quences to the peace and tranquillity of the United States. Accordingly, early in Adams' administration, Clay began negotiations looking to the termination of the war on the basis of Spain's recognizing the independence of the new American republics, while retaining Cuba and Porto Rico. Middleton, the American minister at St. Petersburg, was instructed in May, 1825, to disclose this policy to the Russian emperor in the hope that that monarch would lend the high authority of his name to the attainment of peace and to the prevention of further waste of human life.1

5

At about the same time instructions were given to Alexander Everett, the United States minister at Madrid, to impress upon Spain the necessity of peace. The American ministers in France and England were instructed to invite the cabinets of Paris and London to second this advice. It was hoped that by the united exertion of all the powers, and especially of Russia, Spain might be brought to see her true interest in ending the war. The negotiations, however, produced no favorable result, and Middleton was later instructed to say to the Russian Government that, if Spain should obstinately resolve on continuing the war, the United States, although it did not desire to see either Colombia or Mexico acquire the islands, could not forcibly interfere to prevent them from so doing. The liberation of Spain's remaining possessions being a lawful operation of war, Clay declared that his government could not interpose unless the struggle should chance to be conducted in such a manner and with such results as to endanger the quiet and safety of the United States. Nor did he, he said, apprehend that it would become necessary for the United States to depart from its position of a neutral observer of the progress of events."

+ Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825. American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 846-849.

5 American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 887; for the correspondence referred to see Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the U. S. and Mexico, 115.

• American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 850.

Before these instructions were prepared, Clay had taken steps to forestall the complications that might have arisen from an invasion of Cuba and of Porto Rico by the new states. Although he recognized the right of Spain's enemies to attack her at any vital point, Clay requested the governments of Colombia and Mexico to suspend the expedition which it was understood they were fitting out against the islands until the results of the negotiations already initiated by the United States with a view to bring about peace, should have been ascertained." Colombia's reception of this request was friendly though not very cordial. In a note addressed to the American minister at Bogotá the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the importance of the matter demanded that it be duly weighed. On one side of the balance, he observed, were the noble efforts of the United States to effect and to maintain a general peace and to afford to the American continent an opportunity to heal its wounds; on the other side were the treaties which bound Colombia to its allies, the greater probability of bringing the war to a close by driving the enemy from the Western Hemisphere, and the guarantee which would be obtained for the future tranquillity of the continent by withholding from Spain the hand of friendship until she had recognized her utter defeat.

He therefore expressed the opinion that, as it was not clear that Spain intended to abandon hostilities against the American states, the suspension of vigorous and effective war against her would be a cause for regret, and that the postponement of operations against Cuba and Porto Rico in order to give the United States a new proof of friendship and of confidence in the continuance of its good offices, would result only in making more evident the contumacy and heedlessness of Spain. Nevertheless Colombia wished, he said, to carry its deference to the

7 American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 840, 851.

A good, brief account of the question of Cuba and Porto Rico from the Colombian standpoint is given by Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia (1858), III, 488-494.

United States as far as its own security, its treaty obligations, and its vital interests would permit; in consequence of which, operations of magnitude against Cuba would not be carried forward until the allies had had an opportunity to deliberate upon the matter in the congress to be assembled at Panama.8

Mexico on the other hand gave to Clay's request a cold reception. President Victoria, after having received from Poinsett a full explanation of the attitude of the United States regarding Cuba, declared that his government "had no intention to conquer or keep possession of the island, [but] that the object of the expedition which they contemplated was to assist the revolutionists to drive out the Spaniards and in case they succeeded to leave that people to govern themselves." A few days before this conference took place the Mexican senate had passed a resolution granting permission to the executive to undertake an expedition against Cuba jointly with Colombia. When the question came before the chamber of deputies that body voted to postpone further consideration of the subject until the executive should have submitted to them the plans which were to be agreed upon at Panama. These things occurred shortly before Clay's request for a suspension of the expedition against Cuba and Porto Rico came into the hands of the Mexican cabinet.

