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discussing it with you personally. I might suggest that we are going to have to give attention, it seems to me, to this whole problem of the Federal City complex because it is a matter of some concern. I for one don't see how we can deny to an area that has more people a larger voice. The question is how large that voice is.

I would just invite your attention, without getting at all argumentative to the fact that those who have the advantage under the present system are going to have to be convinced that there is going to be compensating factors or they are not going to give up. If not, we are going to end up with no change at all. This is a problem which concerns me, despite the fact we all want change. As I view the way the present system actually works, it will be harder to get large States to give up the present system than to get the small States to give it

up.

Now, I just ask you to consider that a large city like Chicago or New York under the present system, in addition to casting the millions of votes of people who live in the city area; the unit rule also cast the votes for the country area as well. The upstate areas of New York and the downstate areas of Illinois. For that reason I think they will be reluctant, unless we can get some basic reform, to give up this advantage that they have under the present system.

Senator DOMINICK. Well, this, of course, is why I said so many millions of voters are effectively disenfranchised by this unit rule system. Senator BAYH. But see, we have to have some compensating factor. If those States that presently have an advantage under the unit rule are going to give up this advantage, we have to sort of weigh this off. Senator DOMINICK. Yes; I can understand that problem, and that is a very practical political problem in getting any kind of a bill through the Senate. I realize that, too.

Senator BAYH. I appreciate very much your taking the time to come, Senator Dominick. We are going to have to study this, all of us, and hopefully we can get some change. I ask that your complete statement be printed at this point in the record.

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETER H. DOMINICK, BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORMS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my fellow colleagues on the Subcommittee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity of appearing before you.

The recent election has raised more strongly than ever the general demands for reform of our Electoral System. The manner of selection of the highest Executive office in this land has come under severe criticism from broad elements across our Nation. The interest in Colorado is great. I would like to express some of my views to the Subcommittee as I see the relationship of the smaller Western States to this problem and particularly the relationship of Colorado.

As the Committee is aware, I am a co-sponsor of both Senator Mundt's district plan and Senator Ervin's and Senator Sparkman's proportional plan. I am strongly opposed to complete abolition of the Electoral System at this point in our Nation's history, but I do favor revisions in that system. There is no clear indication that abolition of the system is necessary in order to correct the primary objections. This may be likened to cutting off a head to cure a ruptured appendix. Any plan calling for direct popular election is fraught with difficulties which may prevent its ratification by three fourths (%) of the states. Certain reforms are

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clearly necessary such as the problem of the "faithless elector" and the contingent election of a President and Vice President by the separate houses of Congress. The Unit Rule of casting electoral votes should also come under intensive scrutiny by this Subcommittee, as I am confident it will.

I desire to point out to this Subcommittee at the outset my basic objection to any plan adopting a direct popular vote.

Such a plan will give the Federal-City complex an even greater influence and control of the election of the President and Vice President and reduce substantially the influence of the smaller states. The present system is weighted in favor of the large industrial states and particularly the major seven states of California, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and Michigan. The direct popular vote would give greater influence to the major urban cities in those and other states. Such influence would attract those interested largely in power. Certain of those cities now are, or have been in the past, controlled by city "bosses" who pledge to "deliver" the vote for candidates of their choice and who have the machinery to do so. Tammany Hall still exists though such men as Carmen de Sapio are gone from those halls. This contingency is a serious threat to the smaller states as many do not have total population equal to that of one of the major cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York.

Because of the demands on a major candidate's time, and the expense of a national campaign, these smaller states not only may not see or hear the major candidate, but also television and press coverage may be more limited. Millions were spent on the Presidential campaign in 1968. I fear much more will have to be spent in a direct popular election. The key to any direct popular vote plan is a fully informed electorate. The best medium appears to be television and such time, as we well know, is very expensive. Campaign expenses must be dealt with extensively to make any such plan fair and representative. I am sure this Subcommittee is aware of these problems. Further, each of us as members of Congress must proceed with great caution not to upset drastically the balance of influence between the smaller states and the large urban centers. The direct popular vote plan with its increased influence through a Federal-City complex cannot, at this point in our history, maintain the delicate checks and balances between the smaller states and the larger states. This is not a state sovereignty vs. Federal Government problem, but a shift of influence from the large state to the large city. The large urban city is more subject to control by "political machines." Under the present system, as well as the proposed district and proportional plans, the out-state areas can still exert balancing influence on the large urban centers because they do not lend themselves as readily to central political control. Regional and rural influences may still be heard. Although any system is weighted to favor the large populous areas, we should not totally ignore the historical development of our Presidential election machinery which maintains a modicum of balance between large and small states.

