these objectives in mind, four options have been developed. These options propose that portions of OSD and OJCS be organized along major mission lines. No element of the Washington Headquarters of DoD is organized along major mission lines. While there are small offices within various OSD, OJCS, and Military Department organizations that focus on a functional area relating to a major DoD mission, such as policy for defense of NATO Europe, there is no major organizational entity that has a comprehensive, multi-functional, mission orientation. Only at the unified and specified command, or operational, level which is far removed from Washington is there a true mission orientation. Since institutions should be organized, both at their policymaking and operational levels, to execute their major responsibilities, the current organizational arrangements at the policymaking level of DoD, which emphasize functional inputs, and not mission outputs, are a major shortcoming. In essence, these arrangements are a major roadblock to improved mission integration. Alternative arrangements include: • Option 1A -create an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Program Integration whose office would include assistant secretaries for three major mission categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional (other world regions) defense and force projection In a previous portion of this chapter, it was asserted that DoD has six major missions: These six missions are used as the basis for forming mission-oriented offices in OSD. Under this proposal, the missions of nuclear deterrence and defense of NATO, given their paramount importance, would each be assigned to an assistant secretary. The other four missions -maritime superiority, power projection superiority, defense of East Asia, and defense of Southwest Asia -would be assigned to a third assistant secretary, to be entitled regional defense and force projection. The CSIS report, Toward a More Effective Defense, included major portions of this option as one of its recommendations. (pages 25-27) Under this option, these three assistant secretaries would report to an Under Secretary for Policy and Program Integration. The current position of Under Secretary for Policy would be expanded to assume the program integration responsibilities. Expanding the responsibilities of this under secretary to include program integration is a logical extension of the current duties of this position. DoD Directive 5111.1, which specifies the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, lists the following function first: "integration of DoD plans and policies with overall national security objectives." In essence, the integration responsibilities of this position would be expanded from only policy planning to include programs and resource decisions. Under this alternative, portions of current OSD functional offices -policy and program analysis and evaluation being key examples -would be transferred to the offices of the new assistant secretaries. For example, the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Deterrence would have reporting to him the following offices: current organization Office of the Deputy Assist- Office of the Deputy Assist- Deputy Director (Strategic OUSD (Policy) OUSD (Policy) Office of the Director of Program Similar transfers would be made to the other mission-oriented assistant secretaries. As to the location of the current international policy and international affairs offices in this proposed organization, the Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy) would be divided between the assistant secretaries for nuclear deterrence and NATO defense. The Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) would be incorporated in the office of the assistant secretary for regional defense and force projection. To provide these assistant secretaries with expertise and influence on the range of resource issues that would be of concern in their mission areas, it will be necessary to provide them staff capabilities in the traditional resource-oriented functional areas: research and development, manpower, logistics, installations, and command, control, communications, and intelligence. This capability could be provided in two ways. First, the mission-oriented assistant secretaries could be assigned a resource office that would have a small cell of staffers to address each functional area. This arrangement would enable the missionoriented assistant secretaries to have an effective voice in resource issues without impeding the functional integration role of the functional-oriented under and assistant secretaries. The second method of providing resource expertise to the mission-oriented assistant secretaries would be to transfer to them entire subunits that have mission-oriented responsibilities from the functional offices. For example, the Deputy Under Secretary (Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces) could be transferred from the Office of the Under Secretary (Research and Engineering) to the office of the Assistant Secretary (Nuclear Deterrence). Similarly, the Director of Strategic and Theater Forces Command, Control, and Communications could be transferred from the Office of the Assistant Secretary (CI) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Nuclear Deterrence). Such transfers would not be possible from all functional offices due to the inability to divide some offices along mission lines. This second method would greatly reduce the roles of the functional under and assistant secretaries and make functional integration in DoD more difficult. Under either approach, certain OSD functional areas would remain unaltered, such as comptroller, general counsel, public affairs, legislative affairs, and acquisition. • Option 1B -create under secretaries in OSD for three major mission categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection. Instead of creating three mission-oriented assistant secretaries reporting to a single under secretary, this option proposes the creation of three mission-oriented under secretaries who would report to the Secretary of Defense. Options 1A and 1B differ only in regard as to whether these mission-oriented offices would be headed by assistant or under secretaries and whether these offices would report to an under secretary or directly to the Secretary of Defense. As in Option 1A, appropriate cells or portions of current OSD functional offices would be transferred to the offices of the new under secretaries. Chart 3-4 presents an illustrative diagram of the major offices that would report to these three under secretaries; the diagram is based upon the approach of having one resource office for each under secretary with staff cells for various resourceoriented functional areas. One of the offices subordinate to the Under Secretary (Regional Defense and Force Projection) deserves special attention. That is the office which would focus on low intensity warfare and special operations. At the present time, low intensity warfare and special operations would not qualify as a major DoD mission; it is properly included as a subordinate mission of the regional defense and force projection mission. Despite this judgment, there is a substantial need to create a strong multi-Service, multi-functional, organizational focus for low intensity warfare and special operations. This is so for six reasons: (1) the threat to U.S. interests from the lower end of the conflict spectrum is becoming more serious; (2) the capabilities needed to respond to these threats are not among the traditional ones of the Services; (3) the Services have a tendency in force planning to focus on high intensity conflicts upon which their resource programs are principally justified; (4) there is a need to coordinate the activities of the Services as they seek to develop required capabilities in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; (5) there is a need for innovative thinking and new approaches to these threats; and (6) a clear organizational focus may help ensure that these capabilities receive the proper attention and priority. While the proposals for offices subordinate to the under secretaries may be considered as illustrative, the establishment of an office for low intensity warfare and special operations is a specific proposal. Chart 3-5 presents one possible organizational diagram of OSD that could result from the creation of mission-oriented under secretaries. The set of organizational changes proposed in this diagram also seeks to solve the span of control problems (problem area #2) of the Secretary of Defense by grouping offices under the most logical senior official. Key among these changes is the creation of an Under Secretary for Readiness, Sustainability, and Support whose office would have responsibility for manpower, reserve affairs, health affairs, installations, and logistics. Chart 3-5 also reflects a recommendation of Chapter 7 (PPBS) that the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) be created. This proposal -despite the detail in which it is portrayed -is provided only for illustrative purposes. Chart 3-5 represents only one of many possible schemes for organizing OSD with three mission-oriented under secretaries. Accordingly, it should not be considered a recommended course of action. The purposes of Chart 3-5 are solely to: (1) serve as a starting point for efforts to design an OSD staff with improved mission integration capabilities and a more manageable span of control; and (2) identify for the Congress the underlying principles to be addressed in legislation. |
