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gress. Each of these shortcomings can be corrected without destroying the electoral framework now written into the Constitution.

The federal system as represented by the electoral college distribution of votes, with each State receiving two votes plus a number equal to the number of Congressmen it has, is not an unfair system and is not an archaic or outmoded system. The reasons that dictated the Federal compromise dictate that it be retained today. There are still divergent interests between the heavily populated States and the smaller States. On a one-man, one-vote basis the smaller States are outmanned and out voted.

The use of the federal system in the electoral college did not surrender control of the Presidency to the small States, however. It struck a reasonable compromise. Electors of the President would be chosen not on the basis of one man, one vote and not on the basis of one State, one vote, but on the basis of a combined approach. This does not mean that my State of Nebraska can control a presidential election because it has two more electoral votes than warranted by its population alone. It does mean, however, that a number of States, with a similarity of interest, by mustering 30 or 40 additional votes can manifest a need to be recognized in the political system and in the selection of the President. This need to be heard existed in 1789 and it exists today. That is why it is both realistic and fair to continue an electoral system where federalism plays a role.

Viewed in this light, the President's recommendations on electoral reform represent a complete and proper solution to existing electoral problems. They attack and solve each problem individually. This approach is far wiser than sweeping away an aspect of federalism in a system that, by and large, has served the country well.

I am, and have been for a number of Congresses, a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 12, the district plan of electoral reform. Senator Mundt, the author of the bill, will discuss its terms with the subcommittee. However, I declare at this time, Mr. Chairman, my willingness to meet with other members of this subcommittee and the Senate in an effort to agree upon a constitutional amendment along the lines laid down by the President in his message to Congress.

It is my sincere hope, Mr. Chairman, that with the information which will be furnished by the witnesses who appear before the subcommittee, and those who have come over the years, this subcommittee can fashion a resolution which can be reported to the Senate; a resolution which will receive the requisite two-thirds vote of the Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the States.

THE WHITE HOUSE-MESSAGE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

To the Congress of the United States:

One hundred and sixty-five years ago, Congress and the several states adopted the Twelfth Amendment to the United States Constitution in order to cure certain defects-underscored by the election of 1800-in the electoral college method of choosing a President. Today, our presidential selection mechanism once again requires overhaul to repair defects spotlighted by the circumstances of 1968. The reforms that I propose are basic in need and desirability. They are changes which I believe should be given the earliest attention by the Congress.

I have not abandoned my personal feeling, stated in October and November 1968, that the candidate who wins the most popular votes should become President. However, practicality demands recognition that the electoral system is deeply rooted in American history and federalism. Many citizens, especially in

our smaller states and their legislatures, share the belief stated by President Johnson in 1965 that "our present system of computing and awarding electoral votes by States is an essential counterpart of our Federal system and the provisions of our Constitution which recognize and maintain our nation as a union of states." I doubt very much that any constitutional amendment proposing abolition or substantial modification of the electoral vote system could win the required approval of three-quarters of our fifty states by 1972.

For this reason, and because of the compelling specific weaknesses focused in 1968, I am urging Congress to concentrate its attention on formulating a system that can receive the requisite Congressional and State approval. I realize that experts on constitutional law do not think alike on the subject of electoral reform. Different plans for reform have been responsibly advanced by Members of Congress and distinguished private groups and individuals. These plans have my respect and they merit serious consideration by the Congress. I have in the past supported the proportional plan of electoral reform. Under this plan the electoral vote of a state would be distribtuted among the candidates for President in proportion to the popular vote cast. But I am not wedded to the details of this plan or any other specific plan. I will support any plan that moves toward the following objectives: first, the abolition of individual electors; second, allocation to Presidential candidates of the electoral vote of each State and the District of Columbia in a manner that may more closely aproximate the popular vote than does the present system; third, making a 40% electoral vote plurality sufficient to choose a President.

The adoption of these reforms would correct the principal defects in the present system. I believe the events of 1968 constitute the clearest proof that priority must be accorded to electoral college reform.

Next, I consider it necessary to make specific provision for the eventuality that no presidential slate receives a 40% or more of the electoral vote in the regular election. Such a situation, I believe, is best met by providing that a run-off election between the top two candidates shall be held within a specified time after the general election, victory going to the candidate who receives the largest popular vote.

