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toward a general staff in the 20th century.
5. Chapter 5—Unified and specified commands
B. Evolution of the operational commands.......
C. Key trends.......
D. The current operational command structure....
E. Problem areas and causes.
F. Description of solutions to problem areas
G. Evaluation of alternative solutions ....
H. Conclusions and recommendations
This study, as its title – Defense Organization: The Need for Change-indicates, is critical of the current organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense (DoD) and of the Congress. The underlying problems within DoD have been evident for much of this Century. The inability to solve these problems is not due to a lack of attention or a failure to have the issues examined by the most experienced and learned experts. At regular intervals during the last 85 years, these issues have been vigorously addressed by highly capable and well-intentioned individuals, both from the public and private sectors as well as from civilian and military life. It is the complexity of the Department of Defense – the largest organization in the Free World - that has served to frustrate previous efforts. Adding to the difficulty of these issues are the quickening pace of the technological revolution, the increasing and changing demands of protecting U.S. security interests in a dynamic international environment, and the resistance to needed changes by a substantial portion of the defense bureaucracy. While the problems in congressional review and oversight of the defense program have emerged more recently, their resolution has not been possible despite serious study and concern by Members of Congress.
Twenty-seven years have passed since major statutory changes were last made in DoD organizational arrangements. During that period, substantial experience has been gained with the basic structure provided by the National Security Act of 1947. There is a record —which is not always clear of what has worked and what has failed. George Washington's statement at the time of the creation of the War Office in 1776 would be equally appropriate to the Department of Defense when it was created in 1949:
The Benefits derived from it [the War Office), I flatter myself will be considerable tho' the plan upon which it is first formed may not be perfect. This like other great works in its first Edition, may not be entirely free from Error. Time will discover its Defects and experience suggest the Remedy, and such further Improvements as may be necessary; but it was right to
give it a Beginning. Moreover, the passage of time may permit more objective consideration of issues that flared into emotional controversies during the unification debates of the immediate post-World War II period. These two factors -actual organizational experience and a measured detachment from previous controversies -enhance prospects for the emergence of a consensus on solutions to the long-standing problems of the U.S. military establishment.
Hopefully, this is the case. The Department of Defense's task of protecting U.S. worldwide interests has become exceedingly more complex and demanding over the last 30 years. This trend has increased the seriousness of structural deficiencies within the U.S. military establishment. The gap between today's structural arrangements and the organizational needs of the Department of Defense is continuously widening. B. PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONAL GOAL OF DOD
The principal organizational goal of DD, both in 1949 and now, is the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions. In this study, this goal is termed "mission integration”. Mission integration is necessary at both of the distinct organizational levels of DoD: the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations, and the operational level, consisting of the unified and specified commands. Effective mission integration is critical to U.S. national security because none of the major missions of DoD can be executed alone by forces of any single Service. Without effective mission integration, unification of the four Services —as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 -means little.
In fact, while previous debates on DoD organization have focused on unification or centralization, neither of these concepts is a useful starting point for identifying the organizational needs of DoD. Instead, mission integration describes the real goal of the search for a more effective and, perhaps, a more efficient U.S. military establishment. Focusing on mission integration offers greater prospects for understanding DoD's deficiencies.
At the present time, DoD has six major missions, three of which are worldwide in nature and three of which are regional. The major worldwide missions and their goals are:
nuclear deterrence-maintaining essential equivalence with the strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union;
maritime superiority --controlling the seas when and where needed; and
power projection superiority-deploying superior military forces in times of crisis to distant world areas which are pri
marily outside the traditional system of Western alliances. The major regional missions are:
defense of NATO Europe, including both the northern and southern flanks;
defense of East Asia, particularly Northeast Asia; and
defense of Southwest Asia, especially the region's oil re
sources. While DoD has other regional missions (e.g., Western Hemisphere and Africa), these relatively smaller, while important, missions are included in the mission of power projection superiority.
C. PROBLEMS AND BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Limited Mission Integration at DoD's Policymaking Level
The three principal organizations of the Washington Headquarters of DoD -the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Military Departments -are focused excessively on functional areas, such as manpower, research and development, and installations and logistics. This functional structure serves to inhibit integration of Service capabilities along mission lines, and, thereby, hinders achieving DoD's principal organizational goal of mission integration. The focus of organizational activity is on functional efficiency (or, in other terms, management control of functional activities) and not on major missions and their objectives and strategy. Without extensive mission integration efforts, numerous deficiencies occur:
In colloquial terms, material inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized.
A sharp focus on missions, where DoD must compete with potential adversaries, is lost in the functional diffusion.
Strategic planning is inhibited by the absence of an organizational focus on major missions and strategic goals.
Service interests rather than strategic needs play the dominant role in shaping program decisions.
Functions (e.g., airlift, sealift, close air support) which are not central to a Service's own definition of its missions tend to be neglected.
Tradeoffs between programs of different Services that can both contribute to a particular mission are seldom made.
Opportunities for non-traditional contributions to missions (e.g., Air Force contributions to sea control) are neither easily identified nor pursued.
Headquarters organizations are not fully attuned to the operational, especially readiness, requirements of the unified commanders.
Interoperability and coordination requirements of forces
from the separate Services are not readily identified. Beyond these major shortcomings, the functional structure encourages OSD micro-management of Service programs.
A more appropriate balance between functional and mission orientations is needed, especially within OSD. In the absence of an organizational focus on missions within the Washington Headquarters of DoD, effective mission integration will remain limited. For a major mission like defense of Southwest Asia - for which all four Services have important roles -insufficient mission integration at the policymaking level would lead to critical gaps in warfighting capabilities, wasted resources through unwarranted duplication, interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint training, and ineffective fighting forces.
2. Imbalance Between Service and Joint Interests
Under current arrangements, the Military Departments and Services exercise power and influence which are completely out of proportion to their statutorily assigned duties. The predominance of