placed, by continuing the war, early in the spring, 1812, on the inhabitants of Indiana, so that they had taken twenty, or more scalps, before the 1st of June, and returned to Tippecanoe, where they commenced raising corn, yet the governor was refused the order of the war office, to his proposal "for raising a mounted corps, with which again to assail them." In this situation, the governor, naturally loquacious, and pressed by his citizens for protection, not only filled his own territory, but Kentucky and the neighbouring states, with his cries of danger, battle, or murder! The Kentuckians, more attentive to the voice of distress, than the laws of their country, volunteered to the number of sixty or seventy men, under the command of Colonel Anthony Crockett, and Captain John Arnold, and were marched to Vincennes, to see what was the matter! And ten days after, they marched home again, to tell they knew not what-leaving the governor and his people, in the suds, which he he had made for them to beat into bubbles.

In the mean time, Tecumseh appeared at fort Wayne, grave, dignified, and reserved: he adhered to his former opinions, which were briefly expressed-and he let fall some expressions in relation to Governor Harrison, that marked his sense of injury, with a feeling of resentment, which nothing but retaliation could abate. He requested some ammunition for his own use, from the commandant. This was refused. He then said, he would go to his British father, who would not deny him. He paused-appeared absorbed in his own reflections-then giving expression to his countenance, he raised the warwhoop, flourished his tomahawk, and departed; a determined, but magnanimous foe. If some of the means lavished upon Governor Harrison, had been employed to secure the friendship of this distinguished Indian, the government could but have found him useful.

1

CHAP. XII.

General Harrison's official account of the battle of Tippecanoe Impartial examination of General Harrison's conduct, and accounts in relation to the said battle--The last communication of Governor Scott, &c.

[1811] THE accounts of battles, always interesting to humanity, as well as to men of military science, has ever been the favourite theme of history, and cannot be omitted in this.

While it must be supposed, that although every general is not a historian, yet when he assumes the office, that as to himself at least, he has done no wrong; and intending to exhibit an examination of both his conduct, and, his account of it, when it was fresh in its laurels, the whole of both will be published, rather than either should be accused of partiality by an abridgment.

They follow in order, and will serve as a prologue to the general's subsequent achievements.

"Vincennes, 18th November, 1811. "Sir: In my letter of the 8th instant, I did myself the honour to communicate the result of an action between the troops under my command and the confederation of Indians under the ⚫ control of the Shawanee Prophet. I had previously informed you in a letter of the 2d instant, of my proceedings previously to my arrival at the Vermilion river, where I had erected a block-house for the protection of the boats which I was obliged to leave, and as a depository for our heavy baggage and such part of our provisions as we were unable to transport in wagons. On the morning of the 3d instant I commenced my march from the block-house. The Wabash above this turning considerably to the eastward, I was obliged in order to avoid the broken and wooden country which borders upon it, to change my course to the westward of north, to gain the prairies which lie to the back of those woods. At the end of one. day's march, I was enabled to take the proper direction (N. E.)

which brought me on the evening of the 5th to a small creek at about 11 miles from the Prophet's town. I had on the preceding day avoided the dangerous pass of Pine creek by inclining a few miles to the left, where the troops and wagons were cros sed with expedition and safety. Our route on the 6th for about six miles lay through prairies separated by small points of woods.