We must also resolve some other uncertainties: First, by specifying that if a presidential candidate who has received a clear electoral vote plurality dies before the electoral votes are counted, the Vice-President-elect should be chosen President. Second, by providing that in the event of the death of the VicePresident-elect, the President-elect should, upon taking office, be required to follow the procedures otherwise provided in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment for filling the unexpired term of the Vice-President. Third, by giving Congress responsibility, should both the President-elect and Vice-President-elect die or become unable to serve during this interim, to provide for the selection-by a new election or some other means-of persons to serve as President and VicePresident. And finally, we must clarify the situation presented by the death of a candidate for President or Vice-President prior to the November general election.

Many of these reforms are noncontroversial. All are necessary. Favorable action by Congress will constitute a vital step in modernizing our electoral process and reaffirming the flexible strength of our constitutional system.

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 20, 1969.

RICHARD NIXON.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK CHURCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO

Senator CHURCH. Seldom, Mr. Chairman, are we in the Senate afforded the opportunity to respond to so clear an expression of "the will of the people", as in the case of the electoral reform which this committee is now considering. A recent Harris poll showed 79 percent of the American people favoring the direct election of the President. A more recent Gallup poll indicated the support of 81 percent of our people for this same plan. Expressed in its simplest terms, eight out of every 10 Americans favor the election of the President by direct

popular vote. It is obvious that a mandate for change confronts usa mandate so clear that to ignore it would be to deny our role as representatives of the people.

The reason for the strong public sentiment favoring electoral reform stems from the uncertainties engendered by the closeness of recent presidential elections, in which the people have witnessed the near possibility of a candidate winning the Presidency by capturing a majority of the electoral votes, while his principal opponent garners the largest number of popular votes. Never in recent times, has this anomaly been brought so close to home as in the elections of 1968.

As the American people watched on their television screens through the night of November 5 and into the morning of November 6, the possibility of one candidate receiving the most votes of the people, while another gained the White House, came near to becoming reality. It had happened before. In 1876, Samuel J. Tilden received a majority of 250,000 votes over his opponent, and yet was denied the Presidency, which fell into the hands of Rutherford B. Hayes by one electoral vote. It happened again in 1888, when Grover Cleveland received 100,000 more popular votes than did Benjamin Harrison and yet, by an electoral vote of 233 to 168, Harrison became President. The fact that a man not receiving the largest number of popular votes can nevertheless be elected President, is, in itself, enough to justify electoral reform. It is a contradiction of the sovereign right of the people to govern themselves.

But 1968 did not only expose again the direct defect in our electoral process which allows one man to claim the popular vote and another the Presidency. It also made clear that, under the present system, there exists no guarantee that electors who have held themselves out to the people as supporting a given presidential candidate will, in fact, vote for the candidate to whom they pledged their support.

Originally, as we all know, electors were to be outstanding citizens from the various States. They were to be elected directly by the people for the purpose of choosing the President. Presumably, the electors were to be of such caliber that the people could place their trust in them to select a qualified leader for the Nation. But the system never worked as originally intended.

The birth of political parties, an eventuality not foreseen by the Founding Fathers, quickly reduced the role of the presidential elector to one of mere ministerial duty. As a result, the electoral college lost its reason for being. Today, when the people vote, they are seldom aware of the names, faces, or personal identity of the electors they select to choose the President. In fact, in a majority of our States, the electors' names are not even placed on the ballot. The people, as a practical matter, are voting for the man they wish for President, not for electors to select him. But because of the archaic system we still must use, the people have no guarantee that their wishes will be carried out. As Congress, itself, interprets the Constitution, a free agency still exists; an elector, if he chooses, may cast his vote as he pleases.

In 1968, we saw it happen. When Dr. Lloyd Bailey, an elector from the State of North Carolina, cast his vote in favor of third party candidate George Wallace, even though he was pledged to support

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President Nixon, who had carried his State in the November election, he became one of five electors in our Nation's history to disregard the wishes of the people who selected him. This latest case of a "faithless elector" should give us pause, particularly when we contemplate the potential for mischief in a closely divided electoral college. The very fact that such things can and do happen under the present system further underlines the need for reform.

