網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

Just to be clear, we are not overly concerned about the organizational form that a few early users of the technique -such as Boeing and NASA -called "matrix" management. The key to making these systems work is the same key that makes structures work in the rest of the excellent companies. One dimension -e.g., product or geography or function -has crystal

clear primacy. (pages 307-308) The mission-function matrix proposed for OSD appears to fit into this latter category. It is a simple, two-dimensional matrix involving only eight OSD offices. Furthermore, the mission dimension would have "crystal clear primacy.'

A second disadvantage of the matrix arises from the dual chain of command. The system of two bosses even if one is dominant places new demands on middle managers. This could lead to resistance to the matrix concept. Moreover, some corporations have found that people under a matrix organization are not certain to whom and for what they should report. The all too common question was "Which boss do I report to on this one, or do I keep everyone informed?” This breeds staffers who gain and retain substantial power by ensuring that everything stays complex. o Option 1D -replace the current Joint Staff functional (J-1, J

2, etc.) organization with a mission-oriented organization. Creating mission-oriented offices in OJCS could be undertaken in lieu of or in addition to creation of such offices in OSD. Given the extensive mission integration staff support that the Secretary of Defense needs, it does not appear that the Secretary could rely exclusively on the OJCS. Although the involvement of the OJCS in resource allocation issues can be important, it is not nearly of the same scope as that of OSD. If the Secretary of Defense desires extensive mission integration support, he will need to organize OSD to provide it.

As to whether a part of OJCS should mirror mission-oriented offices in OSD, it might be useful to have a military input with the same perspective as the OSD mission-oriented offices. Such an arrangement could provide the Secretary with a wider range of views on the most fundamental defense issues.

On the other hand, it may be disruptive to make substantial structural changes in the two most senior defense organizations (OSD and OJCS) at the same time. In addition, it is unclear whether the Secretary of Defense would benefit more from two missionoriented inputs or whether it would be more beneficial for OJCS to approach issues from a different organizational perspective.

As a last point, it is not clear that the Congress should play a forceful role in organizing the Joint Staff. It may be preferable to allow the professional military to continue to specify the structure of the Joint Staff. 2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE SUPER

VISION AND COORDINATION OF OSD OFFICES o Option 2A -create two additional under secretaries for evalua

tion and readiness, sustainability, and support.

This option has three principal advantages: (1) it reduces the Secretary's span of control from 24 to 10 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials; (2) it provides the potential for improved coordination between similar functional areas; and (3) by creating an under secretary focused on readiness, sustainability, and support issues, it may produce a better balance between investment and readiness allocations. In addition, of the proposals offered for restructuring OSD, this option is the least disruptive.

While this option has numerous advantages, it fails to address the most serious problem in OSD which is limited mission integration. In addition, coordination across the functional groupings that would report to the four under secretaries would not be improved. Moreover, an additional layer would be placed between the Secretary and his functional specialists. o Option 2B-create three mission-oriented under secretaries for

nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection and an under secretary for readiness, sustain

ability, and support. This option reduces the Secretary's span of control from 24 to 13 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials. Other points of evaluation are included under Option 1B. o Option 2C -create three deputy secretaries of defense for mili

tary operations, resource management, and evaluation. Of all the options put forth for streamlining OSD, this proposal of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel is by far the most extensive. In addition to changing reporting relationships in OSD, this option would alter the officials to whom the Service Secretaries and unified and specified commanders would report. For the former, they would report to a Deputy Secretary (Management of Resources); the latter, to a Deputy Secretary (Operations). If this option were applied to the current organization, the number of DoD officials OSD and elsewhere -reporting to the Secretary of Defense would be reduced from 41 to 14. Within OSD, the reduction would be from 24 to 9 officials.

In addition to reducing the Secretary's span of control problem, this option offers several advantages. It would provide clearer lines of authority and responsibility throughout DoD. It would also provide the potential for increased coordination among the programs of the Services. Moreover, civilian oversight of non-nuclear contingency plans would likely be improved through the creation of a Deputy Secretary (Operations).

There are, however, a substantial number of negatives. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense arrangement has traditionally been one where one incumbent focused on day-to-day management of DoD, and the other on budget justification, Cabinet-level policy interactions, and political and congressional liaison and influence. Even if it were always the Secretary who has the latter role, he would have to add to his responsibilities refereeing disputes among the three Deputy Secretaries. Since military operations would set requirements, resource management would develop programs to meet requirements, and evaluation would decide whether requirements are met, it is not hard to foresee a large role for a referee. This option may ostensibly reduce the Secretary's span of control, but not his workload.

Further, and most important, it would hinder integration of effort along mission lines where development, procurement, and readiness must be balanced to achieve the maximum level of mission output for the resources available. This approach would be a step backward in tying together strategy, policies, and resource allocations.

In addition, the role of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unclear under this proposal. They would be distanced from military operations which has traditionally been a principal responsibility of OJCS.

