He was an expert in all matters relating to coal and electricity. Lieutenant-Commander Potter was an officer of technical experience and calm judgment. LieutenLieuten ant-Commander Marix had been executive officer of the Maine, and was familiar with the details of her structure and organization.

Conscious of the awful responsibility placed upon her by the destruction in her harbor of a friendly man-of-war, particularly one flying the flag of the United States, Spain at once gave assurance of sincere sympathy for the American Nation. The Queen Regent, whose attitude seems always to have been considerate, personally expressed profound horror and regret. The Spanish Government conveyed its condolence through our Minister Woodford at Madrid, and its Chargé d'Affaires at Washington. Governor General Blanco and the Ayuntamiento of Havana declared their grief. From every nation and from every quarter messages of sorrow were received. The world was shocked by the disaster, and was prepared to hold the authors of it, if they could be discovered, to strict accountability. Spain's situation was most delicate.

Her honor and her position in the family of nations were jeopardized by the investigation which the United States had set on foot. She proposed that a joint inquiry be made. The adoption of this proposal was impracticable. Then Spanish officers thought to throw obstacles in the way of our independent inquiry. A sharp protest ended this procedure. The wreck of the Maine was closely inspected by wreckers and divers and United States naval officers. Their discoveries and the evidence of survivors of the Maine and of persons who witnessed the explosion were heard by the court. On March 21 Captain Sampson and his associates submitted their report to the Department. They found that the Maine had been destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, but responsibility for her destruction was not specifically placed upon any person or persons. Unable to obtain a joint investigation, Spain ordered an independent one, which ascribed the catastrophe to internal causes. Spain subsequently suggested that an international court be convened to inquire into the Maine's destruction. The United States

accepted neither this suggestion nor the Spanish findings. Immediately upon the receipt of the report of the Sampson court, Spain was advised of its character, and informed that the President did not permit himself to doubt that her sense of justice would dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two Governments. However, the soon-following declaration of war terminated all negotiations in regard to the Maine. The mystery of her loss yet remains to be solved, but the facts will some day come to light, and it will probably be found that, so far as the Spanish Government itself was concerned, it was innocent of the design, though it is possible that some of its subordinates may have been responsible for the fact.

The destruction of the Maine severely aggravated the situation and precipitated the crisis. The certainty that war was inevitable in case Spain failed to grant generous concessions to the insurgents had caused the Navy Department for some time to maintain the navy on a semi-war footing. The measures to prepare the service for conflict were, as far as possible, of a nature not calculated to arouse public anxiety. Premature disclosure might have jeopardized pending negotiations; and it is a fact that unwise publications materially hampered the President and the Department in dealing with the Cuban question. As quietly, however, as it could be done, preparations were made. Ships under construction were completed and immediately commissioned; those undergoing repairs were finished and added to the fleet. The several squadrons, particularly those of the North Atlantic and Asiatic Stations, were required to engage in evolutions and target practice, so that, when confronted with an enemy, they would be able to maneuver as a unit, and shoot with judgment, rapidity, and precision. Plans of operations against Spain were devised, and all information regarding the Spanish navy that could be obtained was collected and considered in its various relations to hypothetical war situations.

With the further development of the war cloud our preparations assumed larger proportions. Beginning with January 11, 1898, instructions were cabled to commanders-in-chief of the several squadrons

to retain in service men whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. The North Atlantic Squadron and a torpedoboat flotilla were sent to the Florida drillgrounds. The gunboat Helena, en route to the Asiatic Station, was stopped at the Azores, subsequently was ordered to join at Lisbon the San Francisco and Bancroft, which comprised the European Squadron, and, after the destruction of the Maine, was brought to Key West. The Bancroft accompanied the Helena to the United States, putting in at Norfolk for repairs, and again saluted her on the Cuban blockade. The South Atlantic Squadron, consisting of the Cincinnati and the Castine, which were at Montevideo, was advised on January 17 that affairs were much disturbed in Cuba, and that it should, without causing comment, proceed to Para, Brazil. Two days after the destruction of the Maine the Squadron was directed to proceed north from Para, and reached Key West on March 26. The Wilmington, which had been assigned to the South Atlantic Station, was caught by cable at Guadeloupe, and diverted to La Guayra. She dropped anchor in Key West Harbor on the same day on which the Cincinnati and Castine arrived. The Annapolis, which was cruising in the West Indies, was also ordered to Key West. In this way the Department mobilized within ninety miles of Cuba a fleet ready, upon declaration of hostilities, to establish a blockade of the principal ports of the island, and to do battle with the hostile squadron of the Peninsular Kingdom whenever it should appear.

