Similarly, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger criticized JCS advice in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff....The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised. The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is important not to rock the boat...The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure. (Part 5, page 187) The inadequacies of JCS advice have been observed for more than three decades. The following quotes from various studies of DoD organization substantiate this fact. The 1949 Eberstadt Committee found that,

it has proved difficult to expedite decision on the part of the Joint Chiefs, or to secure from them soundly unified and integrated plans and programs and clear, prompt advice. (page 53)

In 1960, the Symington Report stated:

Action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes place, if at all, only after prolonged debate, coordination and negotiation... (page 6) The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel found that:

The increase in frequency of unanimity in the recommendations and advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by no means conclusive proof of subjugation of particular Service views. Such frequency of unanimity can just as cogently support a conclusion that the basis of such recommendations and advice is mutual accommodation of all Service views, known in some forums as 'log rolling,' and a submergence and avoidance of significant issues or facets of issues on which accommodations of conflicting Service views are not possible. (page 33) In 1978, the Steadman Report

found a generally high degree of satisfaction with the military advice which the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally provide the Secretary...[but] the formal position papers of the JCS, the institutional product, are almost uniformally given low marks by their consumers -the policymakers in OSD, State, and the NSC staff -and by many senior military officers as well. (page 52)

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group stated:

...The JCS generally have been seen by civilian leaders as unable to provide useful Joint advice on many issues. Joint Staff work often comes across as superficial and predictable, and of little help in resolving issues. (page 11)

And finally, in 1985, the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Toward a More Effective Defense, stated:

...Although civilian leaders consistently praise the advice they receive from the individual chiefs of the services, they almost uniformly criticize the institutional products of the JCS as ponderous in presentation, predictably wedded to the status quo, and reactive rather than innovative. As a consequence, civilians have filled this void, serving as the major source of advice to the secretary on matters for which concise, independent military inputs would have been preferred. (page 12) a. Symptoms of Inadequate Unified Military Advice

Symptoms of inadequate unified military advice are found in many aspects of organizational activity within DoD including strategic planning, programming, operational planning, force employment, roles and missions of the Services, revision of the Unified Command Plan, organization of the unified commands, and development of joint doctrine. The JCS are viewed as the key military advisors on a substantial range of important strategy, resource, operation, and organization issues. Shortcomings in their ability to meaningfully address these issues has had a serious impact on the ability of DoD to prepare for and to conduct military operations in times of crisis. Moreover, the JCS have failed to provide adequate staff support to the Secretary of Defense in his mission integrator role. The Steadman Report summarizes the impact of these shortcomings and failures as follows:

...many of the issues on which effective joint advice is not being provided by the JCS are of fundamental importance to the ability of the United States to deter war and to fight one successfully, if necessary. The development of force structures and weapons systems within feasible budgets and the resolution of contentious joint military issues are the very decisions most difficult for the Secretary, the President, and the Congress to make. Thus, the joint military voice does not carry the weight it could in the decision process, especially in areas where it could be most useful and influential. (page 58)

The major symptoms of inadequate unified advice are briefly described below.

(1) inability to formulate military strategy

Section 141(c) of title 10, United States Code, specifies the following among the duties of the JCS: "prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces." The JCS system does participate in the strategic planning process through the preparation of the Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal JLRSA) and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). Nei

ther of these documents can be considered to provide "military strategy" because they are not constrained by fiscal realities. The military strategy that is formulated as part of the resource allocation process is developed by civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as part of the Defense Guidance. By their refusal or failure, as the case may be, to consider fiscal constraints in strategy formulation, the JCS have abandoned one of the important tasks of their responsibility as principal military advisers. Some observers believe that the JCS have not formulated a fiscally constrained strategy because the Service Chiefs do not want the JCS system to provide a more structured framework for evaluating Service force structures and programs. In the absence of such a framework, the Services can be much more independent in pursuit of their parochial interests.

