commissioner forty-eight hours to comply with his requirements, viz. to restore the men, to apologise, and to promise good behaviour for the future. Within the forty-eight hours Yeh returns nine of the twelve men; sends copies of depositions against the others, charging them with piracy, as his excuse for not surrendering them also; and waives the apology and the promise, as being demanded under a mistaken impression of the character of the vessel. The consul and the envoy refuse to receive the men, and reiterate their demands and their menace; and, in spite of another letter from Yeh, again detailing the Chinese facts of the case, and promising in future all reasonable and due respect to British lorchas,--but not apologising for a violation of the treaty, which he denied having committed, they proceed on the same day to open hostilities by the seizure of a large junk. Surely this was enough. But Sir John Bowring had other objects. He immediately made arrangements for warlike operations, attacked and captured the Barrier forts and, three days later, the forts close to the city. In the mean time the Chinese commissioner had reiterated his assurances for the future, and sent back the whole twelve men demanded. Consul Parkes declined now to receive them, alleging some informality in the mode of surrendering them. The Chinese authorities had now conceded all we asked, except the apology,-which, with their view of the case, they could not give. But Dr. Bowring writes to Lord Clarendon, that the viceroy "shows no disposition to enter on amicable negotiations;" so he proceeds to revive an old demand for free ingress into Canton, bombards the city, shells the governor's residence, breaches the walls, and storms the place. Of course the Chinese turn upon us; a war begins, and was raging in the Canton river when our last accounts left Hong Kong. We will indulge in no declamation. The bare statement of facts is sufficient. But we cannot forbear from expressing our deep disgust at the tone of Sir John Bowring's despatches. Any thing so flippant, conceited, and unfeeling, in the way of state-papers, we never read before.

So much for the conduct of the British authorities at Canton. What are we to say of the conduct of the British Government at home? It is clear that they are responsible for these proceedings only in as far as they choose to adopt and defend them. It must be allowed, that they were placed in a very perplexing position. We cannot doubt that their first sentiments were those of condemnation and disgust. It was impossible that in their hearts they should approve of Sir John Bowring's proceedings, or should not deeply regret them. But what would be the consequence of disavowing them, now

that they were irrevocably done? On the one hand, it was most painful and revolting to high-minded and honourable men to uphold and sanction a course of conduct, pursued by their delegates at the other side of the world, which they felt to be culpable and imprudent, and which they, if consulted beforehand, would have been the last to warrant ;-to prosecute an unrighteous quarrel, and insist upon unjust demands,—to embrace a cause which, however good in its essence, was full of flaws in its origin, and had been deplorably stained and soiled by its rash and unworthy asserters at the antipodes. On the other hand, to recall Sir John Bowring, and disavow his highhanded proceedings, would be far from safe, and would inevitably lead to future quarrels and to wider bloodshed. The Chinese, like other Orientals, are wholly unable to conceive the idea of any nation receding from an unjust demand simply on the score of its injustice. Our recession would be attributed to fear and weakness, and would invite and insure new insults, flagrant affronts, and unpermissible pretensions. It would, beyond all question, encourage the Chinese to treat us in a manner which must speedily compel us to inflict terrible and exemplary chastisement. It cannot be denied, that the Celestials, in their ignorant contempt and fanatical hatred of foreigners, have for many years been trying our forbearance to the utmost, and are perpetually affronting and oppressing our citizens to the extreme limits of safety, and in a manner which makes residence there neither agreeable nor safe. All British merchants trading to those quarters, and all who have lived there and are acquainted with the Chinese, with scarcely an exception, rejoice in this quarrel (even where they recognise the rottenness of our special case), as a necessary step to placing our relations with those refined barbarians on a sounder and pleasanter footing; and are strongly of opinion that, right or wrong, Bowring ought to be upheld, the insolence of the Chinese to be chastised, and the sanctity of the British flag enforced. We fully recognise the force of all these considerations; and we are not at all surprised at the influence which they seem to have exercised over the minds of her Majesty's Ministers. We entertain little doubt that the immediate consequences-perhaps the ultimate ones also-of disavowing Sir John Bowring, withdrawing his pretensions, and staying his proceedings, would be worse, both for England and for China, than the consequences of supporting and enforcing the demands made, and vigorously pushing the hostilities already commenced. But feeling all this as strongly as the Government can do, we cannot but think that Ministers, in defending Sir John Bowring, have made a sad and most superfluous blunder,-have encumbered them

selves with an unrighteous plea, and committed themselves to an insincere and untruthful, and therefore an embarrassing line of action. They might, we think, by an opener and bolder course, have saved themselves from the pain of using, and Britain from the pain of witnessing, much disingenuous sophistry. Why should they not have said, distinctly and at once, "Our representative at Hong Kong appears, it is true, to have acted hastily, harshly, clumsily, and wrong: we must have fuller knowledge before we can either approve or condemn him. But the mischief is done; we must get out of a bad business in. the best way we can; we must stay all further proceedings, if the Chinese will let us, but we must not waive any just ground of complaint we have against them; and, while withdrawing indefensible ones, must insist once for all upon a settlement which can stand. We must do this out of regard to the Chinese themselves, who assuredly will otherwise compel us to far heavier reckoning ere long. We will be as forbearing and moderate as possible,-as men are bound to be who feel that their first steps in the affair were erroneous and blamable. We shall therefore send out instantly a competent ambassador, with full powers to terminate the disastrous strife on such terms as, when amply informed on the spot, he shall deem just and wise, and shall find feasible." By such a course and such language, we should have escaped that deplorable forensic spectacle of senators and ministers saying what they don't think, and defending what they don't approve, which is so destructive of reverence and confidence in public men. They have virtually adopted this course and this language since their defeat: had they adopted them before, that defeat would have been avoided.

