OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

Gentlemen, I have a brief statement which I am going to read; and then, Senator Tower, ranking minority member of our committee also has a statement, so I will recognize him for that purpose.

The committee meets today to hear testimony from Mr. Paul C. Warnke. Mr. Warnke has been named by the President to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also to be Ambassador in relation to the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations. These two nominations are before the Foreign Relations Committee which has the primary jurisdiction in this matter; however, because of the unusual importance of these positions to the common defense of the United States, and because Mr. Warnke has testified extensively before the Armed Services Committee and other committees on matters relating to both arms control and defense policy, the consensus of the members of the committee was that we should hear Mr. Warnke today. I, as your chairman, have been in close contact with Senator Sparkman on this matter and there is no disagreement about the hearing. This hearing today clearly illustrates the dual responsibilities imposed by our constitutional system, in that the Executive proposes a person for an official position and the Senate is called on to give prior approval before there can be an appointment.

The hearing also illustrates a comity between Senate committees, in that the Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction but there is an overlap of interest by the Armed Services Committee; therefore, in a spirit of cooperation the two Senate committees are taking testimony, by agreement, on this highly important nomination in this special field of common interest, arms control and arms limitation.

There are special problems connected with the conventional weapons, of course, but it seems clear to me that the problems that go with the regulation and possible use of nuclear weapons are not exceeded by any other problem known to mankind.

Personally, I think it is probably the gravest problem facing our Nation and the nations of the world. What we do, or fail to do, in this field can literally determine the fate of mankind on major parts of this planet, including our own.

Some think an effective arms control and limitation plan cannot be worked out and cannot be useful. I do not share this conclusion. Instead, I think we must proceed with all possible effort based on reason and commonsense.

I have said before that man has been unable to outlaw war but that man has made weapons that, as a practical matter, outlaw large-scale war as an intentional act. I refer, of course, to nuclear weapons and their devastating destructive effects.

Our own Strategic Arms Control and Limitation Agency and the negotiator, and the President, constitute that part of our Government that directly deals with this problem of possible regulations and controls.

The President has sent these nominations to the Senate. What concerns me more than anything else is this question: Will the many statements of record, and the positions and comments of record by Mr. Warnke over the years, prove a grave handicap to him as our chief negotiator in the forthcoming talks? It is true that the Presi

dent is the ultimate negotiator but the director of the agency and the appointed negotiator is of the gravest import, as to who he is and his background.

In the interest of time I ask consent to put in the record at this point an additional page of my statement and we will move on. [The prepared statement of Chairman Stennis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN C. STENNIS

The committee meets today to hear testimony from Mr. Paul C. Warnke. Mr. Warnke has been named by the President to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also to be Ambassador in relation to the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations. These two nominations are before the Foreign Relations Committee which has the primary jurisdiction in this matter; however, because of the unusual importance of these positions to the common defense of the U.S. and because Mr. Warnke has testified extensively before the Armed Services Committee and other committees on matters relating to both arms control and defense policy, the consensus of the Members of the Committee was that we should hear Mr. Warnke today.

Mr. Warnke was entirely willing and accepted our invitation to appear.

As chairman of the committee I have been in close contact with Senator Sparkman on this whole matter and to my knowledge there is no disagreement with this approach.

This hearing clearly illustrates the dual responsibilities imposed by our Constitutional system in that the Executive proposes a person for an official position and the Senate is called on to give prior approval before there can be an appointment. The hearing also illustrates a comity between Senate Committees in that the Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction but there is an overlap of interest by the Armed Services Committee. Therefore, in a spirit of cooperation the two Senate Committees are taking testimony, by agreement, on this highly important nomination in this special field of common interest, Arms Control and Arms Limitation.

There are special problems connected with the conventional weapons, of course, but it seems clear to me that the problems that go with the regulation and possible use of nuclear weapons are not exceeded by any other problem known to mankind. Personally, I think it is probably the gravest problem facing our nation, and the nations of the world. What we do, or fail to do, in this field can literally determine the fate of mankind on major parts of this planet, including

our own.

