affairs of the republic with a view to forming what he repeatedly spoke of as an American party. In this he met with success and soon the York rite masons whom he helped to organize were in control of the government. After a time resentment against Poinsett on account of his intermeddling in domestic affairs became very bitter. In the latter part of the year 1827 the Plan of Montaño, the principal demand of which was that the minister of the United States should be furnished with his passports, was proclaimed, and a revolution was started to force its adoption. The movement was soon put down by government forces and Poinsett remained at his post. But as it was believed that he continued to exercise undue influence in domestic affairs, attacks upon him in the public press became frequent. Finally, in July 1829, President Guerrero, who had succeeded Victoria, requested his recall. In October the request was complied with.81

In the mind of Gual, and perhaps also in the minds of the other ministers accredited to the congress of Tacubaya, Mexico's lack of interest in the plan of confederation was associated with the undue influence which Poinsett was thought to exercise over the government. In the published extracts of the Colombian representative's dispatches there are casual references to Poinsett, and these leave one to wonder whether the relations between the two ministers were on the most cordial footing. In May, 1827, Gual wrote that it seemed strange that the pending treaty between Mexico and the United States had not been approved by the Mexican government, in view of the influence which Poinsett had acquired in the republic by means of the York rite lodges. In January, 1828, he wrote that Poinsett had been spreading the report that Peru had disapproved the Pan

81 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the U. S. and Mexico, 80-82, 190-204; 349-377. See also Poinsett's Career in Mexico by Justin Harvey Smith in Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, April, 1914, 77-92. The contemporary Mexican historians were generally hostile to Poinsett; but for a friendly appreciation see Zavala, Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México, I, 339,

ama treaties, the implication being that Poinsett's object was to put obstacles in the way of the resumption of the conferences of the general assembly at Tacubaya. And in May following Gual declared that to whatever it might be due, whether to party spirit, whether to a conviction that Mexico could stand alone, or whether to the intrigues of the American minister, Poinsett, the fact remained that the business of the assembly had made no progress.82

Under the circumstances Poinsett's colleagues would have been unlikely to solicit his participation in the preliminary conferences. And if they had done so it is not likely that he could have acceded to their desire, for the general instructions given by Clay under date of March 16, 1827, supplementary to the general instructions of May 8, 1826, appear to have contemplated little activity on the part of the delegates of the United States in promoting the designs of the congress as they were then understood. "The intelligence," said Clay, "which has reached us from many points as to the ambitious projects and views of Bolivar, has abated the strong hopes which were once entertained of the favorable results of the congress of the American Nations. If that intelligence is well founded (as there is much reason to apprehend), it is probable that he does not look upon the Congress in the same interesting light that he formerly did." Although the secretary of state went on to say to the delegates that the highly important objects contemplated by their instructions ought not to be abandoned while any hope remained, and that the value of those objects did not depend entirely upon the forms of government which might concur in their establishment,83 yet it is an evident conclusion that in the words quoted above, Poinsett found warrant for his passivity concerning the general assembly.

With the signature of the protocol of October 9, the efforts to revive the assembly of American plenipotentiaries came to an

82 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 385, 394, 403.

83 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 152.

end. Gual soon afterward presented his letter of recall, and when in January, 1829, he set out for Colombia it was to return to a land torn by internal strife and bleeding from a war with a sister republic. When Gual reached Bodegas de Babahoyo, a little town near Guayaquil, he wrote Bolivar in a spirit of despair. "I left Mexico," he said, "sick of revolutions caused by those exaggerated doctrines which our people neither understand nor can understand. On the way down [from Acapulco] we ran short of water and had to put in at Realejo, a port of Central America, where we found everything in the greatest confusion; for, having executed their governor, Cerda, they had not so much as a vestige of government. I left there with the hope of finding further to the south a more consoling order of things and I ran upon the Peruvians in Guayaquil, converted into propagandists of anarchy and of the subversion of all social principles. What a terrible state of affairs! Colombia is apparently in a better situation than the rest of Spanish America, for it still possesses a single bond of union, which I hope you will not think for a moment of allowing us to lose. They tell me that you have aged greatly and that your health is bad. Take care of yourself and preserve with your life the hopes of the three millions of your compatriots." 84

The Liberator, the single bond of union, had indeed become prematurely old and his increasing ill health obliged him within a year to release his hold on the conflicting elements which now only nominally constituted the republic of Colombia. This was the signal for the dissolution of the republic. And thus the state which Bolivar desired to weld into a powerful nation and which he hoped to make the controlling factor in a great American confederation abdicated its claim to a position of leadership in the Western Hemisphere.