8 Revenga to Andersin, March 17, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 506-508.

A few days before this Santander had written to Bolivar, making the following comment on the subject: "Revenga will inform you confidentially of the interposition of the United States for the purpose of asking us to suspend the expedition against Cuba, because it might interfere with the negotiations which Russia is carrying on at Madrid in favor of our recognition. Habana is a point of great commercial importance to the United States, and as commerce is the god of the Americans, they are afraid that the independence of that island would be harmful to their trade. I shall have the answer given in equivocal terms in such a way as neither to reject the interposition nor declare that we will suspend our preparations, which would give great satisfaction to our enemies and encourage them to come and attack our coasts." O'Leary, Memorias, III. For Revenga's communication to Bolivar, see O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 484.

› Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, 143-144.

The request was presented by Poinsett in March, 1826, and he soon discovered that the reasons urged by Clay for suspending the expedition tended rather to incline the government of Mexico to persist in it. He reported that Mexico, relying upon the protection of Great Britain and of the United States, no longer feared Spain nor the Holy Alliance, and regarded with indifference the question of Spain's recognition of her independence; that her greatest apprehension was that the powers might compel a peace on the basis of Spain's retaining Cuba and Porto Rico," which would deprive Mexico of the advantage and glory of emancipating those islands," and that she also feared that Colombia alone might liberate and thereafter control them. Poinsett further reported that a messenger had recently brought news of the fitting out at Cartagena of a large squadron against Cuba; that it was current rumor that Bolivar would arrive in April to take command; that the Mexican Government was desirous to participate in the enterprise in order to acquire the right to a voice in the future disposition of the conquered territory; and that President Victoria, being without authority to send troops out of the country, was planning to dispatch the Mexican fleet, with as many men as by a forced interpretation might be considered marines, to coöperate with the Colombian expedition. Poinsett believed that this would be done in spite of Clay's request.10

That Victoria's plans were not carried into execution by no means detracts from their significance. As has been shown in a previous chapter, Mexico, almost from the beginning of its independence, had regarded Great Britain as the only effective barrier to the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the war between Spain and her former colonies in America.11 The establishment of relations of friendship and commerce with Great Britain, it was believed, would be the "foundation of the pros

10 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, 145-147.

11 See supra, p. 228 et seq.

perity and greatness of Mexico, which needed only to obtain the protection of so important a power to be able to advance rapidly to a high position among nations." 12 England in turn being desirous of cultivating friendly relations with Mexico, early established informal diplomatic intercourse with that country. Dr. Mackie, the first British agent to be sent to Mexico, was appointed in December, 1822, and arrived in Mexico about the middle of the following year, after the downfall of the empire. The Mexican Government appointed General Victoria to treat with Mackie, and four conferences were held in July and August, in which the foundations were laid for future diplomatic relations.13 Upon the conclusion of the conferences Mackie returned to England. A second mission, consisting of Hervey, O'Gorman, and Ward, was appointed, and receiving instructions from Canning on October 10, 1823, set out in time to reach Mexico before the close of the year. Migoni, the first diplomatic agent of Mexico in Great Britain, was appointed, but without diplomatic character, soon after the fall of Iturbide. A commission as diplomatic agent which was later issued to him was borne to England by Mackie upon his return. Michelena, the first regular minister, was appointed in March, 1824. He reached England aboard a British warship about the middle of the year.15 De facto relations continued until England recognized the independence of Mexico early in 1825. The British Government then appointed Ward, one of the three commissioners above mentioned, as chargé d'affaires to the Mexican republic.16

14

12 La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 98. For Colombia's plan relative to Cuba, see Santander to Bolivar, January 21, 1826; O'Leary, Memorias, III, 237.

13 For the protocols of these conferences, see La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 109-113, 128.

14 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, 62.

15 Ibid., 56; La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 135, 150; III, 1, 13, 19.

16 Ward was received by President Victoria on May 31, before Poinsett, the American minister, was received. See Bocanegra, Historia de México, I, 379.