the Tacubaya instructions, which had just been made public, before the Colombian Government on its true ground. It was the undoubted right of the late President, said Van Buren, to form such opinions as to the conduct and views of the public functionaries of other countries as he might deem just, and to give them such publicity as might comport with his views of propriety; but the disposition of the Colombian Government toward the United States "should not take its character from sentiments which have been expressed by those whom the people of these states, in the exercise of their sovereign power, have divested of executive authority. Continuing, he declared that events in Colombia had undoubtedly produced in the minds of the friends of liberty occasional and painful apprehensions as to the ultimate views of President Bolivar. In the opinion of the administration, however, "he ought to be considered responsible to the cause of free and liberal principles only for the honest and faithful application of the means placed under his control, and a liberal allowance should be made for the difficulties incident to all attempts to convert long oppressed subjects into discreet depositories of sovereign power. The application of a different rule," continue the instructions, "would be to make President Bolivar answerable for the oppressions which have been for a succession of years heaped upon his countrymen, and to the removal of which the best portion of his life has been devoted." 101 These instructions, together with Moore's discreet conduct, resulted in restoring the customary cordiality between the two countries. In dispatches to the Department of State during the summer of 1829, the new minister succeeded in removing much of the suspicion which had arisen as to Bolivar's designs. Toward the end of the year, Van Buren wrote again to Moore saying that he had read his

100 In 1832, Van Buren having been appointed minister to England and having arrived at his post, learned that his nomination had been rejected by the Senate, partly on the ground that he had criticized and extenuated the acts of a previous administration. Moore, Digest Int. Law, VII, 787. 101 Moore, Digest Int, Law, VII, 788,

"It

observations with profound interest and satisfaction. would be superfluous," he said, "to repeat what was said to you in general instructions as to the policy of this government respecting intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. You are well informed as to this point and as to the President's determination to demand of our public agents abroad the most scrupulous obedience to those instructions." 102

102 Van Buren to Moore, December 12, 1829. O'Leary, Memorias, XII, 420.

CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES AND HISPANIC AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

THE relation of the United States to the Hispanic American struggle for independence is often made a matter of controversy. An illustration of the sort of discussion to which the subject gives rise appeared some years ago in the North Amer ican Review. Matías Romero, then Mexican minister at Washington, opened the debate with a paper in which he maintained that "the United States Government did not render either material or moral assistance to the cause of the independence of the Spanish American colonies." Among other things he adduced in support of his contention certain statements in Lyman's Diplomacy of the United States affirming that the patriot cause did not awaken any great general interest in the citizens of the United States; that the government was left free and unembarrassed to pursue its steady course of good faith and exact neutrality toward Spain and of justice and policy toward the colonies; that neither the vicinity of some portions of their respective territories, nor the circumstance of being members of the same continent, nor the benefit to be derived from commercial relations, nor the similarity of their struggles for independence, appears in the least to have influenced the definite arrangements of the government; that on the contrary the authorities at Washington conducted the business with the utmost caution and circumspection, doing nothing to give offense to Spain, or to awaken in other nations the slightest suspicion of their loyalty to the system of neutrality.1

In a subsequent article Senator Money of Mississippi took the other side of the question. He declared that the view ex1 The North American Review, CLXV, 70–86 (July, 1897).

pressed in Romero's paper "leaves a disagreeable impression on the mind of the American citizen, who has always gloried in the belief that his government had cordially sympathized with any people anywhere in their struggle for liberty, and especially with those of this continent." He maintained that in permitting the revolutionists to buy in our cities all kinds of supplies not contraband of war; that in expressing interest and sympathy for them in Congress, in the public press, and through other channels of publicity; that in recognizing them before other nations had done so; and that in arresting the movement designed by the Holy Alliance to reduce them again to subjection to Ferdinand, the government and people of the United States undoubtedly rendered their cause both material and moral assistance.2

The discussion, as may be readily perceived, hinges upon the definition of the terms "material and moral assistance." The disputants did not reach an accord on this point. Had "material assistance" been defined as substantial military and naval support such as that given by France to the Thirteen Colonies, this phase of the question would have been eliminated at once; for the United States formed no alliance with the Spanish possessions against the mother country. Had it been defined as such support given in violation of professed neutrality, then the problem would have been to determine its extent and importance; that is, whether or not it were material in the sense of affecting the outcome of the struggle. It is evident that assistance afforded by supplies, openly purchased in the markets of the United States and equally accessible to both parties to the contest need not be considered. Had "moral assistance" been defined as encouragement derived from the example and from the interest and sympathy of a neighboring people; the advantages flowing from the recognition of belligerency and of independence; in short, as every aid or support not originating in the violation of or departure from neutrality, then this phase 2 Ibid., 356–363 (September, 1897).

of the subject would have been greatly simplified. It would have become a matter of weighing the effect of certain undisputed facts upon the fortunes of the insurgent cause.

If the writers in the North American Review had placed some such limitation on the discussion, they would have arrived, doubtless, at substantial agreement. But in their case the failure to agree was due in part to another cause; namely, the confusion of government and people. Romero's proposition referred to the government of the United States. Money speaks of the government and people, or of one or the other, indifferently. This divergence of view on the part of men exceptionally well qualified to analyze the subject and to draw just conclusions from it but demonstrates the necessity for a careful review of the whole matter. Such is the purpose of the present chapter. As to whether, or to what extent, the patriots derived material or moral assistance from their relations with the United States the reader may be safely left to draw his own conclusions.

The United States maintained a neutral policy in the conflict between Spain and her colonies. This was in harmony with an already well-established tradition. At the beginning of its independent existence, the nation adopted a distinctive foreign policy, the first and foremost principle of which was nonintervention. By this was meant not only noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, but also nonparticipation in the political arrangements between other governments and especially those of Europe. The system of neutrality was a logical derivative of this principle. The first occasion for its application was the war which broke out in 1793 between France on one side and Great Britain and her European allies on the other. In his famous proclamation, issued on April 22, 1793, Washington declared that "the duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward