military and civilian staffs is insufficient to be able to effectively serve the Secretary of Defense.

This option proposes that barriers to effective OJCS-OSD interactions be removed. Actions to achieve this objective could include: • specifying in statute the desired relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and between OJCS and OSD; • making OJCS part of OSD,

• requiring a greater degree of cooperation and coordination between various Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Directors of Joint Staff functional areas;

• increasing the use of OJCS-OSD working groups;

• removing physical barriers, such as the restricted access to OJCS work areas, that impede OJCS-OSD staff interactions; the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel criticized restricted access to JCS areas in the following terms:

The JCS, by restricting access to all their space, have tended to inhibit the interchange that should take place between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (pages 178 and 179)

。 providing for increased OSD oversight and review of the output of the Joint Operation Planning System; and

• increasing the flow of information between OJCS and OSD.

• Option 1J-strengthen the requirement for joint experience for promotion to Service Chief of Staff

As previously noted, the Service Chiefs have dual responsibilities: military leaders of their Services and JCS members. In selecting Service Chiefs, too much emphasis has been placed on their credentials for the former role and too little for the latter role. The Service Chiefs have been prepared by their careers to lead their Services. Their level of experience on joint matters is too limited to justify their assumption of responsibilities as JCS members.

This option proposes that a specified level of joint experience be established as an absolute requirement for promotion to Service Chief of Staff.

• Option 1K -authorize the JCS Chairman to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff

Many studies of DoD organization have concluded that changes to OJCS staffing procedures would improve the effectiveness of the JCS system. Suggested changes include:

• require that joint papers be authored by Joint Staff action officers (Chairman's Special Study Group);

• provide more guidance from senior OJCS levels prior to formal staffing (Steadman Report and Chairman's Special Study Group);

• require that joint papers be organized to present alternatives (Steadman Report and Chairman's Special Study Group);

o require the Joint Staff to merely include differing Service views in joint papers rather than requiring coordination (Steadman Report); and

o reduce Service staff involvement in joint papers to providing information and advice and then only at the request of the Joint Staff (Chairman's Special Study Group).

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman be given authority to specify the OJCS staff procedures. He would be able to implement any of the above suggestions or alternative approaches that would enhance the quality, utility, and objectivity of OJCS staff work.

This option would be a logical extension of Option 1E which proposes that the JCS Chairman be authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff.

• Option 1L -substantially reduce the Service staffs who work on joint matters

The Chairman's Special Study Group indicates that there are at least 675 officers assigned to Service staffs whose principal or parttime responsibilities are in support of their Service Chiefs in joint activities. (page 45) This is nearly equal to the number of military officers serving in OJCS. The Chairman's Special Study Group comments on this situation:

...Counting the Service staffs, there are really five staffs engaged in Joint activities in support of the Chiefs, not one. Much of the work they do is redundant, with the several staffs analyzing the same issues in parallel....The Service Chiefs depend on their own Service staffs to prepare them for JCS meetings. They are seldom briefed by officers on the Joint Staff, and have relatively little interaction with them. (page 58)

Elsewhere in the same report, Joint Staff members made the following statement:

...The Chiefs get most of their preparation on Joint issues from their own Service staffs, which hardly grants them a Joint orientation. (page 35)

This option proposes that the Service staff who may work full or part time on joint matters would be limited to not more than 25 military officers for each Service. This option has three objectives: (1) free the OJCS staff from the substantial Service constraints that currently inhibit consideration of the joint perspective; (2) eliminate the redundancy in OJCS and Service staff work; and (3) force the Service Chiefs to rely primarily on the OJCS staff on joint matters. The last objective is in line with one of the recommendations of the Chairman's Special Study Group:

Require the Joint Staff to brief, interact with, and prepare the Service Chiefs for JCS meetings, and to support the Chiefs generally in the resolution of the Joint issues they address. (page 68)

If either Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council) or Option 1B (Chief of the Joint Staff) were implemented, substantially reducing the Service staffs who work on joint matters would be an automatic extension of these options.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 made a number of changes to title 10, United States Code, which were designed to help improve the quality of the Joint Staff:

o the JCS Chairman is to select officers to be assigned to the Joint Staff;

o the restrictions on the tenure of the Director of the Joint Staff and his reassignment to the Joint Staff in peacetime were removed;

o the Secretary of Defense was required to ensure that military promotion, retention, and assignment policies give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff;

。 the 3-year limitation on service on the Joint Staff was increased to 4 years; and

。 officers may be reassigned to the Joint Staff after 2 years instead of 3 years, and the Secretary of Defense is authorized to approve exceptions to this limitation.

While these changes do provide the potential to improve the quality of the Joint Staff, they are insufficient, by themselves, to provide the desired quality of Joint Staff officers. Accordingly, additional options to attain this objective are presented in this subsection. Moreover, these additional options have been broadened, where appropriate, to address the entire OJCS staff in some cases and the entire joint duty community in others.

