do not fear to make, what the gentleman from New-York (Mr. Radcliff) is pleased to call" a bold proposition,” to create another council. It is necessity, and not choice, which drives me to the measure. No possible mode is so bad as the unclean connexion with legislation. To justify this connexion, and frighten us with the very name of a council, we have been told that that council of appointment forced through the legislature the Cherry Valley bank. I speak not, said Mr. T., of any personal knowledge of these matters, but as deriving my knowledge from declarations made, in a former debate, by gentlemen now on this floor. We have also heard of the hard and untimely fate of the Franklin bank, which was rejected in committee of the whole on one day, and of its sudden resurrection, by the kind assistance of an honourable gentleman, who voted for its rejection, but whose mind had, during the night, undergone a revolution, and who on the next morning, moved a reconsideration, and the bank went smoothly and quietly through the house. Fame and fortune attended its progress; and, in due time, the council was not unmindful of its patron. But, why waste our time in detailing facts which are yet so fresh in the recollection of all, and in which some were actors who now hear me?

With so much history, and with such a volume of experience before you, why will you suffer the continuance of this illicit connexion between legislation and the appointing power? You must have an appointing power at the seat of government, to provide those offices which cannot be sent to the people for election.

You shrink from the responsibility of creating one. You pull down the old council, because of its corruption, and yet you impose upon the senate a portion of its load, and you give over the residue to the buffettings of party legislation. Be not alarmed at the name of council. It was the connexion with the branches of your legislature which ruined the present. It was chosen by the assembly, from the senate. It was the source and life of party. It gave character to your elections. The members of assembly were more often selected with views to control the choice of the council, than with regard to their fitness as legislators. When chosen, it was in that body where corruption was most active; where the wise workers of party most successfully managed to procure a selection for a council, of such individuals from the senate, as would best subserve the private objects of the principal workers of the machinery. But the proposed new council is subject to none of those evils. I would gladly have it clected by the people, and for no other purpose. But despairing to succeed in such a plan, the first eight senators annually elected, can make a good and safe council. They come fresh from the people. Elected as senators in the several districts, they are not committed to private views, and are not selected by direction of leaders. The assembly will be left to be chosen, without other motive than a fitness for their duties.

Let me not be accused of a desire to bring this power back to the seat of government. Far be it from me to wish it, if any other mode can be adopted. Disperse is my motto, and disperse my maxim; but when I see a system going into operation, which is calculated to burst asunder the bands of society, by bringing strife and contention into the local concerns of every county, and controling the choice of the supervisors by converting them into political instruments, rather than using them as they now are, as the faithful sentinels of the people's interest-and, add to these evils, the making your county judges. parties in these political strifes, and unfitting them to compose the members of an impartial and unsuspected court, and yet having them eligible to become members of the legislature, and, perhaps, commanding their elections by an improper use of their appointing power-I feel myself authorised to endeavour to establish any other plan than one so pregnant with every evil. Could the plan proposed by him be adopted, whereby provision would be made for the benefit of experience, as circumstances may require, and yet guard against the operations of party, we should unite prudence with safety; but by the plan proposed, what will be the result? Your governor nominates to the Senate five judges for each county in the state, and these same judges constitute, in their respective counties, a political caucus to further the views of the excentive, whether they be salutary or pernicious; and upon these same judges depend all your inferior magistrates, for their appointment and continuaree in

office. The power of these judges is under no control, and it may be again brought to bear in the legislature. If these evils shall be found to exist, ought we not to provide against their continuance, by giving to the legislature a power to remedy the plan proposed by the constitution? If they are not evils, experience will demonstrate it; and the constitution will continue, as we shall leave it, to govern the mode of appointments.

