cation of effort. The large number of military officers on Service staffs who are dedicated to joint matters appears to fit into this category of criticism. Moreover, the existence of these Service staff elements has shifted the focus to Service interests and away from the joint perspective. The Service Chiefs have also come to rely on their Service staffs for inputs that they should be receiving from the OJCS staff.

Substantially reducing the Service staffs which work on joint matters could have numerous benefits: (1) the OJCS staff may be able to address joint issues from a more independent and objective position; (2) the Service Chiefs would be forced to rely on the OJCS staff on joint matters; and (3) the duplication of effort between the OJCS and Service staffs could be substantially lessened.

On the other hand, the Services have important inputs to make on joint issues. It may be necessary to have large Service staffs dedicated to joint matters to consistently ensure that such inputs are made on a timely basis. The absence of effective Service inputs may preclude careful and comprehensive evaluations of joint issues within the JCS system.

This option needs to be addressed in the context of other proposed solutions to OJCS problem areas. If Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council) or Option 1B (Chief of the Joint Staff) were implemented, substantially reducing the Service staffs which work on joint matters would clearly be possible and desirable. The loss of responsibility for providing joint advice would greatly lessen the needs of the Service Chiefs for Service staff support on joint matters. The 25-man staff that would remain available to the Service Chief under this option could serve to keep the Chief informed on joint issues and provide necessary information to the OJCS.

If the JCS Chairman were authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff (Option 1E) and/or to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff (Option 1K), there may be a requirement to ensure that the Service Chiefs retained sufficient staff support on joint matters. Such a requirement would arise only if there were concerns that the JCS Chairman would use these new authorities so aggressively that the position of the Service Chiefs would be severely weakened.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

• Option 2A-give the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotion and assignment of officers who are serving or have served in OJCS

The power that the Services retain over OJCS staff officers (and other joint duty officers) through their control of promotions and assignments is enormous. The current system results in incentives to protect Service interests rather than to think in joint terms. Joint thinkers are likely to be punished, and Service promoters are likely to be rewarded. This system of punishments and rewards must be changed if the quality of the OJCS staff is to be improved and if the objectivity of its work is to be increased.

Giving the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotions and assignments of past and current OJCS officers appears to be the

best possible method of changing the currently unfavorable incentives. As the senior military officer representing the joint perspective, the JCS Chairman is best qualified and positioned to ensure that OJCS officers receive fair treatment.

On the other hand, this option may be viewed as an outright challenge to an important Service prerogative: unrestricted management of its professional corps of officers. It would put Service officers under the effective control or potential influence of a military officer outside of their Service.

Despite strong Service objections, it will be impossible to obtain quality work from the OJCS staff unless those officers can be protected from Service retribution for objectively performing their joint duty assignments.

• Option 2B-strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank

The current requirement for joint duty prior to promotion to flag or general rank has been circumvented to the extent that it is meaningless. Obviously, a strengthened requirement for joint duty would greatly increase the interest in OJCS assignments. This should improve the quality of the OJCS staff.

On the other hand, this option could be viewed as an undesirable pressure tactic. As the Chairman's Special Study Group noted:

...To increase interest in Joint duty, one could return to a strict interpretation of that prerequisite [joint duty prior to promotion to flag or general rank] or, indeed, institute other forms of pressure on officers to seek Joint assignments. However, such coercive policies are not the best approach, nor are they likely to be effective in the long run. (Appendix E, page E-1)

In addition, the Services claim that there are insufficient joint duty assignments (under a strict interpretation) to permit the qualification of sufficient candidates for flag or general rank. If this were the case, this option would produce difficulties in personnel management and lead to an undesirable practice of quick, ticketpunching rotations of officers through joint duty assignments.

• Option 2C-require the JCS Chairman to evaluate all nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions on the basis of their performance in joint duty assignments

This option has two objectives: (1) to ensure that nominees for 3star and 4-star positions have strong joint duty backgrounds; and (2) to provide an additional incentive for highly qualified officers to seek joint assignments and to perform their duties in these positions with objectivity.

As to the first objective, this option appears to be too broad. Many nominees for 3-star or 4-star positions will be serving only in Service assignments. Authorizing the JCS Chairman to evaluate their qualifications for a Service position does not appear appropriate. However, the JCS Chairman should be forcefully involved in evaluating nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions that are joint duty assignments.

As to the second objective, this option might provide an additional incentive for joint duty. However, it has, in the view of some ob

servers, the same coercive nature as Option 2B. On the other hand, this option can be viewed as providing a desirable and appropriate incentive. For example, in recommending that the JCS Chairman evaluate all 3-star and 4-star "operational" promotions as well as selected key assignments below those grades, General W. Y. Smith states:

.This would formalize the informal voice the Chairman now has in senior promotions, and it is an important change. It would send the proper signal concerning the importance of joint duty. ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", page 43)

• Option 2D -increase the number of cross-Service assignments of military officers

In addition to joint duty, cross-Service assignments provide an improved understanding for a military officer of the capabilities, doctrine, and tactics of a sister Service. The individual Services are the only ones, however, that can judge to what extent such assignments can be made without undue disruption of the Service experience and training of an individual officer and without creating shortfalls in officers available for Service duty.

This does not appear to be an area where congressional action can or should be taken. At most; the Congress could merely encourage the Services to expand as appropriate their cross-Service assignments of military officers.

