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lowed?)—“is in charge of officers appointed by the Presi. law, the agent for keeping the public moneys, . But from

dent,” is a fact which I am not only obliged to admit, but have much reason to deplore. And further, that “the superintendents and keepers of the whole are appointed by the President,” (it should be added, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” but that advice and consent has not yet been had and obtained to the most important appointments,) “responsible to him, and removable by his will,” are facts and truths which I have admitted, under the existing laws, in a former debate on a former occasion. I then contended, as I now contend, that “the legislative branch of the Government as clearly has the power, by the constitution, to take care of the public moneys of the United States, as it has to appropriâte them by law; and that it can no more delegate the one power than the other. “But Congress having by law created the head of an Executive department, and his subordinate officers the agents for keeping the public moneys, that head and the officers of his department are responsible to the President.” And, sir, lest I may not have been understood then, I will here explain my views of the extent of the responsibility of the officers in the Executive departments to the President of United States. Whenever the laws imperatively require an act to be or not to be done, or to be done in a particular manner, by these officers, the President, within the sphere of the executive branch of the Government, but there alone, is constitutionally bound to “take care” that such acts “faithfully” are or are not done by such officers, and in the manner prescribed by law. These officers are thus far responsible to the President, because he is responsible for their acts in every sense of the word. He is “answerable” and “accountable” for them as they are to him, because there is an obligation of duty imposed upon him by the constitution, which he is capable of discharging. and which if he does not faithfully discharge, he is liable to impeachment, as may be illustrated by a variety of cases. Thus, if Congress had enacted that the public moneys should be kept in the Bank of the United States, without any discretionary power of removal whatever, given to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Treasury had removed them, with the knowledge of the President, and embezzled them, the President would certainly have been impeachable for permitting a violation of the laws, when he had the power of removing the officer thus guilty of a breach of trust. I presume there would have been but one opinion, especially with the opposition, on this point. But where the laws are not imperative, merely permissive, that an executive officer may or may not do a particular act, where a discretion is vested in him, the President has not the power to sub stitute his own discretion in the place of that designated by law; because in this Government his will is not, like that of a king, the will of the nation. No officer is the keeper of his conscience, and much less is he the keeper of the consciences of others. He can in no case be held responsible for the exercise of another's discretion; and the responsibility to him from the officer is founded on his responsibility as described to Congress for the officer, and not, as is contended, on the power of appointment. He appointed many officers, judicial and ministerial, such as judges and marshals, for whose acts he is in no sense responsible. In this, then, in my opinion, consisted the abuse of power in the removal of the depos. ites: that the President exercised the legitimate power of removal for the illegitimate purpose of virtually substituting his own discretion in the place of that appointed by law. With the first of these paragraphs of the protest, then, understood as I am willing to understand it, I perfectly agree. It goes no farther than to state the previous and present fact, that a Department of the executive branch of the Government has always been, and is now made by

this step, as to what “always has been,” and is now, it will be found, in the subsequent paragraph, that he advances another step, trampling directly upon the constitution, to what “always must be” the keeper of the public moneys. Sir, the proposition is, “that, no matter how or when the public money is obtained, its custody always has been, and always must be, unless the constitution be changed, intrusted to the Executive department.” Now, it will be observed, that the first part of this proposition is but the mere repetition of the idea or fact contained in the paragraph already commented on. . The precedent of what “always has been” done is made the stepping-stone to a claim of constitutional right; and what was said in the first paragraph was but the preparation of the mind for what is to follow. Sir, “he who runs may read” this proposition, to which we have seen the preceding context directly leads, and was intended to lead; and now, I ask, whether this broad claim of executive power is lessened, qualified, or mitigated, in the least, by the subsequent context? As the preceding context is the groundwork of this

pretension, so the subsequent is the superstructure. Be patient, sir, whilst I search for the truth. What is the next sentence? “No officer can be created,” &c. A m

