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AMERICAN NAVY'

By JOHN D. LONG

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FROM 1897 TO 1902

WIGWAG DRILL BY THE SIGNAL CORPS

PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN

C

YUBA projected a sinister shadow across the foreign relations of the United States at the time when William McKinley was inaugurated President, March 4, 1897. Rebellion had raged in the island for years. The sound of the crack of its rifles and the swish of its machetes reached across the sea and grew more and more audible in the ears of the great Republic which for more than a century has been the ideal of freedom to all oppressed people.

in their struggle. This feeling was intensified by the inhumane and barbarous methods of warfare employed by Spain to crush the revolt, and by the injury to American citizens and their industrial and commercial interests attendant upon the destructive operations of both insurgents and Spaniards. Responding to the loudly expressed demand of the people for some action on our part, President Cleveland, on April 4, 1896, tendered to Spain his good offices for the pacification of the island. The national pride of the Castilians in the integrity of their possessions rejected the offer. The note of the United States, however, had hardly reached the Spanish Government before our House of Representatives, answering the National insistence, concurred, by an almost unanimous vote, in a Senate resolution recogSamoa, the Philippines, and China; Recent Naval nizing the belligerency of the Republic of

Throughout the United States were manifested deep sympathy for the insurgents and a general wish for their success Copyright, 1902, by the Outlook Company. All rights

reserved.

This is the fifth of a series of twelve papers to appear in the Magazine Numbers of The Outlook. Other papers will be: The Battle of Manila Bay, The Blockade of Cuba, Bottling up Cervera's Fleet, The Battle of Santiago, Valiant Deeds in the War with Spain;

Lessons.

Cuba. As they lacked the attributes of belligerents, President Cleveland declined to grant the insurgents recognition of belligerency. When President McKinley entered the White House, he found the Nation enthusiastic in the cause of Free Cuba, and the Congress feverishly seeking a means to further it.

With that infinite tact and diplomacy characteristic of President McKinley, he immediately addressed himself to the task of holding the people and their representatives in check, and at the same time accomplishing by negotiation the restoration of peace in disturbed Cuba, under conditions that would satisfy the just aspirations of the fighting patriots. He initiated his foreign policy with a declaration of amity toward all nations, which perhaps contributed to cause Spain to listen more considerately to the proposals submitted by John Sherman, as Secretary of State. The inaugural address of the President contained this significant state

ment:

"War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed; peace is preferable to war in almost every contingency."

Judicious as were these words, they yet failed to restrain the Senate, and that body, in the extra session called to enact the Tariff Bill, passed a joint resolution in behalf of Cuban independence. The Republican House, less headstrong than the Senate, stood by the President, and, in spite of public clamor, refused to take action which at once would have precipitated war and which certainly would have gravely embarrassed the diplomatic correspondence then pending.

Looking back over the negotiations conducted with Spain, one cannot but remark the high plane upon which they were placed; how the nobility and prescience of McKinley made humanity and civilization the cardinal principles of his policy-protection of American interests secondary thereto. In dealing with the Cuban question he let no selfish desire for territorial aggrandizement taint the treatment he gave it. Spain was sovereign in Cuba; her rights as sovereign must be respected. The obligation which we, as a friendly nation, owed to her, no less than the necessity of preventing the reproach that we were assisting the

insurrection, led President Cleveland to establish an extensive marine patrol of our Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The same reasons actuated President McKinley in continuing it. Filibustering expeditions reached Cuba, it is true, but, annoyed as Spain was, she found herself unable to substantiate the claim that the United States failed to observe that "due diligence" which international law requires of a neutral.

The revolution, known as the Ten Years' War, which began in Cuba in 1868, was brought to a close in 1878 only by the exhaustion of Spain and her rebellious subjects. When President McKinley and his Cabinet began the study of the Cuban question, the conclusion was quickly reached that a policy of exhaustion had been adopted alike by each party to the later conflict, the one to vindicate its sovereignty, the other to achieve independence. Spain had sought to crush the rebellion in its incipiency by quartering two hundred and fifty thousand men on the island. The effort was futile. Acquainted with the soil, acclimated and hardy, the Cuban volunteer demonstrated that he was a match for the soldier of the Peninsula. The sword proving ineffectual to suppress the insurrection, Spain resorted to the blunter weapon of starvation. The rural folk were compelled to abandon their homes. Males too weak or too old to have joined the insurgents were herded with women in camps of concentration where lack of food and unsanitary surroundings begot frightful mortality. A conservative estimate of the result of this method of conducting war has been put at half a million deaths. The country, rid of its residents, was laid waste by the torch. Determination to make the war expensive to Spain caused the insurgents to vie with her soldiers in the work of devastation. The island, upon which nature lavishes her richest bounty, was transformed into a smoldering desert in which want and misery stalked. Years of work and of American capital and industry had been necessary to lift Cuba from the enfeebled condition caused by the drain of the Ten Years' War; the revolution of 1895 was forcing it back to the unhappy state of 1878.

