the Secretary of Defense and the President. Modern day communications permit the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and, through the National Military Command System, all of the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands no matter where he is in the world. We have found over the past few years that the combination of modern communications and using Service Chiefs for long and planned tours as Acting Chairman in Washington has worked well for consistency of advice and in unifying the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

General Paul F. Gorman, USA, then the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command and former Assistant to the JCS Chairman, presented similar arguments in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

I believe that that system which General Vessey and his colleagues adopted has had the great benefit of educating members of the JCS in the intricacies of the operations of the National Command Authority in the way that they would not otherwise have gotten, had they been left out of the net as it were in the former fashion.

It has made a very serious proposition of their getting themselves briefed and remaining briefed on world events day by day. They have to curtail their travel as members of the service chiefs. In brief, they have to really put their minds to the kinds of consideration that the Chairman has to bring on issues day to day.

I think that has made for a better set of chiefs. (Part 7, page 303)

The new procedure of a 3-month rotation among the Service Chiefs of the responsibility for serving as Acting Chairman is clearly preferable to the previous approach. Prior to institution of the current system, the most senior Service Chief or, if necessary, Vice Chief available became Acting Chairman when the JCS Chairman was absent. As might be expected, the position of Acting Chairman changed hands much more frequently and continuity was diminished. As the Chairman's Special Study Group noted about this earlier period:

...During one recent three-day period when the Chairman was out of town the responsibility for Acting Chairman changed hands seven times. (page 38)

Despite the improvements offered by the new procedure, there are a number of disadvantages to the system of rotating Acting Chairmen. First, the Service Chiefs cannot keep themselves informed on the Chairman's work. When they begin their tour as Acting Chairman, they make an effort to become as knowledgeable as possible on this work. This becomes an additional burden on Service Chiefs who already lack sufficient time to cover their normal responsibilities. Moreover, this system of rapid education poses risks, particularly at the beginning of a tour of an Acting Chairman. The Chairman's Special Study Group highlighted these

risks in discussing the need for continuity in the Chairman's position:

...This is important in many areas, but surely the most critical involves the role of the Chairman as an advisor to the Secretary and the President in the emergency use of strategic nuclear forces, now a highly technical subject. (page 22)

Second, an Acting Chairman may not be able to divorce himself from his Service interests. There have been instances where Acting Chairmen have sought to promote the interests of their Services. This would clearly be a misuse of this position. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, USCINCEUR, noted one instance in which this occurred:

I well remember an NSC meeting in which a Chief was representing the Chairman and it was directed that he, the Chief, never again attend an NSC meeting because he used that opportunity to inject into the system some matters which should not have been raised. (Part 7, page 306)

Third, an Acting Chairman may continue to rely primarily on his Service staff during his tour. Again, Service perspectives would play an undesirable role in the conduct of the duties of the joint spokesman. Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger noted this problem in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

...If the Chairman happens to be out of town during a crisis, as was the case in the Mayaguez incident, the acting Chairman, quite naturally, tends to lean on his own service staff. That causes a fair amount of turmoil in the system. (Part 5, page 188)

• Option 1G -authorize a 5-star grade for the position of JCS Chairman

General Omar N. Bradley, USA, is the only JCS Chairman to have held a 5-star rank. General Bradley, the first JCS Chairman, was promoted to the rank of General of the Army after serving in this position for more than 1 year.

The objective of this option would be to enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman and, thereby, increase his power and influence. While these goals are laudable, this option by itself is likely to have little impact. By statute and by practice, the JCS Chairman is seen as the most senior U.S. military officer. Promoting the JCS Chairman to 5-star rank would not, therefore, change his relative stature.

• Option 1H -lessen the pressures for unanimity in JCS advice Clearly, the JCS would better serve the interests of senior civilian decision-makers if it developed, evaluated, and presented the full range of valid alternative courses of action. When the JCS offers only one recommendation for consideration by higher authority, it ceases to be an advisory body and essentially becomes a decision-making body. When presented with only one proposal without an appreciation of other possible courses of action -civilian officials can either endorse this alternative or develop addition

al options using other staff, usually civilian, resources. This is not a preferable system for receiving joint advice. The Chairman's Special Study Group comments as follows on this situation:

...there are few defense issues with only one possible resolution, and any Secretary of Defense will be quite aware that alternatives do exist. If he does not find them in JCS papers, he will turn to his civilian staff to find them and to determine whether they are preferable to the one recommended by the JCS. But, no matter how useful this civilian advice, it cannot substitute for a competent military evaluation of the alternatives. (page 47)

Another advantage of this option is that it would help curtail collusion by the JCS. This collusion has been described by various observers as negotiated treaties, truces, log-rolling, back-scratching, and marriage agreements. All of these terms characterize a process in which the needs of the Secretary of Defense and others for clear, usable advice are given low priority and the protection of Service interests is emphasized. It can be convincingly argued that collusion by the JCS members to protect Service interests does not serve the overall interests of national defense.