Reform, however, is necessary and vital to the stability of our electoral process. This Congress will hopefully correct the serious threats and criticisms of our process.

These principal threats are:

1. Correcting and eliminating the hazard of the "faithless elector" or a group of such electors acting in concert.

2. Divising an alternative means of electing a President in the event of a tie or lack of a majority or plurality of the electoral vote. This would involve a run-off election or a joint session of the House and Senate voting as individual members for a President and Vice President together. The possibility of a deadlock, delay, or a Vice President from the opposite political persuasion is not relished by any segment of our society.

3. Revision of the Unit Rule concept of casting electoral ballots. Such gross disenfranchisement of a great segment of the voters cannot be condoned. 4. Insuring that the nominee of a party be listed at the head of his party ballot in every state.

The first practical problem presented by a direct popular vote plan is Federalization of voting requisites regarding age. Such requisites are now controlled by the states, and range from 18 years to 21 years of age. The issue presented is not the Constitutional issue of 18 year olds voting. As the Senators are aware, I have been a strong proponent of reducing the voting age to 18 years of age and making this standard across our Nation. Differential in age limita

tions, it seems to me, is as discriminatory as race limitations. The problem is obtaining ratification from the necessary three-fourths (4) majority of the states. I would despair to see the needed reforms just mentioned fail because of this related problem. I would suggest to the Senators that the smaller states' concern with the Federal-City complex and the threat of control by "city bosses" and political machines with the resultant further erosion of the small states' influence on the election of the President in the direct popular plan may result in failure of three-fourths (4) of the states ratifying the amendment and the four particular reforms previously mentioned must be accomplished.

I will make a brief statement concerning the four critical problems of our present system, then address myself to a short consideration of the salient features of the district and proportional plans.

The "faithless elector" has just been considered by this body and I understand that the object of that debate, Dr. Bailey, is scheduled to appear before this Subcommittee. The real threat lies in a group of such electors acting in concert to throw the election into the House of Representatives. The spectre of "deals" rears its ugly head. Bargaining for the highest office in the land would seriously jeopardize the general acceptance of any winner, and may further result in frustrating the intent of the people. We must ask ourselves the question, would that man have the mandate necessary to govern and adequately exercise the powers of his office.

There is no longer any necessity for the office of elector. The office can be eliminated under the present system as well as the various proposals for revision. The elimination of the office does not require abolishment of the whole electoral system. There is a serious legal and Constitutional question, however, whether the states by law can require an elector to vote in a given manner under the present system. A Constitutional Amendment so binding an elector is a superflous appendage. The voters do not need an intermediary to exercise their judgment. This argument posed by proponents of the direct system is valid. It does not necessarily follow that the only method of election left is direct popular

vote.

The contingency of the last election being thrown into the House under the present system was fraught with dangers, many real, others imagined. The fact remains that the clear possibility exists of substantial delay in selecting the President and a Vice President being selected from the opposite or even a minority party.

All proposals to reform the electoral college have included alternatives to correct these dangers. The two most significant would require the Senate and House to meet in joint session, each member having one vote, with a limit on the number of votes. The other proposal is a national run-off. The Subcommittee should consider carefully the time delay and cost involved in the latter proposal. Would additional campaigning be allowed? Both proposals have merit.

We must further determine whether a majority is necessary under any system. A major argument of proponents of the direct popular vote is that a “minority President" may be elected under the present system. Minority as I am using the term means one who finishes second or below in the popular vote. This danger is caused by the Unit Rule, primarily.

The direct plan will not eliminate the possibility of a President with only a plurality vote. As a matter of fact, it may enhance this possibility by fractionalizing our two party system. The question is how large a plurality is necessary. Forty percent appears to be the magic figure adopted by the various amendments. This country has had only three "minority Presidents" under the present system, and only once, in 1876, did the winner's chief opponent receive an absolute majority. There have been, now, twelve "plurality" Presidents. Only one, President Lincoln in 1860, failed to receive forty percent of the popular vote. He received 39.79%.

This problem ties in directly with the Unit Rule. Certainly this Rule lends some influence to the smaller states, but lends greater influence to larger states. No President before President Nixon won the Presidency with less than a majority of the seven big states and their 210 electoral votes. This does not mitigate the fact that the Unit Rule is the most unfair, unrepresentative, undemocratic feature of our whole electoral system. The practice of casting the whole block of votes of one state for a candidate who wins by one vote is not only antagonistic to the one vote one man rule, but effectively disenfranchises many voters in that state.

