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H. of R.] The Tariff. [May 11, 1830 fall upon the producer, until he can withdraw his capital from it the southern planters, with their imported manu. and labor, and thereby diminish the production of the factures. This, sir, is the true issue now pending between taxed article. Such is the operation of impost duties upon the northern and southern States, and I thank the gentle.

the cotton planter. On the contrary, a general impoverishment of all the soils that are devoted to the production of cotton would, in the first instance, diminish the quantity produced, cause an enhancement of the price, and consequently throw the most of the burden upon the consumer. An annual blight, therefore, which should destroy twofifths of the crops of the cotton planters, would be much less injurious to them, than a duty of forty per cent. upon the exchange of their productions. And yet it is argued, with solemn gravity, that this duty imposes no tax upon the planters, which does not equally extend to all other classes of the community l The gentleman from Massachusetts, who first addressed the committee, [Mr. Davis] has entirely misapprehended the argument I used, and the effect of the proposition I laid down, as to the operation of an impost duty on the price of cotton. I did not say that such a duty diminished the price of cotton in the foreign markets. On the contrary, I expressly and distinctly stated, as the basis of my whole argument, that no change was produced in those markets, either in the price of cotton, or of the manufac. tures we receive in exchange for it. The very essence of my complaint was, that the planter was compelled to pay the Government forty per cent. upon the amount of his exchange, and yet could not obtain any more for his cotton, nor purchase foreign manufactures any cheaper, in consequence of the tax imposed upon him. In other words, he receives no larger quantity of manufactures for a given quantity of cotton, than he would receive if no duty were imposed, and yet he is not permitted to bring those manufactures into the United States until he pays the duty. The result necessarily follows, that the whole burden of the duty must fall upon the plauter, unless he can transfer a part of it to the domestic consumer, by enhancing the price of the foreign manufacture in the home market. This, however, can only be doue by diminishing the aggregate quantity of foreign and domestic manufactures in that market. #. the very object and evident tendency of prohibitory duties is to supply the home market with a quantity of domestic manufactures, very nearly equal to the foreign manufactures excluded. The supply, therefore, is not diminished to any great extent, nor is the demand increased by these duties; and consequently the price of the foreign manufacture cannot be enhanced in the domestic market, in proportion to the impost duty, any more than the price of cotton would be enhanced in the foreign market, in consequence of an export duty. It will be recollected that one of the gentlemen from Massachusetts [Mr. GoRHAM] admitted that an import duty was equivalent to an export duty, and operated as a tax upon the producer, where the articles which were subject to the import duty came in competition with similar articles upon which no duties were imposed in the home market. Now, sir, this is precisely the case under consideration. The foreign manufactures upon which duties of forty-five per cent. are paid by the planters, came in competition with domestic manufactures upon which no duties at all are imposed. Indeed, sir, another gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Davis] made an admission, into which I presume he was inadvertently betrayed, as I cannot suppose he would have made a disclosure so fatal to his argument, if he had duly considered its bearings and consequences. He stated, and correctly stated, that the southern planters and northern manufacturers were contending for the domestic market of the United States; that the object of the southern plant. ers in contending for free trade, was to be admitted, with the productions purchased by their own industry, into that is: and the object in the northern manufacturers, in contending for high duties and restrictions, was to exclude