On the other hand, the professional military has long held the view that its influence is maximized if it speaks with one voice in favor of one course of action. If the senior military advisors openly showed divided views on an issue, the influence of the professional military on the eventual decision would be diminished. In Organizing for Defense, Paul Hammond articulates this point of view:

...Were the comity of JCS relations to be abandoned, far more would be lost than gained. To be sure, comity has not meant an unwillingness to disagree. It has meant, nonetheless, delay, equivocation, and compromise in order to minimize the costs of open disagreement to the status of the Chiefs and their services, together and individually. For open division would likely mean the end of the professional status which the military enjoy through the JCS in the making of national policy. Its professional character would be tainted by the arguments and assumptions which open discussion would reveal. What might be worse for American military interests, and quite likely for the nation, would be reduced influence of badly divided military councils in the making of national policy. The JCS, that is to say, represents an interest, and quite a legitimate one, which can only be maintained by its cohesion... (page 350) This argument is based, however, upon misplaced emphasis: the degree of military influence has become the focus rather than the quality of advice offered. Again, the tendency of the JCS to serve their interests rather than those of the Secretary of Defense appears to be the case.

The success of this approach is also open to question. While a united front of JCS members poses a formidable force with which to reckon, there is substantial evidence that JCS advice has played a limited role in many important decisions. Secretaries of Defense have often recognized "watered down" and ineffective advice and have sought counsel elsewhere.

• Option 11 -remove barriers to effective interactions with the JCS system, especially for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Related to its desire for unanimity, the JCS have created effective barriers that limited interactions with non-Service organizations, especially OSD. A more open system would reveal the existence of disagreements within the JCS system. In line with the quote in the discussion of the preceding option, Hammond argues that JCS cohesion "is achieved by its closed military staff characteristics." (Organizing for Defense, page 350)

While arguing that the Joint Staff "does deal openly" with OSD and others, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, the current JCS Chairman, offers another reason for carefully controlling such interactions:

...it is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are charged with being advisors to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council. Because of the importance of the issues with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff deal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff guard that duty very carefully. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want JCS advice to be just exactly that and not to be Joint Staff advice. The Joint Staff duty is to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist them in carrying out their duties. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

While DoD directives clearly call for substantial cooperation between OJCS and OSD, this has not been the result. If both OSD and OJCS, including the JCS themselves, are to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary cannot be well served by either organization if their advice arrives from two separate channels with limited interaction and coordination. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb does not believe that effective OJCS-OSD interactions are possible. In his book, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he writes:

...directing the Joint Staff to cooperate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to act as one staff for the secretary is totally unrealistic. The members of the Joint Staff from one service do not even cooperate fully with joint staffers from the other services. While on the Joint Staff, they are responsive primarily to the interests of their own service. To expect them to operate in unison with a civilian staff is asking too much. (page 19)

While numerous alternatives for improving OJCS-OSD interactions were presented in Section E, the vast majority of these should not be considered for congressional action. Only two proposals are worthy of consideration in the context of this study: (1) specifying in statute the desired relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and between OJCS and OSD; and (2) making OJCS part of OSD.

Sections 141, 142, and 143 of title 10, United States Code, are silent on relationships between the Secretary of Defense and his civilian assistants and the JCS, the JCS Chairman, and the OJCS staff. DoD Directive 5100.1 does specify the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS/OJCS. The relationship between OSD and OJCS is specified in DoD Directive 5158.1. Given

the conflict in the specified and actual relationships, it might be useful to include statutory language that presents the desired relationships. By itself, such additions to title 10 are not likely to have a substantial impact. Despite this realization, no disadvantages of more clearly establishing in statute these important relationships have been identified.

Incorporating OJCS into OSD also has appeal. The existence of OJCS as a wholly separate institution has fostered efforts by the JCS to secure greater autonomy and independence from the Secretary of Defense. The success of these efforts has undermined the authority of and the support for the Secretary. Making OJCS part of OSD would clarify this issue. The JCS is not to be independent of the Secretary of Defense; it is to serve him and be responsive to his needs.

On the other hand, reduced independence for the JCS could create an environment in which it would be easier to "muzzle" the military voice in national security decision-making. While this possibility cannot be absolutely discounted, the system of checks and balances in the Federal Government offer many opportunities to frustrate such an undesirable effort.

• Option 1J-strengthen the requirement for joint experience for promotion to Service Chief of Staff

Given the relatively limited joint experience that Service Chiefs bring to their JCS duties, it would clearly be desirable to set some joint duty standard for promotion to such an important position.

On the other hand, the screening process for Service Chief is extensive. Some observers do not believe that there is a need to establish another yardstick for evaluating the qualifications of candidates for Service Chief positions.

• Option 1K -authorize the JCS Chairman to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff

If the JCS Chairman were authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff, as is proposed by Option 1E, it would be logical to also authorize the Chairman to establish the staffing procedures. If, however, the Joint Staff continued to work for the corporate JCS, the arguments are more divided.

It is clear that the current staffing procedures undermine the quality of joint papers. The process magnifies Service interests and obscures joint considerations. The JCS Chairman would be the most logical person to establish procedures that would strike an appropriate balance between Service and joint perspectives.

On the other hand, if the Joint Staff is to serve the corporate JCS, giving the JCS Chairman the authority to specify staffing procedures might permit him to effectively control the Joint Staff. He might establish a process that would serve his needs and neglect the requirements of the Service Chiefs. This might be of particular concern if the following option, which would substantially reduce the Service staffs which work on joint matters, were implemented. • Option 1L-substantially reduce the Service staffs which work on joint matters

Many observers of the DoD organization have criticized the overly large bureaucracies, excessive layers, and unnecessary dupli