Some think an effective Arms Control and limitation plan cannot be worked out and cannot be useful. I do not share this conclusion. Instead, I think we must proceed with all possible effort based on reason and common sense.

I have said before that man has been unable to outlaw war but that man has made weapons that, as a practical matter, outlaw large-scale war as an international act. I refer, of course, to nuclear weapons and their devastating destructive effects.

Our own Strategic Arms Control and Limitation Agency, and the negotiator, and the President, constitute that part of our government that directly deals with this problem of possible regulations and controls.

The President has sent these nominations to the Senate. What concerns me more than anything else is this question:

Will the many statements of record, and positions and comments of record by Mr. Warnke over the years, prove a grave handicap to him as our Chief Negotiator in the forthcoming Talks?

It is true that the President is the ultimate Negotiator, but the Director of the Agency and the appointed Negotiator is of the gravest import.

The question of arms control involves a delicate balance between hope and prudence. There is the great hope that almost all of us share that the world can be made less dangerous and more secure through the mutual reduction of armaments. This is particularly important when one considers the awesome potential of nuclear weapons to destroy humanity and societies as we know them. But it applies to the field of conventional weaponry as well, which has also grown in destructive power. On the other hand, prudence in this field is absolutely essential if we are to preserve our liberty, our culture and perhaps our very lives.

Mr. Warnke has testified and written on his philosophy and approach to arms control. The Committee today hopes to get a clear view of his thinking on this important subject.

The subject of defense policy and our defense posture in this world has been a matter of continued and extensive study by this Committee. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the SALT negotiator both have a significant effect on our defense policy and posture. Mr. Warnke has expressed himself on these subjects on six separate occasions before the Congress since he appeared before the Armed Services Committee in 1973. Today we want to get a clearer understanding of his views on these important subjects as well.

A number of Committee members have expressed interest in a variety of subjects they wish to ask Mr. Warnke about and we hope to provide that opportunity as well today.

Chairman STENNIS. I want to extend a special welcome to Mr. Warnke. I should have done that in the first place.

Our committee met in deliberation and in conference informally and exchanged views. I called Mr. Warnke and invited him to come before our committee at an early date, to which he readily agreed. I had already talked to him the day before, to make certain that I was not getting ahead of things, and he gave me the same kind of willing response, and for the committee I want to thank you for that.

I recognize Senator Tower now for a statement that he may have. Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Warnke has been nominated for two critical positions in our Government; Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Arms Limitations negotiating team.

It is known to all of us on this committee that over the past several years Mr. Warnke has elected to be quite outspoken on national security matters. He has participated in numerous reports and authored several articles, and has appeared on many separate occasions before committees of the Congress.

I think it is important for us to note, because of Mr. Warnke's rather fervent participation in the so-called national debate on our defense posture that he, indeed. does represent an outlook on the world's military balance that I think we must pay close attention to during this confirmation process.

I think it is important for us at this hearing to probe the workings of the arms control process itself. I think we should contemplate what sort of checks and balances we ought to have within our own Government that come into play during any arms control negotiations.

Some may recall that in the past there was some rather vocal concern expressed as to whether or not the Joint Chiefs were being equally consulted on matters relating to SALT.

I believe we need to be alert to the importance of an arms control process in our Government which will permit the sort of give and take and interaction of the national security leadership that will be critical to the public's confidence in any arms limitation.

The statutory duties of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are to serve as the pricipal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament matters.

I would question whether we should permit the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to also serve as our chief SALT negotiator, though I realize that this was the case with Mr. Gerard Smith some 8 years ago.