man from Massachusetts for his unintentional exposure of the real object of the prohibitory system. It will now be apparent to every intelligent mind, that the duties le. vied on the exchanges of the southern planters are taxe upon them as producers, independent of their consump. | tion. It is not denied that the planter is taxed to the ex tent that he consumes the productions of foreign countries subject to import duties. I will, therefore, confine my: self for the present to the consideration of that portion of the imports obtained in exchange for cotton, tobaceo, and rice, which consist of foreign manufactures brought into, the United States, not for the purpose of being consumed, by the planting States, but for the purpose of supplying the demand of the States for those articles. Let us sup: ; pose, for the sake of illustration, that South Carolina cool sumes only one-half of the eight millions worth of foreign : manufactures annually imported in exchange for her staples. ! and that the other half is brought into the country, to be : carried into the markets of the western and middle States, and offered for sale in competition with the manufacture! . of Massachusetts. What, sir, would be the nature of this, competition, and upon what footing would it stand as a fected by the legislation of Congress | ti Will it be denied that the foreign manufactures, import, a ed in exchange for the agricultural staples of South Caro a lina, are as truly the productions of her industry, as if her own citizens had turned the spindle and thrown the shu: ; tle by which they were fabricated Amidst all the er travagance and absurdity by which the prohibitory system i. has been sustained, I presume no one can be found bold euough to make the denial. o What, then, is the footing upon which the citizens of South Carolina and the citizens of Massachusetts come is competition with the respective productious, of their in . dustry, in the markets of Kentucky and Ohio, of New o York and Pennsylvania Is it a footing of equality Oslo the contrary, is there not a discriminating duty of forty-five s per cent, and upwards, unjustly imposed upon the pro ductions of South Carolina, for the sole purpose of exclud, ing them from the markets in question, while an indirect o bounty to the same extent is given to the productions of . Massachusetts, for the sole purpose of giving them the con-. mand of thosemarkets There is no possible aspeet in which. this system of restrictions could be presented, so well ealed a lated to exhibit its abominable and iniquitous injustice. If a duty of forty-five per cent, were imposed upon the . importation of the productions of South Carolina into all . the other States, the outrage would shock the moral sens of every man in the nation: yet this would be doing no thing more, in point of principle, and much less in point o fact, than what has been actually done already. What have said of South Carolina, is equally true of all the planting States. Suppose for a moment that the manufactures obtained in exchange for the productions of southern industry, were imported for the purpose of supplying Mexico or South America, and that no drawback should be allowed upon exporting them to those countries. Could any ove doubt, in this case, that the impost duties would operate as taxes upon the planters as producers, and not upon the consumers? And yet it is, to all intents and purposes, the same thing to the planters to be compelled to pay duties on the manufactures, they import, for the purpose of sup plying Kentucky and Ohio, as it would be, to be compel led to pay the same duties on the manufactures imported, for the purpose of supplying Mexico or South America. I do solemnly believe that there never was a branch of national industry so oppressed and borne down by unjust taxes and restrictions, as the agriculture of the plantir States; and I beg the committee to notice the compli

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it meets in competition the cotton of Brazil and #.

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weight of discriminating duties, imposed, too, by our own Government, with which it has to contend, both in the fo. reign and domestic market. Let us take cotton as an example. In the first place, it has to seek a foreign market, where produced by the richest soils, and that of the East Indies, produced by the cheapest labor upon the face of the earth. In the second place, it has to contend against a discriminating duty of at least thirty per cent in favor of the cot. ton of Brazil, and of at least forty-five per cent. in favor of the cotton of the East Indies and Egypt. The planters of Brazil, East India, and Egypt, receive the same quantity of British manufactures for a given quantity and quality of cotton, as the American planter; but the Brazilian only pays a duty of fifteen percent on those manufactures, and the Egyptian and East India planters pay no duty at all, while the American planter pays at !. forty-five per cent. It eannot be doubted, therefore, that the American planter has to contend, in foreign markets, not only against the fertile soil and cheap labor of the other cotton growing regions of the world, but against a discriminating duty

equal to the difference between the duties imposed by the

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tnriff of the United States, and by those of Brazil, the East Indies, and Egypt, respectively, upon European manufactures. He does not ask Congress to give him any bounty or protection, to enable him to meet foreign competition in foreign markets; all he asks is, that his own Government may not send him abroad to meet this competition not only unbountied and unprotected, but with a discriminating duty ainst his cotton, and

in favor of that of other countries! Yet even this humble

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ceived in exchange for it. Wherever he goes, at home or

abroad, he finds himself pressed down by the heavy hand of his own Government. While the Government is subjecting the planters of cotton, tobacco, and rice, to the burdens of this twofold operation of discriminating duties, it is worth while to inquire low its legislation operates upon the other branches of domestic industry.