I, is any one who ever dreamt of logic, to be told that this is any qualification of the first position assumed? Sir, it is the very “why and the wherefore” that the custody of the public money “always must be intrusted to the Executive department.” What next? “The legislative power may undoubtedly,” &c., “they may prescribe in what place,” &c., And is it here that any qualification is to be found? Well, sir, I must candidly confess that I would be thankful to his most gracious—no, sir, no! not majesty!—for that little. “to prescribe the place and the reason for removal from one place to another!” Yes, and we have even the generous admission that it would be the duty of the President to see that this prescription should be complied with ! This is gracious, most gracious, and I was about to take the little that was left me, and “be off with it; but—but ay, yes, sir, I am tantalized by a dash, and told, “yet will the custody remain in the Executive department of the Government!” It is even so, sir; you may say where the public money shall be kept, but “remember! ay, remember, that I am to be keeper!” Is not such a qualification upon qualification as this enough to fret a freeman * If this be qualification, it aggravates the monstrous oftence committed; adds insult to injury, and enrages the mind of him, if he has any mind, to whose soul, if he has any soul, it is meant to be “a flattering unction.” Sir, it reminds me of the old common-law notion of the relation between a bail and his principal. The old books tell us that the bail holds his principal by a string, which he may pull at any time. And, in the language of my honored preceptor of the law, let him wander where he may, “at each remove he drags a lengthening chain.” So with the Executive and the Treasury: if the public money “should take the wings of the morning,” or of the law, “and fly to the uttermost parts of the earth,” still there would the strong arm of executive power hold it; and “if it should be cast into the depths of the sea,” still there would it be overshadowed by executive guardianship, attributed with ubiquity, and regulated by no law. Sir, it reminds me of an expression often used by an old acquaintance of mine, whom I often see in this city, about his “sweetheart.” The Treasury may be well called the “sweetheart” of this administration—“wbi,” treasury, “ibi,” Executive department! Such is the sum and substance of this qualification! How can any one insist upon this qualification, when the next three sentences expressly affirm that, “ were Just 9, 1834.]

the Congress to assume, with or without a legislative act; the power,” &c., “such an act would be regarded by al as a palpable usurpation of executive power,” &c., and that there is no difference, in principle, quoad hoc, between the different species of property—“arms, muni. tions of war, and supplies, or gold and silver, or bank notes?” I am justified, then, in saying, that the whole context, antecedent and consequent, instead of explaining away, limiting or restraining the position that “the custo dy the public money always must be, unless the constitution be changed, intrusted to the Executive department,” does, in truth, illustrate and enforce that position. If the expression was, “unless the law be changed,” there would be some room for cavil; but the constitution, “with or without a legislative act,” is made the foundation of this claim, which is pursued by the regular steps of regular reasoning. Facts are stated; a position is assumed, illustrated, and enforced; and, lastly, the problem is solved, and the process of reasoning is terminated by the “quod eral demonstrandum”—“Congress, cannot, there. fore, take out of the hands of the Executive department the custody of the public property or money, without an assumption of executive power, and a subversion of the first principles of the constitution.” Such is the protest itself, explained by itself. But, sir, we are told that there is a codicil to this will; that there is a protest against this construction of the protest; an “explanatory message,” which retracts these doctrines, and modifies this dangerous and alarming claim to power. Quare de hoco Sir, if this second message had retracted the abominable heresies of the protest, and if I could be convinced that the President had revised, and corrected, and withdrawn its offensive matter, I would sit down in humble rejoicing that “the man of my choice” had not intentionally committed this political sin, bringing with it political death. “Nothing is so painful to the pure mind as to think those it highly esteems have acted unworthily; or nothing so grateful as the assurance that they merit the esteem we have been induccd liberally and confidingly to bestow.” And my friend from Pennsylva. na, [Mr. McKENNAN, 3 from whom I was justly proud to receive a compliment the other day, never said aught more just or true than when he said I was the “sincere friend” of the President. I say, sir, if I knew that the introduction of these resolutions had caused him to be conscious of, and to atone for, this error, my labors of this session would be more than amply rewarded; my pride, ony ambition, my heart would be more than gratified. But when I look to this explanatory message, and contemplate the spirit which pervades it, all my senscs and all my soul rise up in rebellion! The expression “that certain passages contained in his message and protest may be misinderstood,” is an insult to my understanding; and when !e says “that such a construction” as I have put upon them, “is not warranted by any thing,” I am more than half convinced that there was a settled and subtle intention, on the part of his advisers and amanuensis--I cannot yet believe on his part—to gull, deceive, and enslave the people. Sir, no one can misunderstand these “certain passages” in the protest, but those who are determined to falliate, who are blind with devotion; who, having eyes, see not, and ears, hear not, the things which concern the salvation of the country. The only effect of this explanatory message has been to render that which was clear as light, dark, lowering, and portentous as the black and muttering cloud from which we may expect a coming storm, to shake, and blast, and desolate all around us! There is no mitigation, but aggravation of the offence, to say mind, in the second message. Indeed, we are o its friends that there is no difference between it and the first. The first, the stubborn, the meaning protest must stand, then, unexplained, unretracted, unexpiated; and I ail not again ask the common sense of any man, if it is