84 Gual to Bolivar, May 29, 1829. O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 449.

CHAPTER IX

BRITISH INFLUENCE

APART from the adoption of the four conventions referred to in the preceding chapter, no official action of importance was taken by the Congress of Panama. Matters of weight were discussed informally, however, as is revealed by the correspondence of some of the delegates and by the dispatches of the British commissioner. Relative to Cuba, for example, Briceño Méndez, writing from Buenaventura on July 22, 1826, makes the following remarks: "The Mexicans have also manifested a desire to incorporate Cuba into their already immense republic. They have proceeded with caution, it is true, and they have succeeded in evading our efforts to make them speak out clearly on the matter; but as good understanders require few words, we are no longer at a loss to know what their attitude is. We have in this question the first germ of division in America, unless we know how to reach a compromise, putting aside our national egoism." 1

In a postscript to the letter from which the above extract is taken, Briceño Méndez expressed the opinion that the fate of Cuba and of Porto Rico was one of the great difficulties which stood in the way of the recognition of the independence of the new states by Ferdinand VII. The desire of that monarch was to have his possession of Cuba and Porto Rico guaranteed by the mediating powers (England, France, and the United States) and by the new states. This pretension of the Spanish king, said Briceño Méndez, was being supported by the United States, who had formally declared that it would not permit the islands to pass to any of the new republics nor to be held by any European power other than Spain. England apparently adhered to this policy because she desired to be on friendly terms with the 1 O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 210.

United States and because she feared to have the islands fall into the hands of some power that might absorb the British possessions in the West Indies.2 To an understanding of this subject a brief review of the negotiations which the United States had been conducting relative to Cuba and Porto Rico is essential.3

The United States was in effect unwilling that Cuba and Porto Rico should be transferred to any European power or be annexed by any of the new American states. Not only so, but the United States, being convinced that the islands were incapable of self-government, was opposed to any project to liberate them with a view to their independence. The situation was one of great concern to the government at Washington; for, as long as the war lasted, there was danger of a change in the status quo of Cuba and of Porto Rico, with possibly serious conse

2 Ibid., 214. The part of the letter here referred to is as follows: "The question of recognition is progressing, so much so that even France has taken an active part in our favor. Do not doubt it. There are only two difficulties that keep Ferdinand from deciding: first, the fate of Cuba and Porto Rico, which he asks to have guaranteed by us and by the powers that mediate in the recognition, and secondly, Spain's burden of debt, and especially the part of which she contracted with France during the campaign of restoration and during the occupation. In the first, Spain is sustained by the government of the United States, which has formally declared that it will not consent to the possession of those islands by any of the new republics nor by any European power other than Spain. It appears that England also adheres to this in conformity with her policy of courting and humoring the United States, and because she does not view with pleasure the creation of an insular power in the Antilles, which might absorb her colonies or fall into the power of Haiti. In the second, interest is shown in a general way by France, who sees no other way of being reimbursed by a ruined Spain; the worst of it is that England is supporting France in this because England has debts to cover and above all because it suits her convenience to keep France as a friend against the Holy Alliance. You see how the question of our independence has become involved with the great interests of the leading maritime powers. We are forced therefore to make a prompt decision, for each day the outcome grows more complicated and more difficult."

3 For the general diplomatic history of this period relative to Cuba and Porto Rico see: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, VI; Callahan, Cuba and Inter national Relations; Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico; Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain; American State Papers, For. Rel., V.