| Sir, there is scarcely a single branch of industry belonging to northern or to middle States, that is not protected, even in the enjoyment of the home market, by an average discriminating duty of forty-five per cent.—a duty profess...} imposed upon the productions of southern industry and enterprise, with a view to their exclusion, and the substitution of the productions of northern industry. , Yes, while the cotton, and rice, and tobacco planters are doomed to sustain all the difficulties and obstacles arising from the competition of the whole world in foreign markets, under the weight of an enormous discriminating duty imposed by their own Government, the cotton and woollen manufacturer, the wool growers, the iron-masters, the salt makers, and sugar planters, not satisfied with the natural

protection resulting from the distance of the competitors,

are secured in the monopoly of the domestic market by

the additional protection of forty-five per cent, unjustly

bestowed upon them by a despotic majority, at the ex

pense of those very planters! If there is one spark of jus: oe left in the breasts of that majority, it will acknowledge , the flagrant outrage of such a discrimination between the

different parts of the Union, and the different branches o productive industry. The committee cannot but now perceive that whether the planting States of the South import manufactures for the consumption of their own citizens, or for the purpose of carrying them into the markets of other States, to be sold in competition with northern manufactures, the import duties, in either case, operate as taxes upon the planting States, though not precisely to the same extent. In the one case, they operate as taxes upon consumption; in the other, as discriminating transit duties, which the planters are compelled to pay for the privilege of vending the productions of their lawful industry in the markets of their own country, when they come in competition with productions of other States, which are not only free from taxation, but nourished by Government bounties. I will now proceed to illustrate the tendency of discriminating duties to change the course of trade, and hence demonstrate the practical injury inflicted upon the staplegrowing States by your impost system. A few years ago, a discrimination of five per cent was made between the duties imposed upon silks imported from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and those imported from Europe; and already has the amount of silks imported from France been almost doubled, while the amount of those imported from China has fallen off in a corresponding degree. It is said by practical merchants, that a discrimination of five per cent in favor of foreigners, effected by evasions of the revenue laws, is sufficient to throw into their hands almost the whole business of importation, to the exclusion of the American importers. If these small discriminations can change the course of trade to so great an extent, what must be the effect of a discrimination of from thirty to forty-five per cent against the American planters in foreign markets, and of forty-five per cent in the domestic market? The most satisfactory mode of ascertaining the burden imposed by these discriminations, is to consider the effect which would result from a repeal of them. What then would be the effect resulting from that repeal t . We have been very gravely told by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. so that it would raise the price of manufactures, and depress the price of cotton in the United States An audience that can believe this, would believe in any of the miracles of the dark ages. The repeal of our impost duties, on the contrary, would, in the first place, enable the American cotton planters to drive all their competitors out of the markets of Europe. If the planters of Brazil, the East Indies, and Egypt, can barely maintain the competition, with diseriminating duties of from thirty to forty-five per cent in their favor, they could not maintain it for a single year upon a footing of perfect equality. The consequence would be an increased demand for our cotton in Europe, to the extent of at least three hundred thousand bales. For it is to be remarked that the increased demand would result, not only from the exclusion of the Brazilian, East India, and Egyptian cotton from the markets of Europe, but from the increased consumption of cotton in those markets. There is no assignable limit to the quantity of cotton that would be consumed in Europe, if we would receive manufactures freely in exchange for it. . Now, sir, upon the conceded principle, that supply and demand regulate the price of every article, it would puzzle the gentleman from Woo. to show that an increased demand for American cotton, to the extent of three hundred thousand bales, would diminish the price. In fact, the real price of American cotton would {. increased very nearly as many per cent as the duties on foreign manufactures were diminished. So that the American cotton planter would have an increased demand for his staple, amounting to three hundred thousand bales, and would obtain an increased price of little less than forty-five per cent, not only for those three hun

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dred thousand bales, but for the whole amount of his production. Such, sir, would be the effect upon the foreign demand for American cotton, produced by the repeal of your unjust restrictions—restrictions which have all the injurious effects upon the American cotton planter which would result from the imposition, by Great Britain, France, and Holland, of a discriminating duty of from thirty to forty-five per cent, on American cotton, beyond what they imposed on the cotton of Brazil, Egypt, aud the East Indies. It remains to be ascertained what would be the effect produced upon the operations of trade in the domestic market of the United States, by the repeal of the high duties imposed upon foreign manufactures, and which really operate, and are designed to operate, as discriminating duties against the southern planters, and in favor of the northern manufacturers. The repeal of those duties, or a considerable reduction of them, would enable the southern planters to drive the northern manufacturers out of the markets of the United States, as certainly and to as great an extent as it would enable them to drive the planters of Brazil, Egypt, and the East Indies out of the markets of Eu rope. This is apparent from the single consideration, that, with protecting or discriminating duties of forty-five per cent, the northern manufacturers can scarcely maintain the competition with the southern planters, in supplying the demand of the United States for such manufactures as those planters obtain in exchange for their agricultural staples. If those were repealed, or even reduced to twenty; per cent, it is obvious that the manufactures of the northern States would be supplanted by those which are obtained in exchange for the productions of the southern States, to an extent fully equal to the increased demand for our cot. ton in Europe. For it cannot be doubted that the aggregate consumption of manufactures would be very greatly increased in the United States; so that the southern planters would have an increased demand for the manufactures purchased with their productions, not only in consequence of underselling and supplanting northern manufactures, but in consequence of the increased consumption of manufactures generally. If, then—as no one, I presume, will question—the benefits which would result to the southern planters from the repeal or reduction of the prohibitory duties, should be taken as the measure of the burdens imposed upon them by those duties, the committee will very clearly perceive that I have not estimated the burdens of the southern States too highly. For it may be safely assumed that a reduction of the duties imposed upon foreign manufac. tures, with a view to the protection of the domestic, from their present rates to twenty per cent, would increase the annual income of the planters of cotton, tobacco, and rice at least ten milllons of dollars, taking into view the increas. ed demand for these staples, and their increased value, resulting from the reduction of the duties in question. And yet, even after this reduction, the planting States would contribute more than their due proportion to the federal treasury. These views of the unequal action of your impost system upon the different sections of the Union, and of the effect of its repeal or modification, are fully confirmed by the concurrent declarations of almost every advocate of that system, who has addressed the committee during this debate. They all concur in the opinion that the adoption of the amendment I have offered—small as is the reduction it proposes—would be utterly ruiuous to the northern manufacturers. One gentleman [Mr. DAvis] has stated that all the manufactories would be razed to their foundations, and that the ple of New England would have no resource or refuge, o flying to the western wilderness, to take up their abodes among savages and wild beasts. Another gentleman [Mr. DENNY] has said, that, if you adopt the proposed amendment, you sweep through Pennsylvania with the besom of destruction, and run a ploughshare over Pittsburg.

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Now, sir, if there be any truth in these representations, if we are to regard them as anything more than mere rhetorical flourishes, they furnish the most incontestible proof of the unequal, unjust and oppressive operation of the prohibitory system upon the planting States. They certainly amount to a distinct and unequivocal admission that the wealth and prosperity of the manufacturing States are derived from the duties imposed upon the productions of southern industry; for if a repeal, or even a moderate restriction of these duties would spread desolation over the eastern and middle States, it follows as a corollary, that the existence of those duties must produce a corresponding injury to the southern States.

I presume I may take it for granted that the days of Political necromancy have passed away, and that no one will now contend, except perhaps that celebrated Rosicrucian philosopher, Professor List, that there is a creative power in legislation. Sir, no political power on earth can, by a mere touch of the legislative wand, as if by the touch of Midas, diffuse wealth and prosperity over extensive regions of country. Nothing less than an omnipotent power is adequate to produce such a result. Whatever wealth, therefore, is communicated to one portion of the Union by the duties and taxes imposed by Congress, must neces: sarily, and in the very nature of things be abstracted from the wealth of some other portions of the Union. Human industry only, co-operating with the bounties of nature, can create wealth. All that human legislation can possibly accomplish in this respect, beyoud protecting the [. of every citizen against foreign and domestic vio

ence and injustice, is to change the natural distribution

of the wealth thus created, by an arbitrary and despotic transfer of the property of one portion of the community to another. I have said that it is impossible to confer wealth on one part of the Union, by the legislation of Congress, without abstracting an equal amount of wealth from some other part of the Union. I now go further: I maintain that whenever this transfer of wealth from one part of the Union to another is effected by regulations which divert industry from its natural into artificial channels, the burden imposed upon the one part of the Union is much greater than the benefit conferred upon the other. When, therefore, it is affirmed that the proposed reduction of the duties upon the productions of southern industry would utterly desolate the manufacturing States, gentlemen should reflect that they are giving the strongest possible confirmation of the alleged desolation produced by these duties upon the prosperity of the planting States. For nothing can be more clear, in my view of the subject, than that the injury done to the planting States by the imposition of the duties in question, is much more extensive than that which would result to the manufacturing States by the repeal of them. A very brief analysis of the manner in which the proposed reduction of duties would operate, will illustrate and confirm the views here presented. What, then, is it that would produce the alleged desolation in the manufacturing States ? Would a British army, with hostile banners waving over the ruins of your manufacturing establishments, carrying devastation by fire and sword throughout the manufacturing States of the Union ? Would the southern planters with an army of slaves, apply the incendiary torch to those establishments Nothing of this sort is pretended, sir. The manufacturers would neither feel the hand of violence nor injustice. Nothing would be taken from them to which they have a semblance of title. The whole of the desolation which gentlemen have depicted, would result from restoring to the planting States a portion only of their natural and constitutional rights. As the tariff now stands, the southern planters are not permitted to vend the productions of their industry in the markets of the Union, until they have paid a discriminating duty of forty-five per cent, while the manufacturing

