These historical analyses are cited not to argue that the JCS should be reformed. Their purpose is to present the case for rigorous evaluations of the JCS and alternative organizational arrangements. Such evaluations have been precluded in the past by "a formidable outcry in defense of custom.

1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE UNIFIED MILITARY ADVICE

All options that can be envisioned for an institution to provide joint military advice involve some degree of conflict of interest. Such institutions will be comprised of military officers whose careers have largely been duty in one Service. Loyalties and, in some options, formal responsibilities to their Services pose a dilemma for officers whose principal duty is to provide advice from a joint perspective. While this conflict of interest cannot be eliminated, the first two options in this subsection would considerably lessen its intensity. The conflict of interest in the current JCS arrangement is so sharp that it greatly limits the utility of the institution.

Option 1A -establish a Joint Military Advisory Council

The establishment of a Joint Military Advisory Council (JMAC) would substantially reduce the conflict of interest of officers serving on this senior advisory body. This council of military advisors would have the responsibility to provide the best possible joint military advice, uninhibited by Service responsibilities and pressures. Moreover, these senior advisors would be able to dedicate their full time and attention to these important duties.

Each member of the JMAC would have substantial expertise on the capabilities of his parent Service. While he would not be as knowledgeable as the Service Chief, his understanding of Service capabilities and programs would be nearly as good, particularly if the Service Chief ensured that he were fully informed on developments. Moreover, JMAC members would have a significant advantage over many Service Chiefs: they would have had substantial joint experience.

Another advantage of separating joint advisory and Service administration functions is that it would result in two positions that require very different abilities. This would facilitate the assignment of senior military officers who have the specific talents required by each position. The current "dual-hatted" position requires a combination of administrator, leader, strategist, and operational planner. Officers who are well-qualified in all of these areas

are rare.

The ability of the Service Chiefs to devote their full time to Service administration and of JMAC members to devote their full time to the joint advisory role is an important feature of this option. Both of these roles require full attention; as a result, both suffer under the current arrangement. Because a Service Chief gives his greatest attention to the Service leader role, the joint advisory role is particularly shortchanged.

There are many JCS duties that are now poorly performed as discussed in detail in Section D. The ability of JMAC members to spend full time on these neglected duties could be a substantial benefit of this arrangement. In particular, JMAC members could

establish close and continuous contact with the operational commanders and carefully monitor their requirements.

In sum, establishment of a JMAC would provide a powerful joint perspective to serve as a counterweight to the Service perspectives that currently dominate the joint arena.

There are numerous arguments against this option. Principal among these is the view that removing the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides joint military advice would separate responsibility and authority. Those that hold this view argue that because the Service Chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, manning, and training Services forces, they must be involved in the authority for the employment of those forces. As Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Retired) has argued on this issue:

The Congress has long recognized that to separate responsibility and authority leads to an impossible system of accountability. It would result in a military establishment totally out of control. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 37)

This argument appears to have little merit. The terms "responsibility" and "authority" are used in an imprecise and confusing manner. The Service Chiefs do have responsibility and authority for organizing, equipping, manning, and training their Service forces. They are to be held fully accountable for executing these logistics responsibilities efficiently and effectively. However, the Service Chiefs, even when wearing their JCS hats, have no responsibility or authority for the employment of U.S. military forces. That responsibility and authority are assigned to the Secretary of Defense and the operational commanders. Accountability for force employment is also clearly placed with the Secretary and the combatant commanders.

In his paper, "The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) presents another dimension of the argument that it is unwise to separate responsibility and authority. In recommending that the Service Chiefs remain JČS members, General Smith argues:

...But many of the positions taken by the Joint Chiefs are matters of judgment involving decisions the Services must in part or in full carry out, and here broad military agreement can be most beneficial. Successful implementation is more likely if the recipients of the instructions [the Service Chiefs] have been a part of the decision process (even though their views have not completely prevailed) and are fully aware of what they are told to do. (page 14)

In essence, General Smith believes that the Service Chiefs may not understand what needs to be done or appreciate the need for fully complying with the decisions of higher authority if they are not part of the joint decision-making process.

This argument has merit to the extent that it reflects a natural bureaucratic desire to be involved in decisions by higher authority and a tendency to resist decisions in which an organization believes that it was not a full participant. By itself, this argument does not appear to have sufficient merit to justify the retention of an ineffective joint advisory body. Furthermore, it should be noted that

the Service Chiefs would continue to be active participants in the Defense Resources Board where the primary issues of interest to the Services-programs and budgets are decided.

There is great concern about one particular separation of responsibility and authority and about the lack of involvement of certain recipients of instructions. It arises, however, in connection with the unified commanders. As Chapter 5 notes, the unified commanders will be held responsible and accountable for force employment, but they have extremely limited authority to shape the capabilities of the forces under their command or ability to be heard in senior decision councils. Given that the current JCS arrangement has exacerbated these problems, the option of creating a Joint Military Advisory Council may help alleviate a critical imbalance in responsibility and authority and provide a greater level of involvement by the operational commanders.

The second major argument in opposition to this option is that a body of senior military advisors divorced from executive authority would become a "council of eunuchs" with little impact on actual decisions. General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) presents this argument as follows:

...Experience has shown, however, an advisory council within the joint system that does not do more than advise sees its influence diminish over time. In the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Chiefs created a Joint Strategic Survey Committee, charged with advising the Chiefs on broad strategy matters, to be manned by the best and the brightest young flag and general rank officers. The Committee, with no control over resources, had substantial influence for a time; then its impact eroded and it was disbanded. There is no reason to believe that the fate of a modern-day similar advisory board would fare any better. ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", page 39)

While General Smith's description of the fate of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) is accurate, it is not clear that it is an appropriate analogy for the JMAC. The JCS may not have wanted the JSSC to provide crisp advice on matters of broad strategy for fear that it would have limited Service independence. The advice of the JMAC may, however, be highly desired by the Secretary of Defense and others. The validity of this criticism of a JMAC centers on the influence that this advisory body would have with the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. If its advice were valued by these officials, it would play a powerful role. If not, the JMAC would play only a minor role in important issues. The ultimate determinant is likely to be the quality of the advice offered.

The third negative argument is that JMAC members would quickly lose their currency on Service and other operational issues. An extension of this argument is that the separation of JMAC members from day-to-day Service activities might produce an "ivory tower" mentality. A troubling possibility is that Service officials, both military and civilian, might attempt to isolate a JMAC member from his parent Service. Obviously, JMAC members would have to devote sufficient attention to Service developments to

ensure an accurate knowledge of their current status. This clearly appears to be possible. However, the Secretary of Defense would also have to play a forceful role in ensuring that JMAC members have unrestricted access to necessary Service information.

It is recognized that Service-unique inputs are required in many areas of joint planning, strategy formulation, and other advisory tasks. The vast majority of these efforts are undertaken in a deliberate manner which permits adequate time for the Joint Staff to obtain the necessary Service inputs and for the JMAC members to consult, as necessary, with the Service Chiefs.

A fourth negative argument is that the establishment of the JMAC would diffuse military influence by creating two sources of military advice: the JMAC and the Service Chiefs. According to this argument, neither source would be as powerful as the present "dual-hatted" Service Chiefs. Less powerful military advisors would have diminished influence with the President, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. As a result, the military point of view will not be adequately represented before decision-making bodies. Speaking with one voice on joint issues has always been an objective of U.Š. military officials although its utility to civilian decision-makers is questionable.

There is a powerful counter-argument to this view. At present, the military voice in DoD decision-making plays a limited role because of the poor quality of advice that results from the institutional deficiencies of the present JCS system. The JMAC -capable of objective analyses of issues could provide better advice_and present a better articulation of professional military views. Such inputs are likely to carry much more weight with the Secretary of Defense and other decision-makers.

Moreover, with the current organizational arrangements, civilian decision-makers normally receive from the JCS only one recommendation for consideration. It would appear useful to have more than one recommendation offered by several sources of senior military advice.

Clearly, establishing the JMAC would create additional power centers and make some aspects of internal DoD organization more difficult. External presentation of DoD positions may also be less consistent. However, these would appear to be acceptable costs for the benefits that would result from having an objective body of senior military advisors capable of approaching issues from a national perspective.

Another negative argument is that the separation of the Service Chiefs from the joint advisory body could intensify interservice competition. The Service Chiefs would remain powerful officials even if a JMAC were created. When freed of responsibility for joint cooperation and capabilities, the Service Chiefs may pursue narrow Service interests with greater vigor. The present degree of Service cooperation might be lost. This is clearly a possibility. On the other hand, the degree of Service cooperation is currently limited by the careful protection of Service interests in the JCS system. The advice offered by the JCS is the lowest common level of assent among the four Services. The JMAC may be able to highlight opportunities for vastly improved interservice cooperation and coordination. To the extent that these opportunities affect Service inter

ests, they will be strongly resisted. It would be the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to decide these issues and to ensure that his decisions are fully implemented.

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A sixth negative argument -not related to disestablishment of the JCS but to other options for a joint advisory institution that the JMAC would continue to perpetuate a committee system. Those who raise this argument believe that a committee system whatever its composition would lead to extensive negotiations and compromises that would lessen the likelihood of crisp, clear advice for civilian decision-makers. The alternative is to place the responsibility for joint military advice in the hands of one or two officers, such as the JCS Chairman and a Deputy. This alternative would lead to a narrower set of inputs and experiences in the formulation of joint military advice. This may not be desirable.

The last major argument against this option is the dramatic nature of the changes that it proposes. Many of the effects of this option will be difficult to foresee. Opponents of this concept may argue that a more incremental approach should be pursued.

Option 1B -establish a Chief of the Joint Staff

Under this option, the JCS would be disestablished and the Chief of the Joint Staff, assisted by a Deputy, would become the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. This option would have many of the same advantages as Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council): (1) would reduce the conflict of interest for those responsible for joint military advice; (2) would provide the opportunity for better joint military advice, uninhibited by Service responsibilities and pressures; (3) would enable Service Chiefs to devote their full time to Service administration; and (4) would provide an opportunity for a greater role for joint military advice in decision-making through a better articulation of professional military views.

Similarly, this option has many of the disadvantages of Option 1A: (1) the Chief of the Joint Staff and his Deputy would not be as knowledgeable as the Service Chiefs on Service capabilities and programs; (2) these two officials could be isolated from the Services; (3) some aspects of DoD internal management would be more difficult; (4) external presentation of DoD positions would be less consistent; (5) interservice competition might be intensified; and (6) the full effect of this dramatic change would be difficult to foresee.

Aside from these pros and cons, the principal advantage of this option is that it would end the committee system in the formulation of joint military advice. By creating a single Chief of the Joint Staff, the principle of unity of command would be applied at the level of the senior military advisory institution. The most senior U.S. military officer would be able to make clear recommendations to civilian authorities after gathering and considering all relevant information and inputs.

On the other hand, assigning responsibility for joint advice to only two military officers -the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff-would limit the range of senior Service expertise and experience that would be brought to bear in the formulation of joint advice. There may be some tasks -primarily advice on operational matters during crises in which the committee system