In preparing for war the Department did not confine its attention to the Atlantic Ocean. Commodore George Dewey, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, was directed to assemble his squadron, with the exception of the unseaworthy Monocacy, at Hongkong. The Olympia, his flagship, had been ordered home for repairs, but this order was revoked as the certainty of war loomed upon the horizon. The cruiser Baltimore was at Honolulu. The Mohican, at Mare Island, was ordered to convey to the Baltimore a large quantity of ammunition, and after its transfer the Baltimore started at once to join Commodore Dewey at Hongkong, who was thus amply supplied with ammunition from the beginning. The battle

ship Oregon, which was at Bremerton, Washington, early in March, was directed to proceed to San Francisco and receive ammunition. On March 12 she was ordered to prepare for a long cruise, and on March 19 she started on that voyage back around the Horn which will be famous so long as the American Nation takes pride in gallant deeds. The gunboat Marietta, which was at San José de Guatemala, was ordered to precede the Oregon and arrange for coal and otherwise facilitate the battle-ship's passage to Key West.

Thus were the regular squadrons mobilized and augmented. New squadrons were formed. The armored cruiser Brooklyn, which was on detached service in the Caribbean Sea when the Maine was destroyed, was ordered from La Guayra to Hampton Roads, where were assembled the battle-ship Massachusetts, the second-class battle-ship Texas, and the commerce-destroyers Minneapolis

and Columbia. These ships comprised the Flying Squadron which was held in readiness to defend any point on the American coast or to assail a port of Peninsular Spain. Though the Department felt assured that the West Indies were to be the theater of military operations, some of the Atlantic coast cities and towns were nervously excited over the possibility of an attack by a Spanish man-of-war, and to allay alarm the Northern Patrol Squadron, under Commodore Howell, was organized on April 20. The San Francisco, brought home from Europe, was made the flagship of this squadron, and attached to the flag were the cruisers Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, and Yosemite. The Columbia and Minneapolis and two auxiliary cruisers, Badger and Southery, were also from time to time attached to this squadron. It turned out that there was never any real need for its organization, although it patrolled the coast northward, and it was finally disbanded and the vessels comprising it assigned to more pressing duty.

The Department early appreciated that the work cut out for the navy was too comprehensive for it to perform without considerable augmentation. The Secretary had exhausted his legal authority in enlisting men and apprentices over and above the quota allowed by law. There

was not sufficient money, however, with which there was authority to buy material. On March 9 Congress, therefore, gave to Spain, and other powers not inclined to regard our policy with friendly eyes, a striking indication of our potential strength. It appropriated $50,000,000 of the ample funds in the Treasury "for the National defense." To show the confidence of the people, irrespective of political affiliation, in our President, this appropriation was placed at his disposal, to be spent in his discretion-which discretion he extended to his Secretaries. The President made allotments to the Navy Department which, in the aggregate, amounted to $29,973,274.22, all of which, with the exception of $618,447.17, was expended by it. Congress subsequently appropriated $25,000,000 for an emergency fund to meet unforeseen contingencies, and $3,000,000 for for the organization and enrollment of the United States Auxiliary force. There was thus given to the Navy Department, for use at its discretion in strengthening the navy, the sum of $57,973,274.22. Of this amount there was unexpended on November 15, 1898, $25,056,131.21-practically the whole emergency fund, and more, which unex

PHOTOGRAPH BY TAYLOR'S, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN JOHN R. BARTLETT

In command of the Coast Signal Stations during the War with Spain

pended balance, of course, remained in the Treasury.