As a last point, the creation of a pure planning staff to do longrange planning is likely to be an unworkable arrangement. Longrange plans produced solely by staff planners have not been readily accepted by line management organizations. Staff planners can only start the process and, later, help it to continue. • Option 2D -have some Defense Agencies report through the

JCS Chairman to the Secretary of Defense. OJCS is more likely than OSD to ensure that the Defense Agencies are more oriented to supporting combat forces in wartime. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the supervision or control of certain defense agencies would be improved by their transfer from OSD to OJCS. In fact, the current organizational de ficiencies of the JCS system may lead to less efficient supervision and control of these Defense Agencies. o Option 2E-create an office in the Office of the Director of

Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) solely to review the

program submissions of the Defense Agencies. This option has the advantage of concentrating authority, responsibility, and oversight of the Defense Agencies. However, there are OSD functional offices other than PĀ&E which have more direct interests in individual agencies. This option would not improve oversight by these other OSD offices. Strengthened oversight by OSD functional offices would appear to be a more beneficial alternative when compared to creation of a new office within PA&E.

o Option 2F -create a Coordinating Group.

The creation of a Coordinating Group in the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense would probably do much to increase the effective integration of the far-flung programs and offices of the Department of Defense –provided that individual Secretaries of Defense used the group effectively and gave it considerable authority. But by itself, such a group could accomplish little; its authority and influence would derive a direct proportion to the management competence of and effective delegation by the Secretary of Defense.

Management style would probably be a critical factor. Secretaries who wanted to maintain tight control of the Department and run it in a fairly authoritative, hierarchical fashion would probably find a Coordinating Group of immense value. Since the loyalty of the group would be to the Secretary alone, he could overcome some of the problems associated with Service Secretaries and under and assistant secretaries in OSD being coopted to a degree by the organizations over which they preside. The Coordinating Group could cut across such dual loyalties and help ensure that the Secretary's will was carried out.

On the other hand, a Secretary who preferred to run the Department as a vast conglomerate, delegating large amounts of his decision-making authority to the Service Secretaries and OSD under and assistant secretaries, might find a Coordinating Group to be merely a nuisance. In addition, a Coordinating Group may result in overcentralization with all of its negative attributes. For this reason, such a group probably out not to be established in law, but might better be set up by individual Secretaries of Defense, according to their preferences and needs.

In addition, it is unclear how the work of this group would differ from the immediate assistants to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and from three existing coordinating bodies: the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Defense Resources Board, and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Moreover, the establishment of mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries and multi-functional under secretaries offers greater potential for coordination without overcentralization. o Option 2G -create a permanent (career position) under secre

tary to focus on management and coordination tasks. The option of creating a position for a permanent under secretary was offered as a solution to three OSD problem areas: (1) inadequate supervision and coordination; (2) inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity; and (3) micro-management of the Services. The general management responsibilities envisioned_in these options for this senior career official are very similar. For this reason, all three options will be evaluated under this heading. The basic arguments raised for Option 2F (Coordinating Group) also apply to an under secretary performing the same role; therefore, they will not be repeated here.

If this official were viewed as sufficiently apolitical as to enjoy the confidence of political appointees, he could play a useful role in numerous management areas. He could help the Secretary of Defense to improve supervision and coordination of OSD offices. In particular, he could play a forceful role in ensuring that OSD does not perform duties that should be the responsibility of the Military Departments. This permanent under secretary could offset the relative inexperience of political appointees especially during periods of transition. Such a senior career official could provide an important institutional memory.

The British Ministry of Defence has successfully employed a permanent senior official with both broad management and policy responsibilities. The U.S. Department of State also has had a senior career official -the Under Secretary for Political Affairs -although his responsibilities have focused on policy rather than management. Nevertheless, he has provided a useful source of experience and continuity.

On the other hand, it is unclear how the authority of this position would compare to that of politically appointed under or assistant secretaries. Inevitable conflicts in this regard would require higher authority to resolve. For this official to effectively perform his duties, the Secretary of Defense would have to give him broad authority and support. Whether the Secretary of Defense would be prepared to share his power with a career official whom he did not select is uncertain. It is also possible that this official could be frozen out by incoming administrations if he were judged to be political or closely associated with previous policies. 3. OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL

APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN OSD o Option 3A –require that political appointees have strong de

fense management credentials. This option is intended to resolve the serious problem of numerous political appointees coming to their positions with little experience in national security affairs or knowledge of DoD. The result is a generally weak management layer imposed on top of the permanent bureaucracy.

There are really no disadvantages to this option, for it clearly would be desirable to appoint OSD officials with the highest possible level of defense management abilities. There is, however, little that can be done about this by direct legislation. The Senate can play a certain rearguard role by applying more rigorous standards in its own review of candidates. However, the real key to improvement in this area would be a greater awareness of the problem and a greater commitment on the part of the present and future administrations to finding higher quality appointees and refraining from using key civilian positions in OSD and the Military Departments largely as political rewards.

It is clear that the Senate has the authority to insist on appointees with greater defense management experience and skills. The extent to which the Senate is prepared to challenge the President on political appointments is uncertain, particularly in light of a general conviction in the Senate that the President should have considerable leeway in appointing senior Executive Branch officials. There may be some small legislative initiatives that the Congress could take, such as enacting a resolution or requiring a report on the subject, that might heighten awareness of this issue, but that is probably all that could be achieved by direct legislation. A more viable initiative would be for the Senate Committee on Armed Services to adopt more stringent professional standards for nominees who appear before it for confirmation. o Option 3B -require a longer commitment of service from OSD

political appointees. Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to induce most political appointees to remain longer unless substantially greater compensation were paid to them, and that is a problem that may lie beyond the scope of changes within DoD. Individual Secretaries of Defense might, however, seek longer commitments of service from their appointees during the initial hiring process. The Senate Committee on Armed Services could seek similar commitments during the confirmation process. While this option presents a desirable goal, forceful mechanisms for achieving it do not appear to be available.

« 上一頁繼續 »