Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion

封面
Oxford University Press, 2004年8月12日 - 288 頁
Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions in a double sense. First of all, they are perceptions of changes in the body, but, through the body, they also allow us to literally perceive danger, loss, and other matters of concern. This proposal, which Prinz calls the embodied appraisal theory, reconciles the long standing debate between those who say emotions are cognitive and those who say they are noncognitive. The basic idea behind embodied appraisals is captured in the familiar notion of a "gut reaction," which has been overlooked by much emotion research. Prinz also addresses emotional valence, emotional consciousness, and the debate between evolutionary psychologists and social constructionists.

搜尋書籍內容

已選取的頁面

內容

Piecing Passions Apart
3
2 Feeling Without Thinking
21
3 Embodied Appraisals
52
4 Basic Emotions and Natural Kinds
79
5 Emotions and Nature
103
6 Emotions and Nurture
131
7 Valence
160
8 A Typology of Affective States
179
9 Emotional Consciousness
198
10 Is Getting Mad Like Seeing Red?
221
Parting Ways
241
References
247
Index
265
著作權所有

其他版本 - 查看全部

常見字詞

關於作者 (2004)

Jesse Prinz is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Furnishing the Mind, in which he defends the view that all concepts have their basis in perception, and two forthcoming titles. In The Emotional Basis of Morals, he argues that moral concepts essentially involve emotions, and, in eyond Human Nature, he argues that culture and experience shape human thought.

書目資訊