(2) inability to provide meaningful programmatic advice

Section 141(c) of title 10 specifies the following among the duties of the JCS: "review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistics plans." As leaders of their individual Services, the Service Chiefs are deeply involved in DoD's resource allocation process. However, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exerts very little influence in determining the composition of the DoD budget. The joint military perspective on warfare and operational requirements that the JCS is uniquely qualified to offer is not seriously considered in the programming and budgeting phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The 1978 Steadman Report found that:

The nature of the [JCS] organization virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues involving allocation of resources among the Services, such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement of new weapons systems -except to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource constraints....The joint system plays virtually no role in this [resource] allocation process. (pages 52 and 53) The Chairman's Special Study Group shared this assessment:

...the JCS and the Joint Staff do not have a significant role in setting objectives or in resource allocation. (pages 12 and 13) PPBS presents a formal opportunity for the JCS to provide programmatic advice through the submission of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). In effect, the JPAM represents the Joint Chiefs' response to the Services' programming plans as presented in their Program Objective Memoranda (POM's). The JPAM has never been a useful document. It has never provided an independent assessment of the Service Program Objective Memoranda (POM's). The JPAM merely accommodates the disparate desires of the individual Services because as General Jones stated:

...each service usually wants the Joint Staff merely to echo its views. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 20) The limited utility of the JPAM is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

The members of the JCS attend meetings of the Defense Resources Board during the Program Review Process. However, the Service Chiefs' role during these sessions is to defend the programs contained in their Services' POM's. While the JCS Chairman also attends the DRB meetings, he cannot provide, due to his inadequate staff support, the quality of joint military programmatic advice that is needed. General Jones commented as follows on this situation:

...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only military member of the Defense Resources Board and can offer independent opinions, but the chairman has only five people working directly for him to sift through the various issues. (The Joint Staff belongs to the Joint Chiefs' corporate body, not to the chairman.) Consequently, chairmen traditionally focus on a few critical items. In my case, they were readiness, command and control, and mobility. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 20)

General George S. Brown, USAF, also commented on the absence of staff support available to him as JCS Chairman when offering advice on programmatic issues:

I had to discuss these very important programmatic and weapons systems problems and draw on things I knew before I got the job, with no help from a staff. (The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy, American Enterprise Institute, 1978, page 9)

(3) inability to effectively represent the operational commanders on resource allocation issues

Section 141(c) of title 10 directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, to "establish_unified commands in strategic areas". In addition, DoD Directive 5100.1 assigns the JCS the responsibility for transmitting orders from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. These two statutory and administrative authorities, as well as historical practice, have contributed to the role of the JCS as spokesman for the unified and specified commands within DoD.

Thus, one of the principal tasks of the JCS is to represent the operational commanders on the full range of issues affecting their commands. The JCS have failed to provide this representation because of the dominance of single Service perspectives in JCS deliberations. The Steadman Report comments on the poor representation of the operational commanders:

...most CINC's have limited power to influence the capability of the forces assigned to them....The Services (and the components) thus have the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible. (page 33)

The Chairman's Special Study Group also found:

...The CINCs are in a particularly good position to advise on operational problems such as shortages of space parts, muni

tions, and manpower, but they have been remote from, and poorly represented in, the programming and budgeting process. (page 13)

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands addresses in detail the failure of the JCS to adequately represent the operational commanders in the context of the imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their influence over resource decisions. The absence of representation of the operational commanders in the resource allocation process is a serious deficiency because in the words of DoD Directive 7045.14:

The ultimate objective of the PPBS shall be to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. (page 1) (4) undue Service parochialism in operational matters

In providing advice to the Secretary of Defense during crises or wars, the JCS have traditionally given undue emphasis to Service interests. Each Service wants to be involved in responding to the crisis or war whether or not its forces are suited to the mission. The resulting JCS recommendations are designed more to balance Service interests than provide the most effective fighting force. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated:

...At the present time, each of the services wants a piece of the action and, therefore, those crises responses are coupled together in an atmosphere in which each service is demanding that it have a piece of the action and is demanding usually that it control its own forces. (Part 5, page 201)

Similarly, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the following lesson could be learned from the Iranian hostage rescue mission:

One basic lesson is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration. (SASC Hearings, Part 11, page 503)

(5) inability to provide for effective organization and command arrangements within the unified commands

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands addresses the organizational deficiencies of the unified commands, especially regarding the absence of unification at subordinate levels of the commands. There are two basic causes of the problem of insufficient unification within the unified commands: (1) the refusal of the Services to accept substantial unification within the unified commands; and (2) absence of agreement on appropriate command relationships, especially concerning the principle of unity of command. The JCS must be held responsible for these deficiencies because they result primarily from organizational and procedural arrangements specified in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces.