quences disastrous to the peace of the two nations. As a measure of precaution, therefore, President McKinley, in October of 1897, decided that a war-ship ought to be stationed within a short distance of the Cuban capital. Instructions were accordingly given to the secondclass battle-ship Maine to proceed to Port Royal, South Carolina. Early in December she was ordered to Key West, with instructions to open communication with General Lee, proceed to Havana at such time as, on notice from him, conditions in that city should warrant, and to grant an asylum to American citizens should they appear to be in danger. The wisdom of this action was proven by disturbances which occurred in Havana on January 12, 1898, as a result of the hostility of the Spanish royalists there to the plan of an autonomic government. General Lee cabled to the State Department that uncertainty existed whether the Spanish Captain-General could control the situation, and advised that ships be prepared to move promptly. Obviously, there was but one thing to do. Through Minister Woodford and General Lee the Spanish authorities had been advised of the purpose of the United States to have its warships resume friendly visits to Cuban ports. Carrying out this decision, the Maine went to Havana, and the cruiser Montgomery to Santiago de Cuba and Matanzas. Spain affected to see an ulterior motive in this action, and declared that the presence of American war-ships would obstruct autonomy and cause disorder, but responded to the announcement of the purpose to despatch war vessels to Cuban waters by declaring her appreciation of the proposed visits, and stating that she would return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the principal ports of the United States.

Several reasons were responsible for the selecting of the Maine for service at Havana. She was a second-class battleship, really an armored cruiser, sufficiently powerful to impress the Spanish troops and loyalists, and at the same time capable of making a good defense in case of an attack by shore batteries and their supporting ships in the harbor. She was under an officer in whom the Department had confidence-Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, who had been ordered to command

her in April, 1897. A few months before the Maine was sent to Key West, Captain Sigsbee had shown good judgment in avoiding in the East River, New York, a collision with an excursion steamer loaded with women and children. Captain Sigsbee's conduct in Havana demonstrated that the Department had justly estimated his character. He was as punctilious as the Spaniards in official courtesies. He diplomatically refrained from involving himself in Cuban politics. At the same time, he served as the eyes and ears of the Navy Department, and transmitted to it all the information he could collect concerning political and military conditions in the island.

When the Maine was ordered to Havana, it was not intended that she should remain for a long time. In the judgment of the medical officers of the Department, sanitary reasons forbade a protracted stay. Political necessity demanded, however, that the advantage gained by the despatch of a vessel should not be lost by her immediate withdrawal. General Lee expressed the opinion that conditions required the presence of a war-ship; that the retirement of the Maine and neglect to order another ship in her place would aggravate them, and that to counteract the Spanish estimate of our navy a first-class battle-ship should be sent in case the Maine were relieved, and with it a torpedo-boat to preserve communication with the Commander-inChief of the North Atlantic Squadron. General Lee's views prevailed. The Maine remained in Havana Harbor, and the torpedo-boat Cushing conveyed despatches to and from her to the Commander-in-Chief at Key West.

While representatives of the United States, diplomatic, consular, and naval, were according to Spain the courtesy due to a friendly nation, the Envoy of the Spanish Government in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, committed an unfortunate breach of etiquette and propriety. In a letter to a friend in Havana the Minister referred to the President in coarse and abusive terms. The letter, brought to light, was submitted to the State Department. The usefulness of its author ceased at once. His recall was demanded, but before the demand was presented he anticipated it by tendering

his resignation. Desire to preserve its agent from humiliation prompted immediate acceptance of the resignation, but the Spanish Government subsequently expressed regret and disclaimed the views expressed in the objectionable missive. Nevertheless, unjustifiable criticism of our President by the representative of Spain and the revelation he had made of Spanish insincerity aroused indignation and distrust, and added further irritation to a situation already brimful of dangerous possibilities.

The widening rift in the relations between the United States and Spain seemed to have no effect upon the treatment of the Maine by the Spanish authorities. Captain Sigsbee reported an evident inclination on the part of Spanish officials to limit their relations with him to those prescribed by official etiquette, but he experienced no discourtesy, and the Maine's arrival and stay produced no appreciable excitement. A few days later the vessel was made fast to the buoy designated by the captain of the port, from which she never moved. Captain Sigsbee, to show his good relations with the island, attended a bull-fight with some of his officers, but while returning from the exhibition a small printed sheet vehemently protesting against the visit of the Maine was placed in his hand. The following is a

taining unexecuted threats against the life of General Lee had been frequently received by that officer, no attention was paid by Captain Sigsbee to the paper delivered to him; nor was it possible of belief that Spain, with many noble traditions, could descend to the depth of authorizing the destruction of the ship of another nation, with which she was still at peace, lying peacefully within one of her harbors. Captain Sigsbee had naturally taken precautions for the care and safety of his command, without making his action offensively obvious to the Spanish authorities, but his procedure related entirely to internal administration and could not extend to external surveillance. Spain's international duty required her to protect the Maine from outside injury. The same duty imposed upon the United States the preservation from harm of the Spanish cruiser, the Vizcaya, during her visit to New York. Though the Vizcaya lay in New York Harbor immediately after the destruction of the Maine, she rested in perfect security, guarded-unnecessarily

-by tugs and launches, and she sailed undamaged to ultimate destruction in battle on the south shore of Cuba.

The Maine was blown up at forty minutes past nine in the evening of February 15, 1898. Two officers and two hundred and sixtyfour enlisted men lost their lives in this catastrophe. I was awakened about two o'clock on the morning of Febru2ry 16, by a despatch from Captain Sigsbee-shall I ever forget it, or the gentle hand that brought it?-briefly announcing the ap palling disaster. It

was a supreme moment, and that telegram was a spark that fired an explo

sion of popular feeling throughout the country far more pregnant of death and destruction than the explosion of the Maine. The bright representatives of the press were at my door, and the news was swift upon the telegraphic wires. Commander Francis W. Dickins, Acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, was at once sent for and directed to notify the President. It was manifest that the loss of the Maine would inevitably lead to war, even if it were shown that Spain was innocent of her destruction. Time was necessary, however, to enable completion of our preparations for conflict. From every point of view hasty action was inadvisable. The President desired to give the civilized world no ground for criticising the American Republic. His policy had not changed from that declared eleven months before. He sought to preserve peace, but to be prepared for war in case it was forced upon him. In his despatch Captain Sigsbee had suggested that "public opinion should be suspended until further report." This advice from the commanding officer of the destroyed vessel was taken by the country to refer to the suspension of its opinion as to the responsibility of Spain for the act, and was followed in that spirit.

With 'admirable poise, but with unrelenting determination to avenge an injury if it had been done them, the people, after the first outburst of horror and indignation, sternly and deliberately awaited the verdict of the Naval Court of Inquiry which had been ordered to make a full and thorough investigation. Appreciating the grave consequences apt to ensue from its decision, the personnel of the Court was selected with the utmost care. Captain William T. Sampson, commanding the battle-ship Iowa, was named as President; Captain French E. Chadwick, commanding, and Lieutenant-Commander W. E. Potter, executive officer of the New York, were appointed members, and LieutenantCommander Adolph Marix was ordered as Judge Advocate. These officers had high professional standing, and the President and his Cabinet believed that their findings would be accepted. Captain Sampson had served as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and as head of the torpedo station at Newport. He was, therefore, well qualified to determine the question whether an internal or external explosive agent had destroyed the Maine. Prior to assuming command of the New York, Captain Chadwick had occupied the office of Chief of the Bureau of Equipment.