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not directly as pointedly at issue with these resolutions as an affirmative and negative proposition possibly can be with each other? But I shall proceed to demonstrate, in my poor way, the truth of these resolutions, which may be voted down by many, though admitted by all. I cannot conceive, Mr. Speaker, where the President or his council find it in the constitution that the custody of the public money must be intrusted to the Executive department, unless they obtain it by implication from the 1st section of the 2d article, which “vests the executive power in a President.” I presume that this is the clause relied upon, from the expression, “the custody of the public property has always bech considered an appropriate function of the Executive department, in this and all other Governments.” But I cannot understand how the exercise of powers, by the Executive or Kings of other Governments, can be precedent or example for the exercise of similar or the same powers by the Executive or President of this Government, except by one mode of construction, which is subversive of our constitution. The section of the constitution referred to must be received by the writer of the protest as conferring all powers which are inherently in their nature executive, according to the standard writers on the nature of the powers of Government. And, in order to obtain for the executive branch of this Government all such powers, all that this school of construction have to do is to look to Montesquieu, or some other writer on the powers of European Governments, for a power in its nature executive; or, to use the language of the protest, for a power which “has always been considered an appropriate function of the Executive department in this and all other Governments!” Now, sir, I doubt, but I shall not stop to discuss, whether the power of “keeping the public money” can be found in Montesquieu, (who, I am informed, is the first writer that divided the powers of Government into legislative, cxecutive, and judicial,) or any other author, to be in its nature an executive power. But admit that it is so, and has always been so considered by all writers, still, I coutend, in the first place, that this section of the constitu. tion confers no power whatever, executive or not; and, in the second place, that the constitution does conser this power of keeping the public moneys, no matter how it had been before considered, expressly upon the Congress of the United States. The first three sections of articles 1st, 2d, and 3d, were intended merely to divide the Government into three branches; to say— 1st. There shall be a Congress of the United States, to consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, 2d. There shall be a President of the United States of Amcrica. 3d. There shall be onc Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. And the constitution then proceeds to specify the powers given to Congress, which are denominated “legislative,” the powers. given to the President, which are denominated “executive;” and the powers given to the courts, which are denominated “judicial.” It does not pretend or attempt to define what either legislative, executive, or judicial powers are, according to their inherent nature; but, by its own power of forming a new Government, arbitrarily in terms, without reference to what had been considered by writers to be the nature of the respective powers, it gives certain powers to Congress, which it makes legislative; certain powers to the President, which it makes executive; and certain powers tot he courts, which it makes judicial. Our Government is entirely “sui generis,” and its powers must be defined by the constitution alone, without foreign aid or help. If the constitution be so interpreted as to give to Congress, for example, only those

powers which have “always been considered” legislative

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in their nature, it would take away a power expressly granted to Congress—the power of declaring war; because it is in its nature an executive power, and is so considered by all writers on the nature of the powers of other Governments. The truth is, that, upon examination, it will be found there are several powers always considered executive in their nature, given by the constitution to Congress; but not one can be found which was ever con. sidered legislative in its nature which the constitution has given to the President. And the reason is, because the chief point of difference between this Government and all others is, that its very object is to limit, and check, and control executive power.

one of the heads of Departments, the keeper of the public moneys, or to do and perform any duties required by law, such an officer is thus far 'responsible to the President, by virtue of his official relations. But does responsibility, to any extent, from an inferior to a superior officer, actually convey the office itself, and its duties? Because the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible to the President for acts which he is imperatively required by law to do, or not to do, has the President the right or the power to assume the office itself? It would, indeed, seem so, from his doctrine of responsibility of executive powers, and from his late conduct. He may fail to nomi

But again: if the 1st section nate the Secretary of the Treasury, permit the appoint

of the 2d article confers any power at all, so does the 1st ment to expire, refuse to nominate another, remove the section of the 1st article; and if the 1st section of the 1st Treasurer, Comptroller, and Register; or any or all of these article confers any power at all, it expressly vests “all offices may be vacated by resignation or death, as well as

legislative power therein granted in Congress;” and it would be entirely irreconcilable with two subsequent sections, which require the consent of the President to the passage of any law, joint order, resolution, or vote; it

by removal—and what is the consequence? Why, sir, according to the doctrine that the custody of the public money is, by the constitution, “an appropriate function

of the Executive department,” the whole keeping of 'the

would go to strip the President himself of one of his treasury would necessarily, in the absence of all these

most darling attributes of executive power—the power

of the veto. Whether the custody of the public money be “an ap

propriate function of the Executive department” or not,

officers, whom he may at will displace and disband, result to the President himself, in whom all executive power concentrates. And the public money having been removed from the Bank of the United States, the place

then the question is, has the constitution given that power where the law placed it, and there being now no other

to the President? And if it is not conferred by the 1st section of the 2d article, which confers no power whatever, by what other letter or clause of the constitution, I ask, is this power given to the Executive department? The appointing power, and none other, can be relied on. The protest says that “no officer can be created by Congress, for the purpose of taking charge” of the public money, “whose appointment would not, by the constitution, at once devolve on the President, and who would not be responsible to him for the faithful performance of his duties.” In other words, the President has not immediately the custody of the public money; but, if the law creates an officer to keep it, the President, by the incidental right of appointment, has the power, under the constitution, of keeping the officer who keeps the money! Such is the idea of this power, as an incident to appointment. But section 2d, article 2d, of the constitution, says: “The President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law?” Now, sir, if this clause had rested here even, still many difficult questions would have to be all decided in favor of the President’s construction, before it could be received as politically orthodox: as that, though the President alone has the power to nominate, yet is not the power to appoint a joint power between him and the Senate? It is true, by abusing the power “to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session,” he may change the tenure of all offices, by annual

appointments, t , be held under his absolute will alone,

place pointed out, he may put it into his own coffers, and dispose of it, for aught there is to prevent him, to his own use! In fact, this claim of the custody results in that of the use of the public money. What, I ask, is there now to prevent the President from taking, without appropriation by law, one hundred thousand dollars, instead of twenty-five thousand dollars, to be appropriated

|by law, for his salary, in the teeth of the constitution? If

this protest be true, the checks and balances of the Government are gone—never existed; and he who does not dare to resist this attack upon the constitution is fit to be a slave, and not worthy of free Government. It is clear, then, I repeat, that if the constitution had

gone thus far, and no farther, in the clause referred to,

the President's claim to power would still be inadmissible. But, sir, I leave all this debatable ground, and take a stand which cannot be assailed by argument or by force, unless the constituiton itself be demolished, so that not one stone shall not be left upon another, from its deep foundation to the top of its superstructure. Happily for the country, this clause further provides: “But the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers”—(what inferior officers?)—“all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law,” besides “ambassadors or other public ministers, and consuls, and judges of the Supreme Court”—“as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments.” Congress may, then, to-morrow, Deo volente, by two-thirds, create a Treasurer, or keeper of the public money, whose “appointment would not devolve upon the President.” A Treasurer being “such inferior officer” as whose appointment is not “in the constitution otherwise provided for,”

from expiration to expiration of every session of the being neither ambassador or other public minister, or Senate; and it is true that the best expounders of the consul, or judge of the Supreme Court, being an officer constitution in '89 decided he has the power of removal; “which shall be established by law,” the Congress may, yet, if the powers of appointment and removal are both by law, passed by two-thirds of both Houses, vest his conceded to be in him alone, still another important ques-appointment, as they think proper, in the courts of law.

