of Idsted, was Commander-in-Chief of the Danes; the Austro-Prussian army was under the command of Marshal Wrangel. On the 31st January, the Marshal summoned General De Meza to evacuate the town of Schleswig, in order to prevent the effusion of blood; to which the answer of the Dane was that he had orders to defend it. At midnight, between the 31st January and 1st February, the Prussians, holding the right of the allied army, crossed into Schleswig and advanced upon Eckernforde, at the head of the bay of the same name, from which the Danes retired. The Austrian troops, on the left, crossed the border on the same night at Rendsburg. On the 2nd February, the Prussians were repulsed with loss in an attempt to carry the tête du pont at Mis

was transported across the estuary in fishing-boats, on the night of the 5th February, during a snow-storm, at an unguarded point between the villages of Arnis and Cappeln; an additional force crossed unopposed by a pontoon bridge; and thus the left of the Danish position was turned. At the same time the Austrians attacked the Dannewerke in front, and General De Meza, finding his position no longer tenable, for the Prussians on his left would in a very short time have cut off his line of retreat, withdrew his army in the direction of Flensborg, abandoning the whole of the heavy artillery with which the forts were armed. The mortification at Copenhagen, when the news of the loss of the Dannewerke reached the city, was intense; the cry of treason was raised by the

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populace, and De Meza was superseded by General De Lüttichau. Retreating northwards, the Danes concentrated under the guns of the fortress of Fredericia, on the borders of Schleswig and Jutland, and behind the lines of Düppel, which command the approach to the island of Alsen. On the 7th February, Wrangel issued a proclamation announcing that Austrian and Prussian commissioners would administer the civil government of Schleswig, and ordered that the German language should be thenceforth used in all branches of the administration. The fortified lines of Düppel were stubbornly defended by the Danes, and their gradual reduction was not effected

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intricacies of the Schleswig-Holstein question were known to be great; few had leisure to master them; and there was a general disposition to trust the Government for doing all that international duty and the obligations of treaties required England to do. The historical sketch with which we prefaced our account of these transactions will have made it clear to the reader that, in 1720, England had guaranteed to Denmark the continual and peaceable possession of ducal Schleswig. Eckernforde, Rendsburg, Missunde, and the town of Schleswig itself-the scene of the first hostile operations of the Austro-Prussians-are all

without severe loss to the assailants. On the 18th April, the last remaining bastions were stormed, and the Prussians became masters of the place. The main body of the Danish army, or rather garrison, retreated into Jutland, leaving a pretty strong force to occupy Alsen. Fredericia, which had been expected to offer a serious resistance, was evacuated soon after the fall of Düppel, the garrison crossing over into Funen. The Prussians, satisfied with having taken Düppel, made for the present no attempt upon Alsen, and there was a pause in the strife.

What all this time had been the behaviour of our Government-what the thoughts of Englishmen? Nine out of ten persons in this country who took any interest in foreign politics at all viewed with indignation the violent proceedings of the German Powers; but the

situated in the part of the duchy so guaranteed. These circumstances appear to have escaped Lord Russell's memory, for, instead of frequent Cabinet councils, and the dispatch of peremptory missives to Berlin and Vienna, after the manner of the England of two generations back, the only expedient which seems to have occurred to him was to write (February 10) to Berlin, urging that the belligerents-the war having lasted exactly ten days-should agree to an armistice! The request was, it need hardly be added, ineffectual. But now the Danish Government took measures formally to remind Lord Russell of the obligations under which England lay. M. Torben Bille, the Danish minister in London, in a despatch, dated February 11, 1864, stated that his Government indulged the hope that Earl Russell appreciated the steps which Denmark had taken with a view to the maintenance of

peace, seeing that these steps had been taken by the Danish Government on the pressing advice of the Cabinet of London; that, however, the pacific desires of Denmark had been frustrated by the ambition of Austria and Prussia, and war had actually broken out; that in this war Denmark, if unaided, must eventually be crushed by the overwhelming numerical superiority of her opponents; that it was necessary, therefore, that, while there was yet time, the Powers friendly to Denmark should come to her aid, "and among those Powers there is none which the Danish Government address with more confidence than England." M. Bille proceeded to say:- By the Treaty of July 23, 1720, Great Britain guaranteed 'to His Majesty the King of Denmark, his heirs and successors, the peaceable possession of Schleswig, promising 'to maintain them therein contra quoscunque who might attempt to disturb them directly or indirectly.' This guarantee is still in full vigour at the present time, as is proved by the note which Lord Westmoreland addressed, on the 18th April, 1848, to the Cabinet of Berlin."