"My order of march hitherto had been similar to that used by General Wayne; that is, the infantry were in two columns of files on either side of the road, and the mounted riflemen and cavalry in front, in the rear and on the flanks. Where the ground was unfavourable for the action of cavalry they were placed in the rear, but where it was otherwise they were made to exchange positions with one of the mounted rifle corps. Understanding that the last four miles were open woods, and the probability being greater that we should be attacked in front than on either flank, I halted at that distance from the town and formed the army in order of battle. The United States' infantry placed in the centre, two companies of militia infantry and one of mounted riflemen on each flank, formed the front line. In the rear of this line was placed the baggage drawn up as compactly as possible; and immediately behind it a reserve of three companies of militia infantry. The cavalry formed a second line at the distance of three hundred yards in the rear of the front line, and a company of mounted riflemen, the advanced guard, at that distance in front. To facilitate the march the whole were then broken off in short columns of companies, a situation the most favourable for forming in order of battle with facility and precision. Our march was slow and cautious, and much delayed by the examination of every place which seemed calculated for an ambuscade. Indeed the ground was for some time so unfavourable, that I was obliged to change the position of the several corps, three times in the. distance of a mile. At half past 2 o'clock we passed a small creek, at the distance of one mile and a half from the town, and entered an open wood, when the army was halted and again drawn up in order of battle.

"During the whole of the last day's march, parties of Indians were constantly about us, and every effort was made by the interpreters to speak to them, but in vain-new attempts of the kind were now made, but proving equally ineffectual, a Captain Dubois of the spies and guides, offering to go with a flag to the town, I despatched him with an interpreter to request a conference with the Prophet--in a few moments a message was sent by Captain Dubois, to inform me that in his attempts to advance, the Indians appeared in both his flanks, and although he had spoken to them in the most friendly manner, they refused to answer, but beckoned to him to go forward, and constantly endeavoured to cut him off from the army. Upon this information, I recalled the captain, and determined to encamp for the night, and take some other measures for opening a conference with the Prophet. Whilst I was engaged in tracing the lines for the encampment, Major Daveiss, who commanded the dragoons, came to inform me that he had penetrated to the Indian fields; that the ground was entirely open and favourable-that the Indians in front had manifested nothing but hostility, and had answered every attempt to bring them to a parley, with contempt and insolence. I was immediately advised by all the officers around me to move forward. A similar wish indeed pervaded all the army--it was drawn up in excellent order, and every man appeared eager to decide the contest immediately. Being informed that a good encampment might be had upon the Wabash, I yielded to what appeared the general wish, and directed the troops to advance, taking care however to place the interpreters in the front, with directions to invite a conference with any Indians they might meet with. We had not advanced above four hundred yards, when I was informed that three Indians had approached the advanced guard, and had expressed a wish to speak to me. I found upon their arrival, that one of them was a man in great estimation with the Prophet. He informed me that the chiefs were much surprised at my advancing upon them so rapidly-that they were given to understand by the Delawares and Miamies whom I had sent to them a few days before, that Iwould

not advance to their town, until I had received an answer to my demands made through them. That this answer had been despatched by the Potawatomie chief, Winnemack, who had accompanied the Miamies and Delawares on their return; that they had left the Prophet's town two days before, with a design to meet me, but had unfortunately taken the road on the south side of the Wabash. I answered, that I had no intention of attacking them until I discovered that they would not comply with the demands which I had made--that I would go on and encamp at the Wabash, and in the morning would have an interview with the Prophet and his chiefs, and explain to them the determination of the President-that in the mean time no hostilities should be committed. He seemed much pleased with this, and promised that it should be observed on their part. I then resumed my march; we struck the cultivated grounds about five hundred yards below the town, but as these extended to the bank of the Wabash there was no possibility of getting an encampment which was provided with both wood and water. My guards and interpreters being still with the advanced guard, and taking the direction of the town, the army followed and had advanced within about 150 yards, when 50 or 60 Indians sallied out and with loud exclamations, called to the cavalry and to the militia infantry, which were on our right flank, to halt. immediately advanced to the front, caused the army to halt, and directed an interpreter to request some of the chiefs to come to me. In a few moments the man who had been with me before made his appearance. I informed him that my object for the present was to procure a good piece of ground to encamp on, where we could get wood and water; he informed me that there was a creek to the northwest which he thought would suit our purpose. I immediately despatched two officers to examine it, and they reported that the situation was excellent. I then took leave of the chief, and a mutual promise was again made for a suspension of hostilities until we could have an interview on the following day. I found the ground destined for the encampment not altogether such as I P**

VOL. II.