and eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff

The distinction between the Joint Staff and other military officers in OJCS serves no useful purpose. In addition, the 400 officer limitation on the size of the Joint Staff has been circumvented by the flexibility offered to assign officers to OJCS rather than the Joint Staff.

It would be much more useful to manage all military officers in OJCS under one system. Not only would this provide for improved personnel management practices, but it would also highlight the total number of personnel in the JCS system.

The argument raised against this option is that it would permit unconstrained growth in the size of the Joint Staff. To the contrary, this option would provide an opportunity to measure the growth in OJCS personnel resources without the artificial and confusing distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS staff.

• Option 2J-authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty

Given that problems in joint duty assignments are broader than just those in the Joint Staff or even the OJCS staff, it would be appropriate to implement management arrangements that would solve the larger concerns. Many of the options proposed in this subsection envision a more forceful role for the JCS Chairman in correcting joint duty problems. Some of these options address only the OJCS staff; others involve all joint duty assignments, but only address narrow solutions to one of many problem areas.

This option would authorize the JCS Chairman to address all personnel problem areas encountered in the joint duty community. The JCS Chairman would be responsible for ensuring that (1) highly qualified officers were selected; (2) they had the appropriate promotion and assignment incentives; (3) they had relevant education and experience; (4) they served sufficiently long tours to be effective; and (5) they could be reassigned to joint duty as necessary. This option could be implemented in conjunction with Option 2G (Joint Duty Career Specialty) or Option 2H (General Staff). Even if options to establish a joint duty career path were not implemented, the JCS Chairman could-with the authority proposed in this option-have a major impact on the quality and effectiveness of joint staffs.

Objections to this proposal are likely to center on the view that it would infringe upon Service prerogatives for management of their professional corps of officers. The JCS Chairman would have personnel management responsibility for 5 percent of military officers in grades of 0-3 (Captain or Navy Lieutenant) and higher. The Services may be especially troubled by the fact that the JCS Chairman would manage nearly 20 percent of all flag and general offi

cers.

Despite possible Service objections, it does not appear possible to obtain the necessary performance in joint duty assignments without substantial revision of current personnel management practices. Only the JCS Chairman can ensure that joint duty has the stature that it deserves, broaden the preparation of officers for joint duty, and reward them for effective work.

3. OPTIONS FOR Dealing WITH THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

• Option 3A -require that the Secretary of Defense annually promulgate a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning