CHAPTER XXI. ABOLITIONISTS SHOW THEIR PURPOSE TO DESTROY THE UNION. The Various Efforts at Compromise... Compromise the Basis of all Governments...General Principles of, Applied... The Compromises of the Constitution : What were They?...Messrs. Yates and Lansing Retire from the Convention of 1787...Compromise between Delaware, Maryland and Other States... The First Draft...Luther Martin on Compromise...The Large and Small Small States at War on Suffrage... Compromise on Slave Trade and Navigation Acts...An Original Plan of Constitution...The Great Suffrage Question... Mr. Martin's Explanations... Compromise between Slavery and Navigation... The New England States Favor the Slave Trade... Official Proof... Hypocrisy of Abolition States... Massachusetts Stealing Negroes... The Virginia and New Jersey Plan of Government...Predictions of Geo. Mason...The Missouri Compromise...General Propositions...Jackson and Clay on Compromise... Compromise of 1832-3...Crompromise of 1850... Why the Radicals would not Compromise in 1861. In this connection we will introduce to the reader sundry facts concerning THE VARIOUS EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE. Compromise is a talismanic word. It presupposes a controversy, and then it assures us of a settlement. "COMPROMISE: To adjust and settle a difference by mutual agreement, with concessions of claims by both parties, &c." This is WEBSTER's definition. Compromise is, indeed, the basis of all governments. No government could exist an hour without compromise. Its "usual signification," says WEBSTER, is, "mutual agreement-adjustment." Now, let us place all men back to first principles-on their natural rights. No one man has any control over another, of right. The aggregate of all is society, and the aggregate of societies or communities form statesstates make up nations. But by what process is it all accomplished? A nation must have a system of laws—a governing principle. How is this to be accomplished? If all thought exactly alike, there would be no need of laws or rulers. But all do not-cannot think alike. The good and bad-the wise and the foolishpromiscuously mix. Who shall make laws, and set the machinery of government in motion? Why, the people, of course (in a Democratic Republican Government). But how can the people act? Why, by choosing Representatives to make laws, and somebody to adjudicate and administer them. Perhaps all may agree to the necessity of this, but the manner-the mode--the how to do it--will be a question of conflicting views. One says by ballot--another by viva voce. One has objec tions to an aggregate poll--another will not consent to a multitude of polls. One has his mode of making returns-another his, and so on, until a thousand and one objections arise, and plans are projected, forming a Baabel of ideas, making confusion worse confounded. What is to be done? A Government is absolutely necessary. All concur in that, but the mode and manner of getting at it-the system and details to be adopted are the points on which minds do and will differ. A knows he is right and will not yield to B. B swears he is right, and scorns to yield to A, while C betieves both A and B to be wrong, and sets up a theory of his own, warranted to be perfect. Here, we have a trio of ideas, each in conflict with the other. The strong bent of human nature, and the pride of opinion, breed a struggle and a contest, for each considers his opinions and wishes as of much consequence, and nearer right than his neighbors, therefore, a complete yielding cannot be expected by either party. What then? Why, the very law of our existence will suggest-a compromise, whereupon A says to B, Now this obstinancy is wrong. We all agree that we need a government, and yet our differences about the mode of securing that government, are likely to finally deprive us of its blessings. As we cannot all agree as to the exact mode, let us compromise the matter. I will agree to a portion of your plan, you to a portion of mine, while we will both agree to a portion of C's. Now, A has touched the subsoil of conciliation, for while he invites a little yielding from others, he himself yields. And this is the basis of amity. It is compromise. Mutual concessions take away the sting of the shout of victory-neither party feels vanquished or humiliated--compromise has accomplished its work, and the organization of government begins. All this is in strict accordance with the theory of the Declaration that Governments ought to be founded on the "consent of the governed." No such Government can be formed, except by compromise. A Government of force-established by the sword, neither seeks or yields to compromise. A tyrant usurps power by restraining the people of the liberty to compromise. The sword is his means-usurpation his purpose—a servile obedience his object. We have thus been led to advance these For weeks, said FRANKLIN, the contest hung in doubt, as to whether any government would be formed, and at one time dissolution and eternal separation seemed inevitable. Two members from New York, Mr. YATES and Mr. LANSING, left the convention, to return no more, because they failed to carry certain points, and in a joint letter to Governor views, because many seem to argue that any THE COMPROMISES OF THE CONSTITUTION. The struggle in the National Convention of 1787 for a supremacy of "ideas" and principles, good and bad, was as vigorous as any contest that has transpired since that epoch. Men of that day were governed by all the ambition and qualities of mind that distinguish men of the present era. All parties of all sections endeavored to secure the most for self and location. The larger States strove to overreach the smaller ones, while the smaller ones were jealous of their more powerful neighbors. "Thus circumstanced, under these impressions, to have hesitated would have been to be culpable. We therefore gave the principles of the Constitution, which has received the sanction of the majority of the convention, our decided and unreserved dissent. We were not present at the completion of the new constitution; but, before we left the convention, its principles were so well established as to convince us that no alteration was to be expectel to conform it to our ideas of expediency and safety. A persuasion that our further attendance would be fruitless and unavailing, rendered us less solicitous to return." Now, supposing that all the members of that convention, who were displeased with some portion of its results (and we believe there was not one but that objected to some part of the instrument adopted) had left the convention because their views were not accepted by the majority, we should have had no Constitution, and of course no Union, but compromise brought the Convention together-compromise kept it together-compromise preserved it from wild disorder and dissolution-compromise saved its labors to bless posterity. Many of the delegates were trameled by instructions. Those from Delaware were instructed to "yield no point that did not secure equal suffrage, as by the original articles of confederation"-which was an equal vote in Congress, under the new government, with any other state. This, of course, was preposterous, for a state hardly the size of some of the counties in others, to demand equal power and voice in the new government. But Delaware was sovereign then, and had a sovereign right to demand conditions. But other states would not grant these conditions. Here was a dead As already stated, in another portion of this work, the National Convention was divided in sentiment as to the nature of the Government to be adopted. There was the extreme Democrotic element, in favor of shearing the power of the General Government to the lowest dimensions; the Democratic Republican party, in favor of uniting a Democratic and a Republican form of Government as near as might be. so as to give sufficient strength to the Union to make it serviceable for the purposes intended; a Federal party, in favor of confederating pow-lock, to begin with. Supposing that all the er in a General Government, under the Republican form, and a party of Monarchists, in favor of a monarchical government, having unlimited sway over the States and the people. As might be expected, these clashing elements were hard to harmonize, and nothing but a spirit of compromise could do it. other states should have said we will yield nothing of the kind—would not that have been an end of the matter, unless one or the other party receded, which was not to be expected. The matter was of course compromised, by giving Delaware an equal voice in the Senate, and her relative power in the popular branch. This claim set up by Delaware then, was the cause of that particular feature of representation in our Constitution. Maryland contended that Virginia had claimed more than her share of the power of suffrage [see Luther Martin's Letter in Elliott's Debates, v. 1, p. 346] and that her representation was too large, while Virginia contended that such was not the case. This matter was compromised in the system of suffrage agreed upon-Virginia yielding a little, and her sister states receding a little-neither victorious neither vanguished. The Convention agreed by resolution to consider propositions as well as a schedule for the whole Constitution in the committee of the whole House, and that after the committee had agreed upon any plan or system, any member might offer amendments or new propositions in open convention. der the National Government, for the space of one year after its expiration. 5th. That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts. 6th. That the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases, to which the seperate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States, may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation, to negative all laws passed by the several states [this was the extreme Federal scheme] contravening in the opinion of the Legislature of the United States, the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union. 7th. That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the National Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable rate of representation, viz.: in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three in the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes in each state. To show the compromising spirit that follow-fifths of all other persons, not comprehended ed, we present here a plan for a constitution which passed the committee of the whole, and which the spirit of opposition on one side and compromise on the other materially modified, as the reader will see by comparing this with the constitution as adopted. "1st. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that a National Government ought to be established, consisting of a Supreme, Legislative, Judiciary and Executive. 2d. That the Legislature ought to consist of two branches. "3d. That the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States, for the term of three years, to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be inelligible to any office established by a particular State, or under authority of the United States, except those particularly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service and under the National Government, for the space of one year after its expiration. "4th. That the members of the Second Branch of the Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of 30 years, at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independency, viz.: seven years, one third to go out biennially, to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be inelligible to any office by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to functions of the Second Branch, during the term of service, and un i "8th. That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be according to the rule established in the first. "9th. That a national Executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws-to appoint to offices, in cases not otherwise provided for-to be ineligible a second time, and to be removable on impeachment, and conviction of malpractice, or neglect of duty-to receive a fixed stipend, by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service-to be paid out of the National Treasury. "10th. That the National Executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act which shall not afterwards be passed, unless by two-thirds of each branch of the national legislature. 