All the money disbursed by the Department was honestly spent and every purchase made in good faith. Even before Congress granted its appropriation for National defense, the Department had given consideration to the question of purchasing foreign men-of-war. The navy list of every nation likely to sell had been scanned. Reports were obtained in regard to war-ships nearing completion in the private ship-yards of Europe. Captain W. H. Brownson had been sent abroad to pursue inquiry and initiate negotiations of purchase. Mr. Charles R. Flint, of New York City, through his large maritime connections, was also helpful. The Department swarmed with agents of foreign firms anxious to make sales to the United States. Sight was not lost of the fact that Spain, too, was anxious to buy, and that it was more desirable that we should pay a high price for a ship than to permit it to be incorporated into her service. As a result of the efforts of the Department and its agents, two protected cruisers, the Amazonas and the Abreu, both building at Elswick, England, for Brazil, also the gunboat Diogenes, belonging to the Thames Iron Works, of England, and two torpedo-boats, were purchased. These vessels were christened the Albany, New Orleans, Topeka, Manly, and Somers, respectively. The New Orleans and Topeka did excellent service in Cuban waters during the war; the Manly was attached to the auxiliary defense squadron at New York; the Albany was retained in England, not having been completed, until after the

war.

The difficulty experienced in adding war-ships to the navy when the country was on the eve of hostilities shows the danger and folly of a policy which trusts to the last moment to make preparation. It was soon evident that foreign governments were not disposed to bring upon themselves the protest of Spain by selling vessels to the United States for hostile use against her, and practically the only Power which served us in this respect was Brazil, which authorized the sale to us of the Amazonas and the Abreu. In view of the inability largely to add regular men-of-war to the service, it became neces

sary to improvise war vessels. Ninetyseven merchantmen were purchased and transformed into auxiliary cruisers, gunboats, and colliers; five vessels, one the City of Pekin, of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, and four, the St. Paul, St. Louis, New York, and the Paris, were chartered from the International Navigation Company; one iceboat and two yachts were loaned to the Department, and fifteen revenue cutters, four lighthouse tenders, and two United States Fish Commission vessels were transferred from their especial departments to the Navy Department.

PHOTOGRAPH BY PURDY

The labor of purchasing vessels devolved to a great extent upon the office of the Assistant Secretary, and Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Allen were successively efficient in procuring ships for the service and rendering other valuable service. Several hundred vessels were offered to the Department, some at extortionate prices. Little political pressure was applied to force purchases. Some American owners displayed far more greed than patriotism. Before competition became active, no doubt the Department paid a higher price than the vessels would have brought at private sale, and in one or two instances there was rank extortion; but when the honor and safety of the Nation were at stake, and time was of the greatest importance, and the ships must be had at any cost, the Department could not go without them. Once, however, the need of the Department became generally known, competition between shipowners grew energetic, with the result that vessels were obtained at reasonable prices. All the ships acquired were first inspected by a Board of which Captain Frederick Rodgers was President, or by special Boards, and the officers comprising them performed their duties with

fidelity and care; thus the Department was assured by expert report that every vessel purchased was properly built and fitted to perform its part in the war.

The acquisition of vessels was followed by their transformation into war-ships. The Bureau of Construction and Repair utilized its plants at navy-yards and private ship-yards to convert them. The ships were to strengthened withstand the shock

of discharge of guns, woodwork was ripped out, batteries installed, and they were docked and painted and supplied with proper equipments. The construction plants at five navy-yards, which in January, 1898, employed 2,200 men, furnished work for a maximum of more than six thousand during the war. Few of the vessels purchased had evaporators or distillers, appliances essential to continued service afloat, or proper outfits of engineering stores and tools, and many of them required overhauling in their steam departments. The Bureau of Steam Engineering performed this work satisfactorily and expeditiously. One novelty which Rear-Admiral Melville, the Engineer-inChief, introduced into the service was a floating steam engineering plant-a floating blacksmith shop. The vessel so transformed I named the Vulcan, and her service in North Atlantic waters showed the great value of having such an establishment attached to a fleet engaged in offensive operations. The Bureau of Equipment supplied auxiliary vessels with complete outfits of rigging, canvas, galleys and cooking utensils, boat supplies, anchors, chains, electric supplies, searchlights, binnacles, compasses, sextants, chronometers, charts and other instruments and appliances of navigation, sails, awnings, hammocks, bags, and many other articles. The best indication of the quantity of