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States are permitted to vend their productions without paying any duty at all. Even if the proposed amendment were adopted, there would still remain a discriminating duty of a least twenty-five per cent against the southern planters, and in favor of the northern manufacturers. And yet gentlemen openly admit and declare, that, even with this discriminating duty of twenty-five per cent. in their favor, the northern manufacturers cannot hold comp. with the southern planters, in supplying the marsets of the Union with manufactured articles, but would be utterly ruined by the competition. If, then, this partial restitution of the rights of the southern States would produce such disastrous consequences to the northern manufacturers, what would be the effect produced by an entire restoration of those rights? Those rights can be completely restored, only by placing the productions of southern industry upon a footing or perfect equality with the ol. of northern industry. To produce this equality, there should be no discriminating duty at all, not to the extent of twenty-five or even five per cent. The manufactures purchased by southern industry skould be subject to no higher duties than the manufactures made by northern industry. The property obtained by purchase is no more rightfully the subject of taxation, nor less entitled to the protection of a just Government, than that which is manufactured by the owner. Whatever duty, therefore, is imposed upon foreign manufactures obtained in exchange for the productions of domestic industry, the same rate of duty should be imposed upon the manufactures made in the United States, and brought into competition with them. This is indispensable to that equality of taxation which every State in the Union has a right to demand. If a duty of twenty-five per cent. is imposed upon the manufactures imported by the southern planters, the same duty should be imposed upon those which are made by the northern manufacturers. They would then come into competition upon a footing of perfect equally in regard to government protection. Whatever advantage either might have, would be a natural advantage, of which they could not be rightfully deprived by the Government. If then, the reduction of the duties on imported manufactures to twenty-five per cent. would prove ruinous to the northern manufacturers, what utter and absolute destruction would result to those manusacturers from that reduction, accompanied by an excise duty of twenty-five per cent. on their 1. It must be obvious from the declaration of almost every gentleman who has spoken against the proposed amendment, that this equalization of duties on northern manufactures and southern imports would give to the latter almost the entire possession of the markets of the United States, to the exclusion of the former. All this conclusively demonstrates that the manufacturers of the northern States are actually sustained by the unjust discriminating duties imposed upon the productions of southern industry, and could not exist for twelve months in a tolerable state of prosperity if those duties were repealed. And yet gentlemen, who admit this to be true, have the modest assurance to tell us that the duties in question impose no burden upon the southern States, that does not operate eqaully as a burden open all parts of the Union, and that the tariff has nothing to do with the distress and suffering and decay of the southern States 1 Sir, it is vain that gentlemen attempt to wind their way through the labyrinth of inconsistencies in which they are involved. To a mind capable of comprehending the subject, there cannot be presented a more palpable contradiction, than to assert that the repeal of the duties on southern imports would ruin the northern manufacturers, and yet that the imposition of those duties is not as injurious to the southern planters, as their repeal would be to the northern manufacturers. Such a notion can be main. tained only by ascribing to the legislation of Congress the supernatural power of imposing taxes which shall confer