tion arises: do the duties of an office, created by law, at- And if the appointment of Treasurer, and all other

tach to the authority from which the appointment is derived, and upon which the power of removal depends; or do they attach and belong to the office itself, derived from

treasury officers, should thus become vested by law in the “courts of law,” what, then, would become of the President’s doctrine of responsibility? Would the Treas

law? urer still be responsible to him by virtue of his office? or,

I have already conceded, to the extent which I have mutatis mutandis, would the custody of the public money described, that, where the law creates an officer, clearly then be an appropriate function of the Judiciary’ would within the pale of the Executive department, such as the power of keeping the public money then be inciden

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tal to the power of appointing the agent to keep the public money? No, sir; the judges would appoint, and become, instanter, as to all other powers touching the treasury, “functus officio,” precisely as the powers of electors of President and Vice President die, as they should, in the very discharge of their functions to appoint, to vote for, or elect. The constitution positively negatives the proposition of the protest, that “no officer can

resolutions declares their control as well as their custody
to be in the Congress of the United States. Sir, upon
examination of the protest, the conclusion is irresistible,
that all, all power over the public purse is claimed by the
Executive. I make not this declaration generally, but in
reference to particular facts.
All control, except that of prescribing the place, is

| claimed over the moneys in the treasury; but let it be

be created by Congress for the purpose of taking charge remembered that there are moments when the public

of the public money, whose appointment would not, by the constitution, at once devolve on the President.”

moneys, unappropriated, and not disbursed under appropriations by law, are not in the treasury. They are “in

And, sir, the mode of demonstrating that this power of transitu” to the treasury immediately after collection, and

the custody of the public money is not given to the Exec

utive, shows that it must be in Congress. Such a power cannot be claimed for the Judiciary, and, if not in the

Executive, where else can it be but in the Congress of
We have seen that Congress may, by

the United States?

from the treasury immediately after appropriation. This is true of all the revenue. What matters it, then, where the treasury is, when the President, through “his” Secretary, may prevent every dollar from ever going there?

It is known to all, I presume, that the moneys of the

law, vest the appointment of the agent to keep the pub- | United States, collected at the different ports of entry,

lic money in either the Executive or the Judiciary; that if that agent is not appointed by the President, even the

are brought into the treasury by an order of the Secretary to the collectors to pay the sums due by them at the places

protest does not claim the power; and whether the judges of deposite, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United have the appointment vested in them or not, they can States. when this order is obeyed, the moneys are in

never pretend to the custody. But the eighth section of the first article settles all controversy on this point, by providing that “the Congress shall have power”—

“To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts,” &c.

the treasury, and not before. Now, sir, what is there to compel the Secretary to order the moneys to be paid into the Treasury? And if it be true that the Executive has their custody, what, in this state of the public moneys,

| becomes of that provision of the constitution which says

“To borrow money on the credit of the United that “no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in

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disbursing as well as raising the public revenue. If the custody of the public moneys is not expressly given in

