ing the invasion, it was, with the Nineteenth Corps, returned to the Shenandoah Valley. Here General Sheridan soon afterwards took command, and opened a brilliant campaign, to the details of which I shall shortly return.

In this enterprise, General Lee founded his expectations less on what might be accomplished directly by the expeditionary force, than on the effect he supposed this menace to Washington would have on the army beleaguering Petersburg. He reasoned that as General Grant was a man who believed in overwhelming numbers, he would find himself, after the detachment of a sufficient force to meet the column of invasion, so reduced in strength that he would remove his remaining corps altogether from Petersburg. The siege would thus be raised and Richmond relieved.

But Lee's reasoning was falsified by the fact. The opportune arrival of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans enabled Grant to provide a sufficient force to meet Early by the detachment of a single corps, the loss of which had no sensible influence on operations against Petersburg. There is

little doubt that at an earlier period of the war the result would have been very different and would have fully met Lee's expectations. As it was, it required all General Grant's moral firmness to withstand the severe pressure brought upon him by the Administration to remove his army from the James River to the front of Washington. The persistency which has been often pointed out as that commander's distinguishing trait was never so happily illustrated.

*I derive this statement of General Lee's views from Colonel Marshall, of the staff of the Confederate commander.

VI.

SUMMER AND AUTUMN OPERATIONS AGAINST
PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND.

Having already set forth the bounds within which manouvres were practicable for the army before Petersburg, it remains to describe a series of operations within these limits, executed during the remaining months of summer and autumn. They present a remarkable illustration of the vigor and skill that marked both the attack and defence of that city. The recital will bring this narrative up to the close of the campaign of 1864.

THE MOVEMENT TO DEEP BOTTOM.-The first of these operations was a repetition of the manoeuvre to the north bank of the James River. The expedition was again under the command of General Hancock, to whom were placed, in addition to his own corps, the Tenth Corps (now under General Birney) and the cavalry division of General Gregg. The movement was begun on the 12th of August. As it was not possible long to conceal its real character, it was resolved to throw the enemy off the scent by the embarkation of the expeditionary force on transports at City Point, and the promulgation of the idea that it was about to start for Washington. During the night of the 12th, the fleet steamed up stream, and the troops were next morning landed at Deep Bottom, where General Foster continued to hold an intrenched camp.* Much difficulty was experienced in the debarkation, which

* The artillery had been previously sent across the Appomattox, by way of Point of Rocks, and parked under concealment within General Butler's lines. It was then taken to the north side of the James when the infantry had debarked.

was not completed until nine o'clock of the morning of the 13th-a tardiness not auspicious of a successful result.*

Hancock moved out by the New Market and Malvern Hill roads, encountering little opposition until reaching Bailey's Creek, the point at which his previous advance had been arrested. Here Mott's division fronted the enemy's intrenched line, while Barlow, with two divisions, numbering nearly ten thousand men, was sent to assault on the right, with instructions that, when the position was carried, he should move to his left and uncover Mott's front, when the whole line would advance. The duty assigned to Barlow was of the nature of a detached operation, but he unfortunately tried to keep up his connection with Mott's right, which strung his force out in a thin line, and left him nothing wherewith to form a storming column. Late in the day he made, with a single brigade, an attack that was rather feebly executed,† so that night found the Confederates still in possession of the intrenched line. On General Birney's front, on the other side of Bailey's Creek, some success was gained for the enemy, having weakened that part of the line to oppose Barlow, General Birney was able, with slight loss, to break through a portion of the hostile front, and captured four guns.

Whatever prospect of success originally attended this operation had been based on the fact that the Confederates were weak on the north side of the James-the whole force being believed to be not above eight thousand men. But the design

* It was supposed that Hancock's troops could be readily landed by running the boats along shore, and throwing out gang-planks. But it was found that the boats could not be run near enough to the shore to effect this purpose, and the difficulty was materially increased by the outrunning tide. Moreover, many of the transports were ill-adapted to this use. Throughout all these operations great inconvenience arose from the lack of a few light-draught river steamers.