Nonetheless, I believe we should expect our SALT negotiator to have a broad perspective on national security as our principal arms control advocate, just as we expect him to have a different perspective than do the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am not sure that it behooves us to send a negotiator to the SALT talks who holds responsibilities elsewhere in the executive branch that may at times conflict with the demand for a tough negotiating stance. I think we need an independent negotiator supported in his delegation by representatives of ACDA, JCS, and the Departments of State and Defense, with no additional responsibilities which may compromise the credibility of his efforts within our own Government.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your willingness to hold this hearing. I do not feel that I am the only member of this committee who is troubled over Mr. Warnke's suitability to hold these two key positions in our Government.

We all know perceptions occupy a particularly important role in the world's strategic balance and can be expected to influence the public's confidence in any treaty limiting the development or deployment of strategic arms.

Mr. Warnke's nomination has stirred no insignificant amount of public controversy. It concerns me that regardless of the nature of any arms agreement that could be negotiated at the SALT talks by Mr. Warnke, the public acceptance of such a treaty could be affected by virtue of the fact some people-and I might add some very prominent and knowledgeable people think his previous statements and public positions serve to weaken his potential effectiveness as a strong negotiator.

Mr. Warnke has been outspoken as a private citizen on the key issue of how much is enough in both strategic and conventional arms. The lower force levels and weapon curtailment he has advocated in recent years differ dramatically from the recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have made to this committee, and I believe if implemented his proposals would place us in an untenable position with respect to the Soviet Union.

I think it is imperative that the individual we send to lead our negotiations in SALT must be one who recognizes the nature of the sustained and ambitious improvements in Soviet arms programs that are now taking place. He must recognize the trends in this regard are quite clear. He must not look upon a SALT treaty itself as essential to our Nation's survival but rather he must consider it essential to seeking arms limitations by negotiating the Soviets from an uncompromising position of strength.

There are a wide range of issues which we need to address here today, Mr. Chairman.

Paramount among our considerations must be the nature of the negotiating posture of the United States and how this nominee would pursue SALT objectives. I hope we will be able to address these matters in a candid and meaningful discussion with the nominee.

Again, on behalf of the minority members of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I applaud your willingness to call the hearing and to pursue this discussion before the Senate and the American people. Thank

you.

Chairman STENNIS. Gentlemen, more of our new members have come in. I want to extend to them a special welcome. I call by name the new members that could be here: Senator Helms, Senator Anderson, Senator Bumpers, and Senator Morgan.

I have a note here from Senator Culver who expresses his great regret it is impossible for him to be here today, although he had planned to be here.

Gentlemen, we will start with the 10-minute rule, for the first time around anyway. It is not altogether satisfactory but as a start it is better than anything I know of.

Mr. Warnke, with reference to matters that may come up that you consider classified, or any member considers classified, I will depend on you to speak up on the matter and raise the point. Members, do not feel hesitant at all to do that also.

Mr. Warnke, you are versed in this field. You raise the point as you see fit.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. That will be quite a help to the Chair. I will rule on the matter if it becomes necessary. I am not too happy about some points being discussed at length beyond that. I hope I have made that clear.

If it is agreeable with the committee, since we have a joint session at 12:30 we will recess for it at 12:15, and we will work out something about an afternoon session. I thought we might be done by noon. Mr. Warnke, do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir, I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman STENNIS. All right, you may proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND AMBASSADOR/ CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY (SALT) TALKS

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Tower, members of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, when I received your invitation to testify I promptly advised you of my readiness to do so. It is, in my opinion, entirely appropriate for the committee to hear from me with respect to my approach to the general problem of arms control and specifically to the negotiation of limitations on strategic arms.

As you have mentioned, and as the members of the committee know. I have appeared before this committee on several occasions, including two confirmation hearings back several years ago.

I recognize the committee's special responsibilities for insuring the security of the United States and keeping our military power capable of meeting that objective.

If confirmed, I look forward to many future appearances to discuss our mutual concerns. It is axiomatic, as stated in the ACDA Act, that "arms control and disarmament policy must be consistent with national security policy as a whole."

In addition, section 2 of the act specifically holds the Agency accountable to the Congress for arms control policy, and I pledge that I will fully meet this responsibility, if confirmed.