11th. That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which to be appointed by the second branch of the national legislature, to hold their offices during good behavior, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or dimunition shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. "12th. That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals. "13th. That the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the National revenuecases arising under the laws of the United States-impeachments of any National officer, and questions which involve the National peace and harmony. "14th. Resolved, That provision ought to be | New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland,† (the made for the admission of states lawfully aris- smaller states) were for equal State suffrage, ing within the limits of the United States, as under the Confederation, while the larger whether from a voluntary jurisdiction of Government terrritory or otherwise, with the con- States, of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virsent of a number of voices in the National Leg-ginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, were islature less than the whole. "15th. Resolved, That provisions ought to be made for the continuance of Congress, and their authority and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all other engagements. "16th. That a Republican Constitution and its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each state of the United States. "17th. That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of Union whenever it shall seem necessary. "18th, That the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers within the several states ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of the Union. "19th, That the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation by this Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies, recommended by the Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider and decide thereon."-pp. 356-7-8 1st v. Elliott's Debates. In commenting on this framework for a Constitution, before the Legislature of Maryland, Mr. Luther Martin, a National Delegate, thus exposed the jealousies that existed on the subject of usurping power by the large states: "Hence, these three states (Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts) would, in reality, have the appointment of the President, Judges, and all other officers. This President and these Judges, so appointed, we may be morally certain, would be citizens of one of those three states, and the President, as appointed by them, and a citizen of one of them, would espouse their interests and their views when they came in competition with the views and interests of the other states." Under the old Confederation, the States exercised suffrage in the National Congress as individual States, and not on the basis of popular suffrage among the people—that is, each State had just one vote on all matters, and if the representation of delegates happened to be even in number and equally divided (as was often the case), the State had no vote and its power was wholly neutralized. This subject was one of the bones of contention in the National convention. On the vote being taken, it was found that Connecticut, New York,* for popular suffrage. Here was a dead lock.— The States were equally divided, and what was to be done? If neither party had yielded "an inch," of course it would have been an end to the whole matter, for it was a vital point. But compromise saved the nation from anarchy and dissolution. Be it remembered, the States had the same votes in the convention they did in Congress, under the Confederation-each one vote. As we have seen, the difficulty, which at one time seemed insurmountable, was compromised by the larger States yielding to the smaller equal State representation in the Senate, and the smaller States yielding to the larger equal representation in the popular branch. Who will say this was not a just course. The way and manner this compromise was affected is so appropos to the application we are making that we feel justified in letting Mr. MARTIN, a delegate from Maryland, tell the story in his own way: "Thus, sir, on this great and important part of the system-the Convention being equally divided-five states for the measure,five against and one divided-there was a total stand; and we did not seem very likely to proceed any farther. At length it was proposed that a select committee should be balloted for, composed of a member from each state, which committee should endeavor to devise some mode of reconciliation, or compromise. I had the honor to be on that committee. We met and discussed the subject of difference. The one side insisted on the inequality of suffrage in both branches; the other side equality in both. Each party was tenacious of their sentiments Las is alwas the case in controversies.] When it was found that nothing could induce us to yield the inequality in both branches, they at length proposed, by way of comprise, if we would accede to their wishes as to the first branch,they would agree to an equal representation in the second. To this it was answered that there was no merit in the proposal; in was only consenting, after they had struggled to put both their feet on our necks, to take one of them off, provided we would consent to let them keep the other on; when they knew, at the same time, that they