This was a categorical request, and the chilling reply which it elicited from Lord Russell must have been a bitter mortification to the over-matched and harassed Danes. After admitting generally that Denmark had followed the advice of the English Government, without which that Government "could not have given even its good offices to Denmark to prevent, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities," Lord Russell remarked that, as to "the request that friendly Powers should come to the assistance of Denmark, Her Majesty's Government could only say that every step they might think it right to take in the further progress of this unhappy contest could only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and Russia." He added, that as to the Treaty of 1720, inasmuch as Austria and Prussia had declared that they had no intention of disturbing the integrity of Denmark, it was not necessary, at that time, to examine the question of principle-that is, the validity of the guarantee itself. France and Russia were as much in terested in the integrity of Denmark as Great Britain, and the British Government might fairly expect their advice and concert in any endeavour to preserve their integrity. Such a reply plainly foreshadowed that England did not intend to fulfil her engagements if other Powers did not fulfil theirs. The Danish Government made the fatal mistake of fancying that the England of 1864 was still the England of the Stanhopes and the Walpoles, and still of the same mind with her own Shakespeare, when he declares that

liament to maintain the principle of non-intervention in the war between Denmark and Germany. Nothing can more forcibly illustrate the change in public sentiment to which we are referring, than the general tone of the speeches delivered at this meeting. The Treaty of 1720 was absolutely ignored by all the speakers, including Mr. Ernest Jones, who had resided many years in Holstein and Schleswig, and professed to be thoroughly acquainted with the history of the controversy. The question, whether the honour of England was engaged, was treated in a slight and cursory manner, as if it possessed little interest for the speakers, but upon the inconvenience and costliness of war they dilated with great earnestness. Mr. T. B. Potter quoted a few words from a speech of Lord Palmerston, which, he said, showed that the honour of England was not concerned in the dispute, and then proceeded thus:-" All our interests were in the direction of peace. Our trade would be paralysed by war. Wo should have increased taxation and increased misery throughout the land. Besides, we must remember, that since the last wars there had been great changes, which would involve greater difficulties to the English nation than possibly to any other. By the resolutions of the Paris Conference the relation of belligerents and neutrals was changed. Neutral ships now covered an enemy's goods, and the goods shipped in neutral bottoms would lead to the transfer of our own carrying trade to neutrals. What would our shipowners in Liverpool, London, and Hull say to this? Were they prepared to see their vessels laid up in dock, or sold to neutral nations? There was another reason why we should hesitate to go to war. We had given hostages to fortune . . . he referred to the question of the Alabama. Although the American Government would be loyal and honest in its dealings, we knew that there were men in America in numbers who would fit out ships, and there would be a dozen or twenty Alabamas very soon in pursuit of our commerce all over the world." The expression of these views was received with continual cheering; and there can be little doubt that, although more nakedly stated than usual, they represent the habitual state of feeling of an immense mercantile class which has for many years swayed, though not administered, the government of England. Still there can be no doubt that the Government felt a real reluctance to abandon Denmark to its fate; and if France had shown any zeal in the matter, it seems not improbable that, in spite of the opposition referred to above, intervention would have gone the length of material assistance. But the French Emperor had been not a little mortified by Lord Russell's abrupt and decided rejection of his proposal for a general Congress of Powers, made in the autumn of 1863. That proposal, starting from the assumption that the Treaties of 1815 were upon almost all points destroyed, modified, misunderstood, or menaced," urged the expediency of a joint endeavour, on the part of the nations of Europe, to regulate the present and secure the future in a Congress." No other European Power, great or small, ha‍d absolutely rejected the Emperor's proposal; most hed assented to it on the condition of a previous definition of

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the subjects which should be laid before the Congress; but Lord Russell's unconditional refusal had caused the scheme to fall through. The feeling of mortification thence arising in the mind of the French Emperor led him to view the diplomatic efforts of England on behalf of Denmark with coldness, and her proposal for a limited Conference on Danish affairs with little favour. Still France, like ourselves, was bound by the Treaty of 1720, and the fidelity of the Danes to the first Napoleon, and the sufferings which they had undergone in his cause, constituted a moral claim which ought not to have been lightly disregarded. But here, there is reason to believe, the "personal" Government by which France was then ruled, and the interests of the Napoleonic dynasty, turned the scale against an active intervention. "There exists," says Sir A. Malet, a very general persuasion that M. de Bismarck had already found means to influence the imperial mind. It has been surmised that his own schemes of aggrandisement for Prussia, at the expense both of Denmark and Germany, had been more than hinted at, and that visions of territorial advantages to accrue to France may have been held out to the Emperor, and entertained by him, in case Prussia was left free to pursue her own course without interruption. To reasons such as these, it is imagined, may in a great measure be ascribed the quiescent attitude taken by the Imperial Government in this question."

It may, however, bo questioned whether, considering the small number of troops that England could bring into the field, there was any chance of a material intervention being successful in the face of the numerous battalions of two great military monarchies. Had both Austria and Prussia entered into the design of despoiling Denmark with equal heartiness, it may be admitted that material intervention on our part, though it might have retarded, would not have prevented, the catastrophe. But this was not the case; the Austrian Government was acting in the matter rather from a jealous disinclination to allow Prussia to take the lead and decide by herself questions in which German feeling was so deeply engaged, than because it desired to turn Denmark out of a duchy which had been linked to it for 800 years. "Had either" France or England, "or still more had they conjointly, said to Austria and Prussia in firm language that their attack on Denmark was a direct violation of public European law and could not be permitted, Austria would have been only too happy to find so plausible a pretext for extricating herself from a false position."* It is also nearly certain that Sweden, whose people sided most warmly with Denmark, would have immediately joined us had we resolved upon giving material aid. The particular form in which our assistance might have been most effectually rendered would have been the sending of a combined military and naval force to Schleswig. Lord Grey said, in the debate on the address (February 4, 1864), that, "looking to the geographical position of Denmark, the great exertions which the Danes seemed inclined to make in their defence, and the great support

Sir A. Malet.

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our naval power could give in a defensive war to a mili. tary force, he was convinced that such a force as this country ought to be able to send with ease and expedition to Schleswig might have an important effect on the contest."

It is not for us, writing at so short a distance of time, either to vindicate or condemn the abstention of our country from all active interference in favour of Denmark. It was, however, strongly urged at the time by many that if there was to be no active interference, it is much to be regretted that there was so much diplomatic interference. Had England, like France, stood aloof from the whole struggle, at least it could not have been said that we fed Denmark with false hopes, and then left her to be destroyed. It was fair enough, argued Lord Grey (and Lord Derby had before spoken in the same strain), to induce the Danish Government to revoke the Constitution of the 18th November "if we intended to support Denmark afterwards, but to give the advice without the intention of supporting her was neither just nor generous." Perhaps, too, the nation has some cause to complain of the conduct of the ministers who conducted the negotiations. Had Lord Palmerston, upon finding that, in spite of his assertion, in July, 1863, that Denmark if attacked would not stand alone, Parliament and the country had no mind for war, immediately resigned his office,--and had Lord Russell, on discovering that for the same reason his expressions about material intervention could never take effect, and that his diplomacy had failed to preserve Denmark, followed the example of his chief, both the country and the ministers themselves would have been in a far more satisfactory position.

Mr. Lincoln, speaking, in his Message to Congress this year, of slaves who had been liberated under his proclamations, said, "If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an executive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, not I, must be their instrument to propose it." Similarly, it would have been more honourable for the two ministers and also for the country, when they found that the nation would not permit the hopes which they had held out to be realised, to declare that others, not they, should consent to the dismemberment of Denmark.

While the war was proceeding on the mainland, the Danish navy-which was superior in force to that of Prussia-had not been inactive, but had made numerous captures of German merchant ships. To obtain compensation for these losses, Marshal Wrangel, after the fall of Düppel and the evacuation of Fredericia, entered Jutland and imposed a war contribution of 650,000 thalers (£97,000) upon that province. A naval action, indecisive as to its result, was fought a few miles to the east of Heligoland, on the 9th May, between a Danish and an Austro-Prussian squadron. There were engaged two Austrian frigates, one Prussian corvette, and two gun-boats; total, 121 guns

the whole under the command of Captain Tegethof. The Danes had two frigates and a corvette; total, 71 guns. The leading Austrian frigate, the Schwarzenberg, lost her foremast and 100 men of her crew killed and wounded; she also caught fire, but her crew succeeded in extinguishing the flames. Towards evening, the German squadron