banks? I do trust, sir, there is too much good sense in this committee to believe any such doctrine. Then, sir, if the gentleman's position in this respect is unfounded, does not his whole argument fall to the ground? Then, Mr. Chairman, is there anything wrong in retaining the penalty in the constitution? Some gentlemen seem to think that with the penalties retained in the constitution it will look bad. Now, sir, that is not the question. I care not whether we make a long or a short, a homely or a handsome constitution. The only question with me is, How shall we make it in order to get it right? Make it right, and then it will possess all the qualifications that will be necessary to recommend it to my constituents. Something has been said about trusting the people; that the Democracy should not mistrust the people; that Democrats should be willing to leave the question of penalty and of enacting such laws [as] shall be necessary from time to time to carry into effect the constitutional prohibition to future legislation. Now, sir, I am never afraid to trust all matters of government with the people, and I am confident that if any legislature hereafter should betray the confidence reposed in them by the people, and attempt to render the constitutional provisions nugatory by their acts, that the people would at the very next election relieve such honorable legislators from the responsibility of serving them further. Notwithstanding I have complete confidence in the people, I have not that confidence in the legislature. I am convinced from the past history of our country that money has an uncontrollable influence upon legislative bodies. I well recollect the history of banking in Michigan. Although that system is charged upon the Democrats by gentlemen upon this floor, I must beg leave to differ with them. I admit the fact, sir, that the time the wild-cat system in Michigan was established by the legislature of that state, the Democracy had a majority in both branches of the legislature; but did not the main body of the Democratic party oppose, and did not the entire Whig party support it? And I ask if money was not brought to bear upon the weakness of representatives? And did not some corrupting influence bring to the assistance of the Whigs a few Democratic members-suffi

cient to carry the measures-and thus curse that state for years? And, sir, is it not an alarming fact that when General Jackson was elected president there was a large majority in both houses of Congress decidedly Democratic? And when the term of the same Congress closed, a majority were decidedly opposed to him? A second Congress elected by the people who took their seats decidedly Democratic and devoted friends to the President-their term expired and they closed their labors with a decided majority against the President. All this had its effect with the people; they began to inquire into the cause; a third Congress was elected and took their seats with a decided majority in favor of the administration, but to the astonishment of all, the same biennial change visited them. A fourth exertion followed on the part of the people in behalf of the administration with a similar result; and again was the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot boxes, defeated and disregarded. This was sensibly felt, but the cause was as yet unseen and untold. The energy, firmness, and patriotism of the President in the meantime prostrated the United States Bank, and subsequently a settlement of the affairs of that institution disclosed the whole evil. The great cause of the numerous political changes of members of Congress was then made apparent. The financial affairs of the government monster showed that some two hundred and fifty members of Congress, during the eight years of President Jackson's administration, had received large accommodations at that institution, all of which satisfied the people most effectually that a speedy divorce between the government and all moneyed institutions must take place. I mention these circumstances, sir, to show the influence money has had and will be likely to have again over legislatures to prevent which the penalty in the report was proposed. I also mention these facts to show that the people are generally right, but that when money can be brought to bear upon their representatives they (the representatives) are generally wrong.

Now, Mr. Chairman, what would be the great advantage to the people of this new state, if the penalties should be retained and made a part of the constitution? I will briefly give my

views in relation to the great benefits we should derive from the penalties proposed to be enacted. The report only proposes to fix the minimum below which no after legislature can go, thus settling the question forever beyond dispute, teaching the banking world that we have forever placed our legislature beyond the influence of money and corruption on the subject of banks and banking, that we have rendered lobbying useless and of no avail, and therefore the time that would undoubtedly be spent by our legislature in listening to the appeals made to them by capitalists, asking, yes, begging of them to enact mere nominal penalties in order that the rich may in a legal way monopolize all monetary affairs and thereby crush the poor. Who does not believe that the simple enactment of the penalty would in time save many hundred thousand dollars to the people of the new state?

But, Mr. Chairman, while I am upon this subject, permit me to say that it is my opinion that the penalty proposed as a minimum is too high; the term of imprisoninent proposed should in my opinion be reduced to one year; but by all means retain the provision for imprisonment in the state prison; for I can assure the members of this committee that imprisonment in the state prison will do more towards prohibiting the violation of the provisions of such a constitution as we now propose to adopt than a fine of a hundred thousand dollars. And in the case of passing, I think a forfeiture of the money offered would be sufficient to prohibit a violation of that portion of the constitution.

I would in conclusion suggest, as a matter of policy, that the exclusion of foreign paper from the new state be gradual. After 1847, exclude all paper of a less denomination than $5; after 1848, all of a less denomination than $10; after the year 1849, all of a less denomination than $20; and after 1850, all of a less denomination than $50; and all bills of $50 and over would become and take the place of bills of exchange. I have thus briefly given my views, hoping that we will act rationally on all these matters and avoid as much as possible personalities; too much personal feeling has already been exhibited upon this subject.-Democrat, Oct. 31, 1846.

BANKS AND BANKING

(Speech of Mr. Prentiss, October 12, 1846)

Mr. Prentiss said he had no desire to discuss the subject of banks and banking, but, that his course might not be liable to misconception, he wished to state briefly some of the reasons why he could not vote for the article as reported from the committee. Whenever it was his duty to act in any manner to affect the general interests of the country or of any portion of it, he would so act as he believed would best promote those interests, whatever might be the consequences to himself as an individual. If he could not please all his friends, he could only say it was as much a source of regret to him as to them. The question was not whether there should be a bank, but whether they would give the power, with proper guards and under proper restrictions, to the legislature of authorizing banking in any form, at any future time, or in any possible contingency that might occur. That is the true question at issue. The great principle involved in this article, if fairly developed, would reduce the currency, which is now a mixed one, to one of a purely metallic character. The mere inhibition upon the legislature of authorizing banking in any form is but half of the work; to carry out the principle they must expel from the currency everything but hard money, and that in the present age he believed was utterly impossible. In viewing this question they should not act with reference to first principles merely, they should not look upon the thing in the abstract only, as if it were new and untried, but they should have regard to the circumstances in which they were placed and the relations which they bear to other states, and see how they would be affected by attempting to carry out the principle. If they were an isolated people, separated from all the rest of the civilized world, perhaps the principle as contained in the article would be well enough in practice; but as they now were, in their present condition, the principle he believed was utterly impracticable. If they were to inhibit every species of banking, as a necessary consequence they must pre

vent the influx of foreign bank bills; it is in vain to inhibit all banking and yet permit here the circulation of bank notes of other states, over which banks they can exercise no control or regulating power, and of the character of their notes they can know little or nothing. He would have no banking under any circumstances unless it could be done safely to the public and for their convenience; he was as unfriendly as anyone to irresponsible banking, and he was equally as unfriendly to any principle which, if carried out, would tend to impair or check the increasing prosperity of the country.

This article forever prohibits the legislature from authorizing banking of any kind, under any restrictions. He was not willing that the legislature should have no power at any future time when, perhaps, the circumstances and necessities of the people might require it, to permit banking with proper guards, and under proper restrictions. Nor was he willing that the present population of the territory, of one hundred and sixty thousand, should bind half a million of people, to which the population of the territory would soon swell, upon a matter of at least doubtful policy.

Besides, a constitution, in his apprehension, should consist of few, single, and fundamental principles, and not of matters of questionable expediency or doubtful policy; those should be left to the legislature properly restricted; and especially should they not insert into the constitution provisions which cannot be enforced.-Democrat, Oct. 31, 1846.