military officers capable of effectively performing joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in such assignments have been permitted to persist.

In this regard, some observers argue that the overriding solution to DoD organizational problems is to improve the caliber of senior officials. While improving the quality of DoD's senior leadership is an important initiative, it should not, however, be seen as a substitute for necessary organizational reform. Although good people can, to a certain extent, overcome a deficient organizational structure, a well-designed structure will support a higher level of sustained effectiveness than a poor structure will. Moreover, a choice between good people and sound structure need not be made. Efforts to improve DoD's performance should emphasize both structural change and enhancement of the management and leadership skills of senior officials.

13. Failure to Clarify the Desired Division of Work

One of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency is to rationally divide the work among the various structural components. Within DoD, the desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many instances; in others, the assigned division of work is ignored in practice. Congressional micro-management of defense programs and OSD micro-management of Service programs are key examples of this problem. Equally relevant is DoD's inability to objectively examine the Unified Command Plan and the Services' roles and missions. This inability precludes a more rational division of work among the operational commands in the first instance and among the Services in the second. In the context of civilian control of the military, there is also a lack of clarity on the division of work between civilian and military officials and organizations. As a last point, many organizations have encroached on the duties of OJCS; both OSD and the Services are performing roles assigned to OJCS. The absence of a rational and enforced division of work leads to greater complexity, friction, delay, duplication, and inefficiency.

14. Excessive Spans of Control

At many levels of the Department of Defense, key managers have an excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. For example, the Secretary of Defense has 41 senior military and civilian officials (excluding the Deputy Secretary and his immediate staff) who report directly to him. Likewise, the Service Chiefs have unwieldy spans of control. The Army Chief of Staff has 42 officials reporting directly to him; the Chief of Naval Operations, 48 officials; the Air Force Chief of Staff, 35 officials; and the Marine Corps Commandant, 41 officials. Effective supervision and coordination of excessive numbers of officials are not possible. As a result, organizational inefficiency is substantial. In general, excessive spans of control in DoD result from the use of relatively flat organizational structures. Use of more orderly hierarchical structures may help to solve the problems of insufficient supervision and coordination.

15. Insufficient Power and Influence of the Secretary of Defense The actual power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not sufficient to enable him to effectively manage the Department of Defense. The problem arises not from his formal statutory authority which provides him a full measure of power. Instead, the problem emanates from powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own agendas has substantially weakened the office of Secretary of Defense. As a result, the Secretary lacks the tools, levers, and organizational channels that he needs to effectively manage the defense bureaucracy. Moreover, his efforts are seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military advice; he is too dependent on the advice and counsel of the Service Chiefs who pre-negotiate key issues. The Secretary of Defense is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer him little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities. Organizational and procedural changes in DoD should be consistent with the need to enhance the management potential of the Secretary of Defense.

Strengthening the power and influence of the Secretary of Defense does not mean increased centralization. Only when bureaucratic constraints and obstacles that diffuse the Secretary's power are removed will he be able to decentralize without losing control. On the whole, the recommendations of this study offer the potential for the Secretary of Defense to realize the advantages of decentralized management of many activities.

16. Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional Oversight

The Congress has a central role in the overall planning and management of the Nation's security and must share responsibility for any fundamental problems. In fact, efforts to reorganize the Department of Defense will prove imperfect again unless accompanied by changes on Capitol Hill. The very structure of the Congress and its review procedures produce an inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pattern of oversight and guidance. This inconsistent pattern reinforces divisions within DoD, inhibiting the development of a coherent and integrated defense program. The absence of effective mission integration in DoD is a fundamental flaw, and the Congress has been a major contributor to that shortcoming.

There are five aspects to this congressional problem. First, the cognizant committees have developed different structures, styles, and traditions, resulting in an inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pattern of DoD oversight. These differences foster confusion and tempt factions within DoD to export conflicts to the Congress. Second, the Congress tends to review the defense program in terms of artificial accounting inputs rather than in terms of mission outputs. Adjustments tend to be made for financing reasons within accounts rather than for reasons of priorities among missions. Third, the Congress tends not to compare programs across Service lines and very rarely makes policy tradeoffs that cross Service lines. Fourth, the Congress tends to dwell on policy or program conflicts and tensions within DoD, reinforcing those conflicts. Fifth, the Congress has historically favored independent subordinate offices as opposed to centralized control in DoD, in order to maximize con

gressional leverage in directing the allocation of resources or determining the outcome of policy disputes.

Beyond this major deficiency, the current practice of congressional review and oversight has resulted in substantial instability in defense policies and programs. This has resulted from the hegemony of the congressional budget process which has overwhelmed the remainder of the legislative agenda and which has precluded meeting the established schedule for enactment of authorization and appropriations bills. As a result, the Congress has been forced to resort to continuing resolutions for spending measures. Instability in defense policies and programs has been further heightened by the tendency of the Congress to look at DoD activity in only single fiscal year increments with predictable short-sighted results. Lastly, the Congress extensively micro-manages DoD. Increasingly, the Congress is becoming involved in the details of the defense budget, not just the broad policies and directions that guide it.

D. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Many of the broad recommendations of the staff study are presented in the preceding text of the Executive Summary. The study also makes a total of 91 specific recommendations to solve the problems identified in Chapters 3 through 9. The twelve most important specific recommendations are:

1. Establish three mission-oriented under secretary positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) NATO defense, and (3) regional defense and force projection.

2. Disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, thereby, permit the Service Chiefs to dedicate all their time to Service duties.

3. Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a 4-star military officer from each Service on his last tour of duty to serve as the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

4. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own right.

5. Designate one of the members of the Joint Military Advisory Council, from a different Service pair (Army/Air Force and Navy/ Marine Corps) than the Chairman, as Deputy Chairman.

6. Specify that one of the responsibilities of the Joint Military Advisory Council is to inform higher authority of all legitimate al

ternatives.

7. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty.

8. Establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty.

9. Make the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council (JMAC) the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JMAC system while ensuring absolute clarity that the JMAC Chairman is not part of the chain of command.

10. Remove the Service component commanders within the unified commands from the operational chain of command.

11. Fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy. (The Department of the Navy is treated differently because of its dual-Service structure.)

12. Create the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) who would be responsible for establishing and maintaining a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process.

A. BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In June 1983, Senator John Tower, then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the late Senator Henry M. Jackson, the Ranking Minority Member, initiated a comprehensive review of the organizational relationships and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense (DoD). As part of this project, the Committee held a series of 12 hearings in which it took testimony from 31 witnesses.

In addition, Senators Tower and Jackson directed the staff to prepare an objective evaluation of the structure and functions of the Department of Defense. In writing this study, the staff has relied on a variety of sources for information: a 40-year record of testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; interviews of current and former DoD civilian and military officials; reports done for and by the Executive Branch; and studies prepared by research institutions. Under the direction of the Committee's current Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, and the Committee's Task Force on Defense Organization, the staff has now completed its work on this evaluation.

The authority for congressional review of the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense derives from specific Constitutional powers. Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution provides that:

The Congress shall have Power...

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; (clause 14)

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. (clause 18)

The specific responsibilities of the Committee on Armed Services are enumerated in Rule XXV (section 1(c)) of the Standing Rules of the Senate. The authority for the Committee's review is found in subsection (2):

Such committee shall also study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defense policy of the United States, and report thereon from time to time.