The unfortunate situation of the Cuban

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island. This money, judiciously expended,
succored many who were starving. The
good it wrought was an indication of the
greater good which could be accomplished
by affording relief to the victims of the
reconcentration camps. On December
24, 1897, the eve of the birth of the
Master who taught the blessed lesson of
charity, President McKinley appealed to
the American people to give of their
plenty to the suffering Cubans. The
response was generous.
His own per-
sonal contribution, of which few knew,
was far beyond his means to give. Dis-
tribution of the money and supplies col-
lected caused immediate alleviation of
distress, and thousands were saved from
death. The President's action was hu-
manitarian in conception and execution,
as it was also specially characteristic of
his own generous nature, but it was also
internationally significant, for it marked
the beginning of American intervention
in Cuba.

guise the gravity of the situation," General Woodford said, "nor conceal the conviction of the President that, should his present effort be fruitless, his duty to his countrymen will necessitate an early decision as to the course of action which the time and the transcendent emergency may demand." This was practically the text of the instruction given to General Woodford before his departure for his post, and carefully considered by the President and his Cabinet during the hot summer days of the preceding July.

Spain suffered a Cabinet crisis eleven days after the presentation of the American note, and a new Ministry was formed, with the Liberal Señor Sagasta as its President. Sagasta appreciated the power of the United States and the temper of our people. The note of General Woodford, our able Minister to Spain, was answered by the announcement that an autonomist government would be established in the island. The innovation was one that to the President and his Cabinet indicated a hopeful change of policy on the part of the Spanish Crown. But though autonomy was established in Cuba within limited areas and with evidence of good faith on the part of Spain, it promptly developed its insufficiency to restore peace to the belligerent island. Those loyal to Spain derided it; the insurgents contemptuously refused to accept it.

Temporary amelioration of the condition of the Cuban sufferers was the immediate object of the Presidential appeal for contributions for their sustenance. Eradication of the evils in the political system of Cuba, which made such a condition possible, was the only remedy which could prevent its return. Moreover, the United States owed it to itself and to its people to insist upon the termination of a situation which was productive of disaster to American capital, industry, and commerce, which caused constant irritation and disturbance of domestic, social, and business affairs, and which menaced the health of the Nation through the danger of the introduction of infectious diseases from the reconcentration camps of the island. These obligations were far more pressing upon the Presi dent than, and in fact superseded, the obligation to respect the sovereignty of Spain. The first step in their observance was intrusted to General Stewart L. Woodford, of New York, who was appointed Minister to Spain. On September 18,tion of Cuba. It was of vital importance 1897, General Woodford tendered to the Madrid Government, on behalf of the President, the most kindly offices of the United States. This offer was couched in language decidedly more emphatic than that employed by Secretary Olney seventeen months before. "I cannot dis

Americans must review these negotiations with a feeling of satisfaction, for they clearly show that every opportunity and ample time were given to Spain to meet the demands of our President, and to effect a settlement honorable and right to herself and her rebellious subjects. During the consideration of the notes exchanged, I was often struck by the concern manifested by President McKinley and his advisers of the Cabinet to be considerate of the susceptibilities of the Spanish people, and at the same time to attain the one object in view-the permanent pacifica

that the Navy Department should be advised of every development in the negotiations, as the maintenance of the naval anti-filibustering patrol was in its charge, the protection of American life and property in foreign lands was the first duty of our men-of-war, and there was, finally, the

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REAR-ADMIRAL MONTGOMERY SICARD
Of the Naval War Board.

probability that war-especially involving the navy-might be the ultimate result.

His conscientious view of the situation had deterred President Cleveland from sending a man-of-war to Cuban waters, though consular officers had not failed to call attention to the advisability of such action. American citizens had been arbitrarily thrown into jail, and one, Dr. Ricardo Ruiz, died in prison under circumstances which indicated that he had been foully murdered. Energetic representations made by the State Department during the Cleveland and the first few months of the McKinley administration resulted in the release of all Americans confined in Cuban prisons. Nevertheless, General Fitzhugh Lee, our Consul-General in Havana during both administrations, found his representations in behalf of American

REAR-ADMIRAL A. S. CROWINSHIELD
Of the Naval War Board.

property and commercial interests hampered by the absence of a naval force, and the known determination of the prior administration not to order a warship to Cuban waters. In the first meetings of President McKinley's Cabinet consideration was given to the suggestion to despatch a man-of-war to Havana. because it was desirable not to arouse the

CAPTAIN ALFRED T. MAHAN Of the Naval War Board.

But

suspicion that the United States was applying pressure to Spain to compel acceptance of the President's proposals for the termination of the insurrection, it was decided to defer such action. Time, however, only accentuated the gravity of the Cuban situation, and there were indications that Havana might become the scene of disturbances antiAmerican in character. Such demonstrations, especially if directed against the American Consulate, could only have had conse

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