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these clauses of the constitution, it is nowhere expressly quence of appropriations made by law? Ay, sir, I ask given. The grants of the powers to raise and appropri- those who attended the discussion of the appropriation ate, necessarily, to my mind, include the power to keep bills, if moneys collected have not been expended, bethe moneys of the United States. But, if not expressly fore they were brought into the treasury, without approgiven to any, yet all must admit that it belongs to some spriations made by law? I inform the people that they one branch of the Government; that it necessarily results have; that suits are multiplied unreasonably on collectors' from the powers which are expressly given; and that it bonds; and that collectors and district attorneys of the cannot result srom any express power so properly as from United States pay their fees and the costs, and return the those of collecting and appropriating the public moneys. nett proceeds only into the treasury. And if a part may To which branch of the Government, then, does it be-be withheld without sanction of law, why not the whole? long? To Congress, which has all the powers, or to the And if a part, or the whole, may be withheld for one Executive, which has none of the powers of collecting object, why not for another? Again, sir: there are the and appropriating the public revenues? Most clearly, immense revenues of the Post Office Department, which all powers, necessarily and properly resulting from those are never brought into the treasury, over which there expressly given to Congress, belong to Congress. But I never was, and is not now, the guard or check of Treaadvance a step farther, and contend that all resulting surer, Comptroller, or Register. What, I ask, is there Powers whatever belong to the Legislative, the law-giving to prevent the Executive from pocketing them for his branch of our Government. Whatever doubts may exist own use, or controlling them for his own purposes, if or be raised in other Governments, where the Executive Congress cannot take their custody from the present power is always strongest, there is a clause of our consti- agents; “Where are they now * is a question which tution which leaves no room for doubt on this point in has been reiterated in vain this winter, until its repetition this Government, where the Executive is at best merely has ceased to annoy the few who only know, and has left co-ordinate. The constitution provides that Congress the interested many who know not, in despair of ever

shall have power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” If the custody of the public moneys be a resulting power, then, and resulting, too, from a power expressly given to the Executive even, it must, nevertheless, by this clause of the constitution, belong to Congress. But it is an express power, and exressly given to Congress.

We have thus far been contending, however, for the

custody alone of the public moneys. The first of these

knowing, until the too far distant day of account shall come! I say, then, if the custody of the moneys of the United States, unappropriated, and not disbursed, whether in or out of the treasury, be not in Congress, their control must be in the President. Are any here so basely servile as even to connive at this doctrine? None, I hope. I call upon all, then, to vote for the first of these resolutions. It says, that “the custody and control of the moneys of the United States are placed under the order and direction of Congress,” to meet the cringing argument which is used, that “Congress has no hand to hold the public purse.” It is true, sir, that Congress, as a body,

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cannot keep the public moneys; but the custody of Congress is the custody of the law, and the hand of the law is the agent created by Congress. The third resolution declares that Congress can take out of the hands of the Executive department the cus. tody and control, not only of the public moneys, but of the public property of the United States. Sir, I shall not stop here to refine upon the nice distinctions between the words “money” and “property;” and, though there is a material and important difference between “money in the treasury,” and lands, tenements, arms, and other “property” purchased with money once appropriated by law, yet I will admit that, in a broad sense, “public money is but a species of public property.” If so, my argument is at once confirmed by the constitution, which expressly provides (section 3d, art. 4th) that “the Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States;” besides the power given in the 16th clause of the 8th section of the 1st article. I hope, sir, that I have now shown what are the doctrines, and some of the errors of the protest; that I have demonstrated the truths of these resolutions, and maintained not only their propriety and consistency, but laid bare their absolute necessity to the very preservation of our form of government. I therefore call upon this House, by the danger of giving silent consent to enormous and alarming claims of power by the Executive, by the sacred trusts which are reposed in it by the people, by its own dignity, self-respect, just powers, and independence, and by the cause of civil liberty, to sustain these resolutions, which contend for the laws and the constitution. But, sir, the protest is not a mere declaration of powers. If it was but theory, we might, perhaps, amuse ourselves with its abstract philosophy, fold our arms in security, and smile at the harmless arrogance of the Executive self-sufficiency. It is practical, sir, with a vengeance; and a false security on our part may be fatal. It does not merely declare what the Executive might do if it would, but it is a justification of what it has done of its own will and accord. There is, therefore, something practical involved in the instructions proposed, which I must not leave untouched. By an abuse of power, the President has taken the treasury itself out of the custody of law. By the worst policy that ever misguided an administration, this has destroyed confidence and credit in trade; deranged the money market; convulsed, and shocked, and stunned business of every description among men; injuriously af. fected every species of legislation, and produced the most unparalleled commercial suffering and distress that ever afflicted a people in a time of profound peace and of exuberant national prosperity. And, by claims of power still more extravagant, dangerous and alarming, this state of things is sought to be perpetuated, by strengthening still more the cords, and extending still wider the boundaries of executive power, by paralyzing the legislative arm, and corrupting the representative will! The Executive has not only claimed, but has actually obtained the custody and control of the public moneys. The custody and control carry with them the usc; and the moneys have been used, expended, and, I scar, squandered, without authority of law. It is at this time collected, brought into the treasury or not, transferred, deposited, as to time, place, and circumstances; loaned with or without security; and may be disbursed “ad libifum,” according to the simple dictation of the President and “his Secretary.” This is not matter for argument; it is “stubborn fact.” I shall make no other comment than earnestly to say, that something effectual and permanent must be done. The