Again, however, abolishment of the Unit Rule does not require abolition of our whole electoral system. Such action may be compared to chopping off an arm to cure an infected finger.

I am a co-sponsor with Senator Mundt of S.J. Res. 12, calling for a district plan. The office of elector is retained with a binding declaration by the elector to vote for certain candidates for President and Vice President. It requires a majority of electoral votes. In any event no candidate receives a majority, the three highest are chosen and voted for by a joint session of the House and Senate, each member having one vote, three-fourths (4) being a quorum. If no person has received a majority after the fourth vote, the fifth ballot shall be taken on the two with the highest number of votes on the fourth ballot. I also co-sponsored S. J. Res. 2 with Senator Ervin and Senator Sparkman. This plan calls for a proportional distribution of the electoral vote in each state based on the percentage of the popular vote received in that state. It wholly abolishes the office of elector and each state's votes are automatically cast on a percentage basis. A candidate must receive 40% of the total electoral vote. If not, the two highest shall be voted on by a joint session of the House and Senate, each Congressman having one vote.

Both provide for abolition of the Unit Rule. By retaining the electoral vote, they balance the small state-large city interests inherent in the direct plan. They solve the problem of the "faithless elector". They prevent delay, stalemate and a Vice President from another party by providing for a joint session of the House and Senate, narrowing the candidates and limiting the number of votes.

Both would solve the four critical deficiencies of the present system previously pointed out. Each provides a more direct relationship to the popular vote by eliminating the Unit Rule, thus minimizing any possibility of a "Minority President."

I would point out one or two statistical facts in relation to the proposals and minor problems presented by each plan.

Under a district plan in the 1960 and 1964 elections, the results would be different. This Subcommittee was given these figures by Mr. Neal R. Pierce, Political Editor of Congressional Quarterly, in hearings held in the 89th and 90th Congress. They appear on page 233 of the Hearing Record. Under a district plan, in 1960, President Kennedy would have received 244 electoral votes and President Nixon 279-270 votes being a majority. The result would have been changed from President Kennedy's 303 electoral votes to President Nixon's 219.

In 1964, the district plan would have given President Johnson 466 votes instead of 486, and Senator Goldwater 72 rather than 52.

No figures are yet available for 1968 by districts.

In 1960, under a proportional system. President Kennedy would have received 265,623 electoral votes and President Nixon 266,075. If only 40% were necessary, President Nixon would have been elected. In 1968, on a proportional system requiring 40%. President Nixon would have received 231,524 votes, and Hubert Humphrey 218.570. George Wallace would have received 79.822 votes. Forty percent is 215.20 electoral votes.

I offer to the Subcommittee a chart I have prepared giving the state by state breakdown on the electoral votes each candidate would have received in the 1968 election on a proportional basis. I would request that it be printed in the record of these hearings with my statement.

I would point out under Senator Mundt's plan, S. J. Res. 12, in my opinion the office of elector could be eliminated without altering the basic intent. This plan would retain a semblance of Unit Rule in each district wherein the plurality winner gets its one vote. The plurality winner statewide gets two votes. Each voter effectively has three votes. It minimizes the Unit Rule and retains the local and regional influence within each state, which I feel is so necessary to balance our system.

The proportional plan of Senator Ervin and Senator Sparkman, S. J. Res. 2. directly relates to the popular vote, but still retains the state and regional influence. It eliminates entirely the Unit Rule. It does present the problem that, statistically, in any close election, where third parties are a factor, there is little probability that the leading candidate wll receve a majority of the electoral vote. He may not receive even 40%, but this contingency is provided for. If a 40% plurality is an acceptable winning margin, the plurality issue is not critical.

I congratulate the Subcommittee and appreciate it giving me this opportunity. I commend the Senators and thank them for their attention to my remarks.

BREAKDOWN BY STATE UNDER PROPORTIONAL VOTE PLAN, 1968 ELECTION

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Note: Number of votes required for 40-percent plurality, 215.20.

Senator BAYH. I notice that Senator Baker is here. Let me go ahead and read this statement while he is coming to the table. Would you mind? I know you are busy.

I'd just like to point out that today our subcommittee is resuming a study of what to my mind is one of the most pressing issues facing this Nation, namely, to determine the best method of electing the President and Vice President. I think most of us would argue that nothing short of the best method will be sufficient. We should never lose sight of that as we study our problem here. The stakes are great.

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