In conclusion, let us beg special attention to what appears to us the weighty moral of the whole matter. Our representatives, military, consular, and diplomatic, who are stationed in distant quarters of the globe, are necessarily intrusted with large discretionary powers, and incur a responsibility corresponding in degree. Their instructions, however carefully drawn up, can scarcely provide for all possible contingencies; and even if they could, much confidence must yet be reposed in their judgment for determining when these contingencies have actually occurred. Cases must frequently arise when the honour of the British flag, the security of British citizens, and the interests of British trade, require spirited remonstrances, peremptory demands, and even prompt and unhesitating action. They cannot refer home for orders;-if they did, the time for remedy and reparation would be past. In dealing with semicivilised and oriental nations more especially, every thing depends upon the rapidity with which the demand for redress

follows the injury, and the retaliation the refusal of redress. If every instance of outrage or injustice had to be represented to her Majesty's Government for decision and directions, six months would often elapse before any thing was done; and six months of impunity to a savage or an eastern monarch would seem like an eternity, and would confirm him in his oppressive and contemptuous behaviour. It would be impossible, and most undesirable, thus to tie the hands of our delegated authorities. We must give them ample powers, and trust them to use those powers with judgment and forbearance.

At the same time, having appointed and instructed them, it is almost equally necessary to support them. If they are liable to be disavowed,-if we condemn and reverse their proceedings, refuse to endorse their demands or to ratify their agreements, on any but the weightiest grounds and except in the rarest cases,-we do even more mischief than if we had conferred upon them no discretionary powers at all. We render their action scrupulous, timid, and hesitating; and deprive their remonstrances and menaces of the weight without which they will, in the majority of cases, be utterly unavailing. Foreign potentates and people soon cease to regard or fear them; for they can never feel confident that they are acting in conformity with the sentiments, and will be backed by the whole power, of the imperial authority which sent them. So obvious are these considerations, and so cogent have they always been regarded by our Government, that instances in which we have disavowed even the rashest and most questionable proceedings of our representatives abroad are almost infinitely rare. It has become almost a maxim, that, whatever they do, they must be upheld and sanctioned ;-they are treated, in fact, as an impetuous colonel, who has, without or against orders, entangled his regiment or brigade in a premature or undesirable conflict with the enemy, is treated by the general in command: he is cursed for his folly; but he cannot be left to perish, or to draw the disgrace of defeat upon the flag, so other troops are pushed forward to support him, and the action, which his superiors would fain have avoided, becomes general. The result is, that a considerable portion of our foreign policy is liable to be determined, not at home, but on distant stations,-not by the prime minister in London, but by the admiral in the Gulf of Mexico, by the ambassador at Teheran, or the superintendent of trade at Hong Kong.

To a very great extent, we admit that all this is inevitable. We must give our representatives ample powers to speak and act on our behalf; and we must support them in the exerciseeven in the unwise and condemnable exercise-of those powers,

except where the want of judgment has been so flagrant that the mischief of endorsing is greater than the mischief of reversing their proceedings; or where their conduct has been so clearly unrighteous, that it would indicate a deficiency of the moral sense to sanction or defend it. Sometimes, indeed, as in the present instance, disavowal would come too late, and recession is simply impossible. War has broken out; and we cannot afford to be beaten in a contest, even though it be one into which we ought never to have entered. What, then, is the conclusion to which all these considerations point? What, but that the choice of the men to whom we confide such enormous and undefined powers, and whom we place in such arthritic positions, ought to be the one function of the supreme Government to be exercised with the most conscientious care, with the most scrupulous purity, and under the most solemn feeling of responsibility; and that no condemnation can be too strong for the minister who jobs these appointments, or who allows himself to be influenced in making them by the desire to serve a friend, to reward a political adherent, or to neutralise a political opponent; or, indeed, who considers any thing except the character of the man, and his moral and intellectual qualifications for the post. It is true, that bad selections bring ample retribution to the selector; but this is no consolation and no atonement for the woes and shame they inflict upon the country.

Now, what is the truth in this matter? Is it not that our diplomatic servants, from the lowest to the highest branches of the service, are appointed with less regard to fitness, desert, or capability, than any other class of public officers; more at haphazard,-more as a matter of favour,-more from considerations of political or family connection? Nay, is it not notorious, that the more distant the station (and therefore the more critical and hazardous), the more careless and impure are the appointments? We all know the moves and influences by which remote embassies and consulates are filled up. We are not so bad as we were in this respect, but we are bad enough in all conscience still. We know that the opinion which foreign nations form of us is mainly based upon the character and conduct of those whom we send out to represent us and act for us, -of our ambassadors and their attachés;-yet the emptiest young men of family are considered specially qualified for the latter, and the former are almost always selected for rank and party ties. We have had ample experience that wars may be prevented or precipitated by the judicious and conciliatory, or the rash and arrogant, behaviour of our residents at foreign courts; that on the choice of these depend often thousands