†The inadequate character of Barlow's attacks General Hancock attributes to "the large number of new men in his command, and the small number of experienced officers."-Report of Operations at Deep Bottom.

"An estimate of General Butler's was furnished me, putting the enemy's strength north of the James at eight thousand five hundred men."-Hancock. Report of Operations at Deep Bottom.

being now fully disclosed, Lee rapidly re-enforced to meet this menace, and success was already very problematical, New dispositions were, however, made on the 14th. On the following day General Birney was directed to find the enemy's left flank and turn it, Gregg's cavalry covering the movement on the right; but he did not conduct his operations sufficiently to the left, and nothing was accomplished that day. On the morning of the 16th, Birney* made a direct attack, with the division of Terry, and succeeded in carrying the line, capturing three colors and two or three hundred prisoners; but the enemy soon rallied and recovered the position.

In connection with Birney's operation, Gregg's mounted division, and an infantry brigade under General Miles, were sent to operate on the Charles City road. Gregg's advance was spirited, and he succeeded in driving the enemy before him for a considerable distance the Confederate General Chambliss being killed in the skirmish. Fresh forces during the afternoon assailed Gregg, however, who retired, fighting, to Deep Creek, across which he was afterwards driven. In Birney's front the enemy showed so strong a force that a renewal of the attack was deemed impracticable.

During the night of the 16th a fleet of steamers was sent from City Point to Deep Bottom, returning at four A. M. on the following morning-the object being to convey the impression to the enemy that the expeditionary force was withdrawing, and induce him to come out of his works and attack. This ruse was not successful.

*

During the night the greater part of General Birney's command was massed in rear of the position occupied by General Barlow. The line from the New Market and Malvern Hill road, at a point designated on the map as the "Potteries," to the extreme right, was held by a thin skirmish line only. One of General Mott's best brigades, under Colonel Craig (One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers), was sent to General Birney. The remainder of Mott's division was massed in rear of his picket-line, except a small force left at the "Potteries." Gibbon's division (temporarily under Colonel Smythe) was also massed in rear of the skirmish line, and Barlow's division was con centrated near the fork of the Darby and Long Bridge roads.

The four succeeding days passed in unimportant reconnoissances, though on the afternoon of the 18th the Confederates made a sally against a part of Birney's line. After a fight of thirty minutes they were repulsed, with considerable loss. General Miles, with two brigades, participated, attacking the enemy on his left flank. At dark of the 20th, Hancock returned, by way of Bermuda Hundred, to his old camp before Petersburg. The Union loss in this operation exceeded fifteen hundred men.* Much had been expected from it, but the results were trivial.

TO THE WELDON RAILROAD.-If the movement to the north side of the James had failed to accomplish the object contemplated, it had at least compelled Lee to detach a considerable force from the lines of Petersburg. Advantage was, accordingly, taken of this fact to strike out on the left flank, which now rested within three miles of the Weldon Railroad. This, as one of the chief lines of communication for the Confederate army, presented a tempting prize.

This operation was intrusted to General Warren, who began its execution on the morning of the 18th, while Hancock remained yet on the north side of the James. No more than slight opposition was encountered on the march, and early in the forenoon, Warren established himself on the railroad. Leaving Griffin's division to guard the point seized, and observe the avenues of approach from the south and west, the advance was continued northward along the railroad. After proceeding a mile towards Petersburg, the enemy was found in line of battle, showing a firm disposition to contest further progress. In the afternoon, when Warren attempted to renew his advance, with Crawford's division on the right, and Ayres' on the left, the Confederates took the offensive against the latter.

The attack of the enemy came from the left, from the

* Hancock's loss in his own corps was nine hundred and fifteen. In the Tenth Corps and cavalry it is unknown.

Warren: Report of Operations on the Weldon Railroad.