• Option 2E -establish a personnel management system to ensure that joint college graduates actually serve in joint duty assignments

This option appears to be highly desirable. A substantial portion of the graduates of the three colleges of the National Defense University (NDU) should receive joint duty assignments. This is not to say that NDU graduates do not make better contributions to their work if assigned to a position within their Service. However, only a small percentage of NDU graduates actually are now being assigned to joint duty.

No disadvantages of this option have been identified as long as the Services are given some flexibility in assignments of NDU graduates.

• Option 2F -authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation

The Joint Staff currently suffers from a lack of experience, continuity, and corporate memory. This option would seek to lessen these deficiencies. By authorizing the Secretary of Defense to extend Joint Staff tours for military officers, it would be possible to retain key personnel to provide the JCS with quality staff work.

Opponents of this option may see extended tours on the Joint Staff as the first step to the creation of a General Staff. The argument may be made that officers who serve for more than 4 years on the Joint Staff would lose currency on Service doctrine, operations, and capabilities and, thereby, be susceptible to an “ivory tower" approach.

There may be some merit to these negative arguments. However, careful control of such extensions by the Secretary of Defense could lessen these possibilities while providing the necessary experience and continuity in key Joint Staff positions.

• Option 2G -establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty

The Chairman's Special Study Group made the following observations about the preparation and tenure of joint duty officers:

...All professional military assignments have special requirements for prior training and experience. Submarine skippers, F-15 pilots, and infantry battalion commanders all require-and are given-careful preparation.

The same should be true for officers serving in Joint assignments, such as the Joint Staff or the Unified Command headquarters. Aside from understanding how such staffs function, they face the immense problem of learning how the DoD and their sister Services function. Few officers are expert in the several branches of their own Service, let alone the other Services. But officers serving on Joint staffs should at least have a broad working knowledge of all the Armed Forces. Few do. Most assigned to Joint duties have little formal preparation, and few stay long enough to acquire expertise on the job... (page 41)

Given the demanding nature of joint duty assignments, it would appear appropriate to establish a joint duty career specialty. This would provide an opportunity to develop a small cadre of military officers who have demonstrated abilities for and an interest in joint duty. This cadre would provide for better continuity, more objectivity, and greater experience in the handling of joint matters.

To ensure that joint staffs served by joint duty career specialists would not become isolated, this option has two important features. First, joint duty specialists would return periodically to their parent Services for field assignments to maintain currency. Second, only half of the positions on joint staffs would be filled by joint duty specialists, thereby retaining a mix of varied backgrounds and ensuring that joint staffs would not become isolated.

The Services have opposed the creation of a joint duty career specialty for two basic reasons. First, the Services believe that implementation of a joint duty specialty would require the establishment of a joint-duty subspecialty in each functional area. This increase in the number of subspecialties, according to the Services, would disrupt current Service personnel systems and detailed officer distribution plans.

Second, the Services argue that a succession of joint duty assignments may result in a loss of currency with respect to Service doctrine, operations, and capabilities. Accordingly, an officer's ability to contribute to the work of a joint staff would be diminished.

In a memorandum for Secretary Weinberger dated December 24, 1984, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, presented the following conclusion on a joint duty career specialty:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified commands consider Service functional expertise the most im

portant prerequisite in selecting officers to fill joint-duty positions, and they consider a separate career specialty unnecessary to ensure that qualified, experienced personnel are selected for joint-duty assignments.

• Option 2H-establish a General Staff in place of the current Joint Staff

Before evaluating this proposal to establish a General Staff, it should be noted that the U.S. military establishment has not rigorously analyzed the General Staff concept. As Colonel T. N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) notes:

...the United States has generally ignored (rather than rejected) the example of the German General Staff... (A Genius for War, page 312)

While there was some interest in a U.S. General Staff by those who were studying alternative organizational arrangements during World War II and the immediate post-war period, there has been little attention on the subject since then. This is particularly troublesome because objective evaluations of the concept would only seem possible after the strong emotions associated with World War II began to subside. It may be that the General Staff is an outmoded organizational concept and does not fit the American approach to providing for national defense. Unfortunately, the U.S. military establishment is unable to say whether this is the case or not.

The establishment of a General Staff is a far-reaching option that might substantially contribute toward resolving the existing inadequacies of the Joint Staff. The fundamental characteristic of a General Staff is that its officers, once selected, remain General Staff officers throughout the remainder of their careers, regardless of their assignments. Their promotions are determined by their superiors on the General Staff, not by their original Service.

On the plus side, the very nature of a General Staff would give top-quality officers an incentive for entering this career path, knowing that it offered a promotion track wholly separate from any Service. The type of officer attracted would probably be particularly interested in and suited for staff work. The independence and objectivity of a General Staff, as well as the high-quality officers that it would likely attract, would make it a powerful instrument in planning for war, developing military strategy, and promoting inter-Service cooperation and coordination. In particular, a General Staff would be able to cut across the biases of the individual Services in determining innovative and effective ways for employing their combined combat capabilities.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown presents the following arguments in favor of a General Staff in his book, Thinking About National Security:

Such an approach would be an attempt to introduce a clearer and less parochial military view on issues of military strategy and capabilities, and the relationship between the two. It would provide a means to clarify roles and missions and to improve the procedure for establishing the requirements for oper