could not put one foot on our necks, unless we would consent to it, and that by being permitted to keep on that +Mr. MARTIN was the only delegate present from Mary*New York in population was then below many of the land, which carried the vote for State suffrage. Had the other States. delegation been full it would have been divided. ་ one foot, they should afterwards be able to place the other foot on whenever they pleased. "They were also called upon to inform us what security they could give us, should we agree to this compromise, that they, would abide by the plan of government formed upon it, any longer than suited their interests, or they found it expedient. The States have a right to an equality of representation. This is secured to us by our present articles of confederation. We are in possession of this right. It is now to be torn from us. What security can you give us, that, when you get the power the proposed system will give you-when you have men and money-you will not force from the States that equality of suffrage in the second branch, which you now deny to be their right, and only give up from actual necessity? Will you tell us we ought to trust you because you now enter into a solemn compact with us? This you have done before, and now treat with the utmost contempt. Will you now make an appeal to the Supreme Being, and call on Him to guarantee your observance of the Articles of Confederation, which you are now violating in the most wanton manner? [This argument might well be addressed to the radicals to-day.] The same reason which you now urge for destroying our present Federal Government, may be urged for abolishing the system you propose to adopt; and as the method prescribed by the Articles of Confederation is now totally disregarded by you, as little regard may be shown by you to the rules prescribed for the amendments of the new system! [This was prophetic.] Whenever, having obtained power by the Government, you shall hereafter be pleased to discard it entirely, or so to alter it as to give yourselves all that superiority which you have now contended for, and to obtain which you have shown yourselves disposed to hazard the Union! "Such, sir, was the language used on that occasion; and they were told that, as we could not possibly have a stronger tie on them for the observance of the new system than we had for their observance of the Articles of Confederation, (which had proved totally insufficient,) it would be very imprudent to confide in them. It was further observed, that the inequality of the representation would be daily increasing -that many of the states, whose territory was confined, and whose population was at this time large in proportion to their territory, would probably, twenty, thirty or forty years hence, have no more representatives than at the introduction of the Government; whereas, the states having extensive territory, whose lands are to be procured cheap, would be daily increasing in the number of inhabitants, not only from propogation, but from the emigration of the inhabitants of the other states, and would soon have double, or perhaps treble the number of Representatives that they are to have at first, and thereby enormously increase their influence in the National councils. "However, the majority of the select com mittee at length agreed to a series of propositions by way of compromise-part of which related to the representation in the First Branch-nearly as the system is now published (in the adopted Constitution) and part of them to the second branch, securing in that equal representation; and reported them as a compromise, upon the express terms that they were to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected. Upon this compromise a great number of the members so far engaged themselves, that if the system was proceeded upon agreeably to the terms of compromise, they would lend their names by signing it, and would not actively oppose it, if their states should be inclined to accept it. Some, however, in which number was myself, who joined in that report, and agreed to proceed upon these principles, and see what kind of a system would ultimately be formed upon it, yet reserved to themselves in the most explicit manner, a right of finally giving a solemn dissent to the system, if it was thought by them inconsistent with the freedom and happiness of their country. This, sir, will account why the gentlemen of the Convention so generally signed their names to the system-not because they thought it a proper one-not because they thoroughly approved, or were unanimous for it-but because they thought it better than the system attempted to be forced upon them. This report of the select committee was, after long discussion, adopted by a majority of the Convention, and the system was proceeded in accordingly. I believe near a fortnight-perhaps more-was spent in the discussion of this business, during which we were on the verge of dissolution, scarce held together by the strength of a hair, though the public papers were announcing our extreme unanimity." Such were some of the difficulties encountered by our fathers in reference to only one point of issue then pending. The same species of opposing views and clashing interests arose on almost every section of the Constitution-all of these discordant elements had to be met by the spirit of compromise. COMRROMISE BETWEEN SLAVERY AND NAVIGÁ TION. We have not room in this connection to no tice, even by reference, any other point of difference and the compromises thereon, save that pertaining to the slave trade and the navigation laws. · Some portions of the South were very anxious to be protected in the slave trade for a considerable period, in order, as they said, to compensate them for the losses of slave pro perty during the Revolution. On the other hand, New England was very jealous lest the non commercial states should place some obstacles on commerce and navigation, and when the slave trade clause came up for con |