disease is too Yiolent and radical for a nostrum or nothing,

I am fully sensible of my own inability to command influence, and I am conscious that I can scarcely be heard in any sense in this hall. but I would appeal to gentlemen, on all sides, of all parties, not to leave here without doing something at least to appease popular discontent. I would ask of all, if any can be so infatuated as to imagine, for a moment, that the people will tolerate the present state of things, and permit it to exist? To those who, with me, deprecate and deplore the present condition of the country, I would say, it is too true this is no longer a question of restoration or not of the deposites, of “bank or no bank,” of dollars and cents, but a question of constitutional freedom. How, though, are we to redeem the constitution, vindigate our own powers, and restore the rights of the people, without acts as well as declarations? It is useless to declare the powers of Congress, without attempting at least, to exert them. The cry of “Usurpation! Usurpation!” is a dull sound, without efforts to second its notes. . How correct the abuse of removing the deposites, but by restoring them? How restore a sound, uniform, and safe currency, but by adopting some permanent plan of relief? How rebuke the abuses and usurpations of power, but by couteracting both? Sir, I hope gentlemen in opposition are in earnest, and are actuated by patriotism more than by party spirit; that they do not mean only to cast odium on the acts of the administration, without intending to apply a remedy themselves. I hope they do not desire the suffering of their countrymen to continue, in order that they may be more than imbittered against those in power; that the cry they have raised is not so much to destroy the popularity of “the powers that be,” but that it has a meaning in it worthy of the patriot's warning, and that they will continue at their posts until this policy of doing nothing, of leaving all power where it now is, is defeated and overthrown. Sir, I respectsully ask gentlemen who support the administration in all these measures, if it can possibly be their deliberate policy to adjourn without doing something for relief—not pecuniary relief, that is now but as the dust in the balance--I mean relief of the laws and constitution? I respectfully inquire of the honorable chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, if any other can be his design, or the design of the party with whom he acts, by the proposition of the measure he has reported? Can he or any man expect us to adopt that measure, when it would but confirm the present state of things; but employ the worst of means to effect the very evils complained of, but add the sanction of law to the very violations of law; and servilely grant, yield, and consent to the usurpations of power which we are so loudly called on sternly to deny, refuse, resis', and denounce? Does he not, did he not foreknow that Congress will reject this proposition to strip it of all its powers, and transfer them to the oxecutive? And if Congrés does reject it, as it is bound by law and duty to do, do gentlemen flatter themselves that they can return to their constitucnts with the insulting excuse, that the administration has done its part for the people?... I imploringly ask gentlemen, if this is to be their “ultimatum?” if so, I venture to predict that it will be the “ultimatum.” of their fate! Sir, this may be the croaking of prophecy, and they may feel secure as a tower of strength in their present possession of power. But if they continue to mock the complaints of the people; if they continue in that desperate course which blindly plunges from bad to worse; if they do not quickly retrace their steps of folly, repent of past errors, (which they may now do without making confessions) if they persist in this sacrilegious policy which pollutes the sacred vessels of the sanctuary; they will yet have to tremble, like Belshazzar, at the hand-writing on the wall! sir, in the language of Fisher Ames, “if my powers

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