The popular election amendment before this committee meets these problems headon. By placing the power to elect the President directly in the hands of the people, where it belongs, we would never again need fear the election of a President who lacks even the approval of a plurality. By elimination of the free agency of intervening electors, we abolish the possibility, in a close contest, that our people may be actually disfranchised by the capricious action of faithless men.

Moreover, the proposed amendment is in harmony with the historic trend toward broadening the role of the people in their Government. We have moved, since the time of our creation as a nation, from a system in which only the propertied few had the right to vote to a time when universal suffrage is the rule. This is only proper in a country blessed_by_the_best educated and politically sophisticated electorate on earth. Surely we have reached that stage when the people can be wholly entrusted with the power to directly elect their President and Vice President.

It was not so very long ago, in terms of history, that the 18th amendment became part of our Constitution. That amendment, as we all know, provided for the direct popular election of U.S. Senators. The arguments raised against its adoption were strikingly similar to the ones we hear now being voiced against the current amendment. Since that time, the Senate has not changed its essential character.

It remains the bastion of the States as it was intended to be. It stands not less, but greater in stature, because its legitimacy rests upon the direct vote of the people of the 50 States. If it is best for a Senator to be directly elected by the people of his State, then it must follow that it is best for the President to be directly elected by the people of the Nation.

Coming from a small State, I am well aware of the argument of those who maintain that popular election of the President would deprive the less populous States of the relative mathematical advantage they presently possess in the electoral college. They contend, for example, that Alaskan voters, with three electoral votes, have more power than New Yorkers, with 43, because a much smaller number of Alaskans control the casting of each of their electoral votes than is the case in New York.

This is a classic instance of a case where mathematical ratios distort political reality. For the fact is that the emergence of political parties, which destroyed the original function intended for the presidential elector, also destroyed such advantage as the mathematical ratio of a State's electors to its population (in number equal to each State's sum of Senators and Representatives in Congress) might otherwise have given the smaller States in the electoral college.

With the advent of political parties, it became the practice for the States to cast all their electoral votes for the candidate who carried the largest number of popular votes in the State, regardless of the size of his margin. This "unit rule system" governs to the present day. It has undermined the apparent mathematical advantage of small States in the electoral college. Indeed, populous States, such as New York and California, obtain greater importance than they should, since carrying them even by the smallest margin-delivers their entire electoral vote to the prevailing candidate. Thus, these large States have come to wield a disproportionate influence over our public policy.

At the present time, it takes 270 electors to compose a majority of the electoral college. That number of electors can be secured by carrying as few as a dozen of the largest States. It has, therefore, become the practice of our political parties to lavish their attention upon the most populous States in their quest for an electoral majority.

So it is that the present electoral college actually gives the preponderant advantage to the big States. The importance of carrying them, if only by a handful of votes, in order to secure their entire electoral vote, is mandatory. Consequently, the big States have come to dominate our national conventions, unduly influence our party platforms, and exercise an inordinate power over the selection of our national candidates.

On the other hand, if the President were elected by direct popular vote, such States as New York, California, Pennsylvania, and Illinois would not loom so large in the national political picture. A presidential candidate could lose them all by several hundred thousands votes, and easily make up the difference in the Intermountain West. Carrying the big States would no longer be so essential, thus giving the smaller States a better break in the politics of the Nation.

In the final analysis, however, it is not for the purpose of securing any advantage for the smaller States, but rather to do equity to all, that I favor the abolishment of the electoral college.

Under the direct popular vote amendment, all of our people would be given the same treatment. Different weights would no longer attach to the votes cast by the citizens of one State, as compared to those of another; no State would command special influence or advantage; each voter would stand equal with every other.

As the President of the United States represents all Americans, let us take the action that will allow all Americans equally to choose the President.

I think it is most appropriate to welcome back before the subcommittee one of our colleagues who has given a considerable amount of attention to this subject. He has taken the time to give us his advice and counsel previously on this subject and we are glad to have him back with us again.

Senator Holland, thank you very much for taking the time to be with us. I know from past experience that your presentations are learned and well throughout. We have had some friendly discussions over the subject, and I trust we will this morning.

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