Options to improve the quality of the OJCS staff and other joint duty staffs can be grouped into three categories: (1) change promotion policies to increase interest in OJCS and other joint assignments; (2) improve the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments; and (3) provide for improved personnel management of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments. Within these categories, a total of ten options have been developed.

a. change promotion policies to increase interest in joint assignments

Three options involving promotion policies have been developed. The first option is designed to protect officers assigned to OJCS duty in future promotions and assignments. The other two options are designed to provide promotion incentives for joint assignments and, thereby, raise the quality of officers assigned to joint duties. • Option 2A -give the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotion and assignment of officers who are serving or have served in OJCS

As long as the Services retain absolute control over the promotions and assignments of those officers who are serving or have served in OJCS, such officers will have strong incentives to comply with their parent Services' positions in their joint work.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman have a representative on all promotion boards that would review candidates with prior or current OJCS service. In addition, the OJCS would establish procedures for monitoring assignments of officers with OJCS

experience. Should the JCS Chairman find that an officer's assignments have been negatively influenced by his joint duty, he should seek to have this situation corrected by the Service Chief. Failing in such an effort, the Chairman should be authorized to bring the issue to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

• Option 2B-strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank

DoD Directive 1320.5, "Assignment to Duty with Joint, Combined, Allied and Office of the Secretary of Defense Staffs", provides:

...a requirement is established that all officers... will serve a normal tour of duty with a Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD Staff before being considered qualified for promotion to general or flag officer rank. (page 1)

This directive does provide for a waiver of this requirement, subject to approval of the appropriate Service Secretary.

The current Directive is widely circumvented by liberal waivers and by the broadest possible interpretation of what constitutes joint service. This loophole could be closed either by legislation or by directive of the Secretary of Defense (the latter clearly being preferable).

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman specify the assignments that will meet the requirement for Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD staff duty. Furthermore, this option would grant authority only to the Secretary of Defense to waive this requirement upon the recommendation of a Service Secretary.

• Option 2C-require the JCS Chairman to evaluate all nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions on the basis of their performance in joint duty assignments

H.R. 3718, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983, included this option as one of its provisions. H.R. 3718 would require the JCS Chairman to submit such evaluations to the President. The rationale for such a requirement is presented in the report (H.R. Report No. 98-382) accompanying H.R. 3718:

Because the demands and complexity of Joint Staff work require talented and dedicated officers, the committee is convinced that performance at the Joint Staff level should be considered a mark of distinction deserving special attention by promotion boards. (page 8)

b. improve the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments

The House Committee on Armed Services Report 98-691 accompanying the Department of Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1985 requested a DoD report (with supporting studies by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on alternatives to improve the capabilities of joint duty officers. This reporting requirement and the report of the Chairman's Special Study Group in April 1982 have increased attention on the issue of the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments.

In his December 24, 1984 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense forwarding the JCS supporting study to fulfill the congressional reporting requirement, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, states that considerable progress has been made since April 1982 in improving the capabilities of joint-duty officers. He cites the following:

An annual 8-week CAPSTONE course for newly selected general/flag_officers was implemented in 1983. [The CAPSTONE curriculum is designed to enhance understanding of key factors and issues influencing the planning for and employment of U.S. military forces in joint and combined operations.]. A joint policy document on PME [Professional Military Education] recently developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff focuses on objectives and policies for NDU [National Defense University] and the Service schools. The document provides guidance and objectives for all officer education programs at the primary, intermediate, senior, and general and flag officer level. Goals for the use of Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) graduates have been established effective CY [Calendar Year] 1985. Assignment of AFSC graduates to joint-duty billets has increased steadily from 36 percent in 1982 to 63 percent in 1984. A Joint Staff Officers Training System currently under development will provide computer-based instruction in 25 topic areas for officers assigned to the Joint Staff. This course will be exportable to the unified commands and other joint activities. Inter-Service education and exchange programs have experienced modest growth in recent years. During the coming year, the Services will explore the feasibility of establishing a joint skill identifier for officers with joint-duty education and training or experience, of expanding their inter-Service education programs, and of adding a second general and flag officer CAPSTONE course each year.

These developments will help to improve the preparation and experience levels of joint duty officers. By themselves, these developments will provide only modest improvements. Accordingly, five options for expanding this trend are presented. The first involves increased cross-Service assignments for military officers. The second proposes the development of a personnel management system to ensure that the graduates of joint colleges actually serve in joint duty assignments. The third option would authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation. The fourth and fifth options involve the creation of a joint duty career path.

• Option 2D -increase the number of cross-Service assignments of military officers

The Chairman's Special Study Group recommended this option:

In another step designed to reflect greater awareness of Joint needs, a program should be established for increasing the frequency of cross-Service assignments aimed at improving the awareness within each Service of the characteristics, traditions, capabilities, and problems of the other Services. (page 70)