It is hardly necessary to seek any explanation of the events. of Bull Run, other than what arises from the consideration of the simple fact that the battle was fought at all. McDowell's plan of battle was well-considered, and even bold; but the faults of execution were innumerable. Owing to the absence of any thing like a staff, the attack was made in a most fragmentary way, without order or ensemble. Since the close of the war, the writer of these pages has had with General Johnston a very full conversation on this action; and on the question of the general management of the battle of Manassas, he spoke as follows: "The key-point was a flat, bare crest. It was here that the Federals made their attacks. But they were made by a brigade at a time. The position was really hardly tenable, and had an attack been made in force, with double line of battle-such as any major-general in the United States service would now make--we could not have held it half an hour, for they would have enveloped us on both flanks."

So far as regards the mere physical fact of fighting, which was at the time the all-important question, there was nothing of which the Union soldiers had to be ashamed—they stood up to it with the blood of their race. The fault lay in the inherently vicious organization of the force-in the great number of miserable subordinate officers, which in turn was the natural result of the method of raising regiments. Yet, with all the faults, the action was for a time almost a success, which shows that the Confederates were really in not much better condition. Their chief point of advantage was in the better class of officers created by their system. Nevertheless, the victory long hung in the balance, and might readily have declared itself on either side.* At the close of the action, the

*General Jordan, chief of staff to Beauregard, informs me that while conducting "President" Davis up to the battle-ground from Manassas Junction during the progress of the action, and just a short time before the giving way of the Union lines, such were the streams of stragglers and skulkers pouring to the Southern rear, that Mr. Davis fancied Beauregard had been completely beaten. Observing the fact that each even slightly wounded man was es

Southerners were hardly less demoralized than their opponents, so that the idea of pursuit was not to be entertained. On this point, again, the testimony of General Johnston is of the highest value. "In our condition," said he, "pursuit could not be thought of; for we were almost as much disorganized by our victory as the Federals by their defeat. Next day, many, supposing the war was over, actually went home. A party of our soldiers, hearing that a friend lay wounded twenty miles off, would start out to go and see him; or that another acquaintance was dead, and they would go and bury him. Our men had in a larger degree the instinct of personal liberty than those of the North; and it was found very difficult to subordinate their personal will to the needs of military discipline." *

Both sides, in fact, had much to learn; and it is the fact that the battle of Bull Run was the first great lesson which the two armies received, that makes the events which transpired on the plains of Manassas that July Sunday, forever memorable in the history of the War.

corted by two or three comrades, Mr. Davis exclaimed to Jordan, "Battles are not won where several unhurt men are seen carrying off each wounded soldier!"

* General Johnston in his official report says: "The war department has already been informed of all the causes that prevented pursuit, some of which only are proper to be communicated." I suppose, what is stated above, which I had from General Johnston's own lips, supplies the rest.

III.

THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON.

JULY, 1861-MARCH, 1862.

I.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

WHEN the army that so lately had gone forth with such high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discomfited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there was that had suffered worse defeat than the army-it was the system under which Bull Run had been fought and lost. The lesson was a severe one; but if it was needed to demonstrate the legitimate result of the crude experimentalism under which the war had been conducted,-wheh campaigns were planned by ignorant politicians, and battles, precipitated by the pressure of sanguine journalists, were fought by raw three months' levies,-the price paid was perhaps not too high. The Bull Run experiment taught the country it was a real war it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for by a strict conformity to military principles.

The spirit in which the country rose to meet the emergency showed that it had benefited by the experience; and if before Bull Run the public mind had been in a mood to require just such a stern lesson for reproof and correction and instruction, it soon appeared that there was in it a temper to rise above the worst lapses and failures. For then was seen that which again and again throughout the war has been seen a spectacle