signal benefits upon one portion of the Union, withou" doing a corresponding injury to any other portion. It is true, indeed, that one of the gentlemen from Massachusetts [Mr. Davis] did very distinctly advance the proposition that impost duties are not taxes, and do not impose any burden upon the community, but confer very great benefits. The first day, he addressed the committee, he made a very labored argument to prove that impost duties imposed no burden at all upon the southern planters, as producers. The second day he maintained, with equal earnestness, that every increase of duties on foreign manufactures, so far from increasing their price, had actually made them cheaper, and consequently that the consumer paid no part of the tax, but, on the contrary, received a benefit. The gentlemau acted wisely in not uttering these two *P. on the same day. Separated by the interval of a night, it was possible that the paradoxical absurdity involved in their union might not be perceived. When brought:together, they amount to nothing less than the broad and unqualified assertion that the impost duties laid upon foreign manufactures, though they yield a large revenue to the Government, and, indirectly, a bounty to domestic manufacture, impose no burden at all upon any portion of the community. After this, the doctrine that “taxation is no tyranny," can no longer be regarded as confined to the slavish advocate of the despotic power of the British Parliament, and the passive obedience of the North American colonies. Improving upon the exploded political text, that a “public debt” is a “public blessing." the gentleman from Massachusetts has revealed to us the still more important discovery, “that a public tax is a public blessing.” So far as there is any truth in the assertion of the gentleman from Massachusetts, that the increase of duties on foreign manufactures does not enhance their price, it is a conclusive confirmation of my argument, as to the operation of impost duties on the producers of our exports. For if the price of manufactures be not increased, in conoil. of the duties, it follows that no part of the tax falls upon the producers. Nothing can be more certain than that, if there be no magic in the business, somebody must pay the taxes that go into the federal treasury. The truth of the matter is, that the price of manufactures is not increased in proportion to the duties imposed upon their importation, though it is increased to a certain extent. But it is equally true that the price of the staples of exportation is diminished by the impost duties, to a certain extent also. The duties must be paid either by the producers, or by the consumers, or by them both. Whatever portion of the duties is not paid by one of these classes, must be paid by the other. In the actual state of the foreign ...” domestic markets, I confidently believe that the principal burden, falls upon the producers; in other words, that the duties imposed upon foreign manufactures exhibit their effects much more in depressing the price of our agricultural staples in our own markets, than in the enhancement of the price of manufactures. But the gentleman from Massachusetts cannot conceive how the price of cotton can be depressed by our impost duties, and seems to suppose that if these duties depress the price of American cotton in our own markets, they must equally depress the price of foreign cotton in the markets of Europe. Now, the truth is nearly the reverse of what he supposes. If an export duty were imposed upon cotton, the gentleman would probably understand it. That would diminish the vale of cotton to the planter, almost to the full extent of the duty, although it would not at all diminish the price in Europe. If the planter receive the same price only for his cotton, after the imposition of the duty, that he received before, the duty most unquestionably falls on him. The gentleman seems to me to have failed in his usual acuteness, in confounding the effect of our tariff upon the price of cotton in foreign markets, and in our own

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markets. Hence he infers that the American merchant who purchases, the cotton of the planter, pays for it in money; as much as it is worth in Europe, deducting only the freight and charges; and, from these erroneous premises, he infers that if any loss occurs afterwards, by receiving goods subject to duty, it must fall on the merchant. Now, the gentleman gives credit to the American merchant for a very small share of sagacity, in taking it for granted that he will pay the planter as high a money price for his cotton as can be obtained for it in Europe, (de. ducting only freight and charges,) when it is known that the only purpose for which he purchases the cotton, and the only profitable use to which he can apply it, is to give it in exchange for foreign manufactures which he will not be permitted to sell until he pays the duty. In fixing the money price of cotton in the United States, the merchants undoubtedly take into consideration the duties they will have to pay on the return cargo. These duties constitute one of the principal elements of the calculation upon which the price of cotton is founded. It may be true that this calculation is not actually made by each individual merchant who purchases a lot of cotton; but it is equally true that each individual merchant does not calculate the demand and supply when he makes a purchase, though every one knows that these are the two circumstances which infallibly regulate prices. This reasoning is conclusively confirmed by a comparison of the prices current of cotton in Great Britain and the United States at this moment. Prime cotton now commands seven and a half pence, or about fourteen per cents per pound in Liverpool. Add to this the difference of exchange, and the difference in the value of the currencies of the two countries, which amount to eight per cent, and you have fifteen cents, or more, as the price of cotton in Liverpool, estimated in American currency. Now, sir, the very highest rice that can be obtained in the markets of the United States, is eleven and a half cents. Add to this two cents for freight and insurance, and other charges, a large allowance, and you have thirteen and a half cents as the rice which it costs the American merchant to deliver in iverpool the cotton for which he obtains fifteen cents. So far, therefore, from giving the planter as large a money price for his cotton, deducting the charges, as he could obtain in Europe, the American merchant reserves one and a half cents for his profit on every pound; whereas, if imported manufactures were freed from the discriminating duties imposed upon them, and the importing merchant could make his regular profit upon the merchandise imported, every practical man knows that, as cotton is the most convenient medium of remittance, it would command very nearly as high a price in the United States as it would in Great Britain. But the merchant must have his profit on one branch of the exchange or the other. What your discriminating duties in favor of domestic manufacture prevent him from making on the merchandise he imports, he must make upon the staples which he exports. Thus it is, sir, that the price of cotton is depressed in our own markets, more than that of manufactures is enhanced, by prohibitory duties; and, consequently, the largest portion of the burden of these duties falls upon the planters, as producers. If all the duties now imposed upon foreign manufactures were repealed, and trade left perfectly free, I will hazard my reputation on the assertion that there would not be a difference of more than one cent a pound between the price of cotton in Liverpool and in Charleston; whereas the difference now is two and a half cents at least. And here I cannot but remark that the gentlemen opposed to me have, in scarcely a single instance, stated my propositions correctly, and met them fairly. Whereas I stated that at laast one-half of the burden of the duties laid upon imports falls upon the producers of the exports given in exchange for them, as producers, I am repre

sented as stating that the whole burden falls upon the producers, and no part of it on the consumers. And whereas I stated that the duties imposed upon the foreign manufactures we received in exchange for cotton, have the effect of depressing the price of cotton in the United States, I am represented as stating that those duties depress the price of cotton in foreign markets. - It will {. recollected that the leading proposition which I laid down, and to which all the rest were subservient, was that forty per cent on the cotton, tobacco, and rice, exported from the planting States, might be fairly assumed as the measure of the burdens imposed upon them by this Government. Now, sir, if we assume that only one-half of the burden of the imposts fall upon the planters, as producers, my proposition will be most completely sustained: for I will now take into the estimate two very important items, which I did not think it necessary to present in my former argument. We have been told, this morning, by a geotleman from New York, [Mr. Strong] that the tariff States purchase from the planting States cotton to the amount of six millions of dollars. I believe this to be nn extravagant estimate; and, though it would better subserve the purposes of my argument, I will not adopt it. The true amount of cotton sold by the southern to the northern States may be set down at five millions of dollars. Assuming forty-five per cent. as the average of the duties levied on foreign manufactures, and that one-half only of this duty is taken out of the price of cotton, it will follow that the planters sustain a loss of twenty-two and a half per cent. upon the cotton sold to the northern manufacturers. For whatever depresses in our own markets the price of the cotton exported to foreign countries, must equally depress the price of the smaller portion of it consumed by the domestic manufacturers. Here, then, is a burden of one million one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars imposed upon the internal trade of the cotton plant. ers, which does not go into the public treasury, but evidently into the pockets of the manufacturers. But this is not all. If the planters receive, in exchange for this cotton, northern manufactures, enhanced by protecting duties, they are subjected to an additional burden of one million one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars, as the consumers of those manufactures. I will assume, however, that only half the amount of cotton sold to the northern manufacturers is received by the planters in domestic goods, enhanced by the protecting duties. From this, it will follow that the planters sustain a burden of one million six hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred dollars upon this branch of their internal trade; of which, one million one hundred and o: thousand dollars results from the depression of the price of cotton, and half that sum from the enhancement of the price of the manufactures received in exchange for it. There is another item to be added to the burdens of the southern States. They export grain, flour, lumber, turpentine, and various other articles, amounting to not less than two millions of dollars, in addition to their exports of cotton, tobacco, and rice. The burden they sustain, through these exports, cannot be less than six hundred and fifty thousand dollars, in any view of the subject. This sum, added to one million six hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred dollars, gives two million three hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars, which must be added to the burdens of the southern States, besides what they bear as the exporters of cotton, tobacco, and rice. Now, if even we grant that only one-half of the burden of the duties imposed upon the foreign trade of the planters is paid by them as producers, yet they will pay, even in that view, twenty-two and a half per cent on thirty-seven millions of dollars of exports, amounting to eight million three hundred and :twenty-five thousand

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