It was not, as had been suggested before, anticipated, that we shall, in this way, procure a better appointing power: but it is to keep from an immediate connexion with the legislature, these two branches of your judidicial establishment, that they may not destroy the usefulness of each other, and subvert the best principles of our republican institutions. If the power of appointment is vested in the Senate, may not a majority of that body, in party times, differ in political character from the executive, and in the conflicts arising from such a difference, may not the course of legislation be influenced, or even stopped? Have there not been instances where the Senate of this state have differed from your chief magistrate, and when all official communication between these two branches of your government was suspended? Is it to be expected, that this body of men will, at all times, be willing to obey the dictation of the executive? Can they always concur in the nominations which he shall please to make? Is it necessary to tell you, that unless his nominations are such as they shall be willing to approve and sanction; they will take advantage of their pow er and stop the wheels of government? Party will support them in such a

measure.

How easy will it be for this body of men, by varying the salaries and jurisdiction of officers, to train them to the most submissive obedience in promoting their political or party views; and again, may not these same men possess nerve enough to force through the legislature any favourite object, by means of this complicated political machinery?

Experience has shewn, that the difficulties here suggested may arise, and. that the men in our government are not wanting for nerve of this kind, and to avail themselves of such occasions. There were men who now heard him, who had been actors in such scenes, and which had given rise to a former convention; and should the plan continue, as at present adopted, the extent to which these evils may be carried, is not easily anticipated. We have heard much of the wise and discreet exercise of this kind of power, in the senate of the United States. But are gentlemen aware of the manner in which it is there exercised? Whenever executive business was announced, the galleries were emptied, the house was cleared, the doors were shut, and all the business was done in private. Was this Convention ready to adopt a measure which had to establish such a usage? He did not think the people of this state were yet prepared for such a state of things. The learned gentleman from New-York (Mr. Radcliff) has feelingly deprecated the horrors of the proposed council, and has declared he never will consent to establish another conclave. Does that gentleman wish or expect the senate to execute this new portion of executive duties, which we are about to impose upon them, before the public and with open doors? Will he again solicit the honour of a nomination from the governor, to some high office, and when his name is sent to the senate, will he hold his place in the lobby of that house, and, in mute silence, listen to a public discussion of his fitness, and have some senator, perhaps some personal foe, tear asunder his reputation, and drag to public view the foibles of his life? And yet this gentleman abhors a conclave. If such discussions of character are intended to be allowed, timely provide by another article in this constitution, for the personal protection of the senators, and their freedom of speech. And if not to be allowed, all inquiry, and all communication of information is shut out, and the senators will become, on this point, useless members. Is it not, therefore, more discreet, more fit and proper, that the performance of these delicate duties should be confided to a few men who can assemble for consultation, without public observation? The senate are now made the removing body, and where the causes for removal are to be discussed, would not this critical duty be more carefully and temperately performed by eight than by thirty-two? and when it is recollected that these eight are to be the first class of senators, elected with

out concert in their several districts, and bringing with them the public senti ment, can there exist apprehensions for much cause of danger; and should conflicts ever arise between the executive and these eight senators in council, may we not yet hope that those conflicts would not be suffered to interrupt the progress of legislation, and those higher duties of a court of appeal? There was no system without its inherent difficulties; but, to his mind, the senate was the most objectionable.

Another, and an important consideration is this: whilst you leave with your senate the appointment of one thousand officers, and to the disposal of the legis lature two thousand more, you are perpetuating the seeds of discord, and heaping up fuel to increase the flame of future disagreement and controversy. These difficulties will always exist till the emoluments of office are diminished, and they can never be diminished till the legislative and appointing powers are separated. Let one body have the appointing power, and another the legisla tive, and the emoluments of office would soon be so reduced, that strife and ambition for office would be done away; but whilst the two powers are exercised by the same hands, the case is remediless; the people can never hope for relief.

Here Mr. T. read from the constitution of Vermont, " If a man is called into public service, to the prejudice of his private affairs, he has a right to a reason. able compensation, and whenever an office, through increase of fees, or otherwise, becomes so profitable as to occasion many to apply for it, the profits ought to be lessened by the legislature."

This, said Mr. T. is a sound political doctrine, and worthy of all imitation. It is due to the honourable gentleman from Queens, to acknowledge, that there never has been a government established, in which the different branches have been kept distinct. History records but few instances where the legitimate despot would suffer himself to be encumbered with any other department which dared to think or to speak. But the patriots of all ages, who have laboured to ameliorate the condition of man, have placed their hope for the perfection of government, in the separation of its executive, legislative, and judicial departments. It is the fortune and the honour of our country, that we can boast, here were the principles of rational liberty first put into form and practice. Those immortal patriots, who had the honour of adjusting and combining the component parts of our government, were obliged, by way of compromise, to commingle the conflicting interests with which they had to deal. Assailed by a monarch and an hereditary nobility on the one hand-and on the other, alarmed with the terrors of democracy, they did much more than any other portion of the human race ever dared to do; but we, with the benefit of experience from their works, now tremble not to extend the plan which they so gloriously commenced. We have extended the rights of suffrage, and prostrated those distinctions which the influence of property had hitherto sustained -Let us proceed and consummate that perfectability in the condition and government of society which our fathers so nobly dared.

The question on inserting Mr. Tallmadge's amendment to the second section, was then taken by ayes and noes, and decided in the negative as follows:

NOES-Messrs. Bacon, Baker, Barlow, Birdseye, Briggs, Brinkerhoff, Brooks, Buel, D. Clark, R. Clarke, Clyde, Collins, Dodge, Dubois, Duer, Dyckman, Edwards, Fairlie. Ferris, Fish, Frost, Hallock, Hees, Hunter, Huntington, Hurd, Jay, Jones, Kent, King, Lawrence, Lefferts, M'Call, Millikin, Moore, Park, Paulding, Porter, Kadcliff, Reeve, Rhinelander, Rogers, Rose, Kosebrugh, Sage, Sanders, N. Sanford, Seaman, Seely, Sharpe, R. Smith, Spencer, Stagg, I. Sutherland, Sylvester, Townley, Tripp, Van Buren, Van Fleet, Van Ness, J. R. Van Rensselaer, S. Van Rensselaer, Van Vechten, Verbryck, Ward, Wendover, Wheaton, E. Williams, Woodward.-68.

AYES-Messrs. Beckwith, Breese, Burroughs, Carpenter, Carver, Case, Child, Cramer, Eastwood, Fenton, Hogeboom, Howe, Humphrey, Hunt, Hunting, Knowles, Lansing, A. Livingston, P. R. Livingston, Nelson, Pike, Pitcher, Price, Pumpelly, Richards, Rockwell, Root, Ross, Russell, R. Sandford, Schenck, Sheldon, I. Smith, Starkweather, Steele, Swift, Tallmadge, Tay

or, Ten Eyck, Townsend, Tuttle, Van Horne, E. Webster, Wheeler, N. Williams, Woods, Wooster, Young--48.

The question then recurred to the tenth section of that part of the report which relates to military appointments, when the tenth, eleventh and twelfth sections were passed without amendment.

GEN. ROOT moved to add to the fifth section the following clause, which was carried:

"Brigade inspectors and chiefs of the staff departments, except the adjutant general and commissary general.”

MR. VAN BUREN moved to add to the eighth section the following words? "who shall hold their respective offices till a due election shall be made." Carried.

The whole of that part of the appointing power which relates to military ap pointments, was thereupou passed as follows:

MILITIA OFFICERS.

That appointments and selections for offices in the militia, ought to be directed by the constitution, to be made in the manner following:

I. Captains, subalterns, and non-commissioned officers, by the written votes of the members of their respective companies.

II. Field officers of regiments, and separate battalions, by the written votes of the commissioned officers of the respective regiments and separate battalions. III. Brigadier generals, by the field officers of their respective brigades.

IV. Major generals, brigadier generals, and commanding officers of regiments or separate battalions, to appoint the staff officers of their respective divisions, brigades, regiments, or separate battalions.

V. The governor to nominate, and by and with consent of the senate, to appoint all major generals, brigade inspectors, and chiefs of the staff departments, except the adjutant general and commissary general.

VI. The adjutant general shall be appointed by the governor.

VII. That it shall be the duty of the legislature to direct, by law, the time and manner of electing militia officers, and of certifying the officers elected to the go

veruor.

VIII. That in case the electors of captains, subalterns, or field officers of brigades, regiments, or battalions, shall neglect or refuse to make such election, after being notified according to law, the governor shall appoint suitable persons to fill the vacancies thus occasioned, who shall hold their respective offices till a due election shall be made.

IX. That all the commissioned officers of militia shall be commissioned by the governor.

X. That no officer, duly commissioned to command in the militia, shall be removed from his office, but by the senate, on the recommendation of the governor, stating the grounds on which such removal is recommended, or by the decision of a court martial pursuant to law.

XI. That the commissions of the present officers of the militia be no otherwise affected by these amendments, than to subject those holding them to removal in the manner above provided.

XII. That in case the mode of election and appointment of militia officers now directed, shall not, after a full and fair experiment, be found conducive to the improvement of the militia, it shall be lawful for the legislature to abolish the same, and to provide by law for their appointment and removal, provided two-thirds of the members present in each house shall concur therein.

The first section of that part of the report which relates to the appointment of civil officers, was then read.

MR. RADCLIFF moved to insert "secretary of state," and "attorney general," before the word "comptroller," so as to give the appointment of these officers to the legislature.

The motion was supported by Messrs. Radcliff and Root, upon the ground that these were important offices, the duties of which were connected with the legislature; and opposed by Mr. Van Buren.

CHIEF JUSTICE SPENCER made a few remarks against the amendment, when the question was first taken on inserting the secretary of state, and carried. On inserting the attorney general, Messrs. N. Williams and Spencer oppos ed the motion, and Mr. Root supported it. Carried.

Mr. FAIRLIE moved to strike out the word "treasurer," and leave the appointment of that officer as it was in the old constitution.

The amendinent was supported by the mover, and opposed by Messrs. J. R. Van Rensselaer and Spencer, when the motion was put and lost, and the section passed without further amendment.

MR. RUSSELL offered the following substitute to the second section, down as far as the word "peace," in the fifth line:

1st. That there shall be an executive council for the state, consisting of the go vernor and eight councillors, who shall be constituted in the manner following, viz.

2d. That there shall be elected in each of the eight senatorial districts by the electors thereof, as often as a governor is elected, one person for a councillor, and the eight persons so elected, shall form an executive council with the governor, who shall have the power to appoint all officers in the state not otherwise directed. 3d. That the said council shall meet on the day of in every year, at the seat of government.

4th. That the governor shall be ex officio president of the said council, and shall have an exclusive right to nominate all state officers, but shall have but a casting vote in the council.

5th. That each councillor shall bave the exclusive right to nominate all officers whose powers are to be exercised within the district for which he shall have been elected.

6th. That the secretary of state for the time being, shall be the secretary of the council, and record the doings of the same; and all the nominations and proceedings thereof shall be open and be published.

7th. That the said councillors shall hold no office under the government of the United States, which would prevent their holding a seat in the legislature of this state, or be eligible to an office by the said council during the time for which they shall be elected; and that they shall receive, as a compensation for their services, the same sum for wages and travel as may be allowed by law to members of the legislature.

8h. That the governor may convene the council whenever he may think the public good may require it, except when the legislature are in session.

The question on the substitute was taken by ayes and noes, and decided in the negative, as follows:

NOES.-Messrs. Bacon, Baker, Barlow, Beckwith, Birdseye, Briggs, Brooks, Buel, Case, D. Clark, R. Clarke, Collins, Dodge, Dubois, Dyckman, Fairlie, Fish, Frost, Hallock, Hees, Humphrey, Hunter, Hurd, Jay, Jones, Kent, King, Lawrence, M'Call, Millikin, Moore, Munro, Nelson, Park, Paulding, Porter, Price, Radcliff, Reeve, Rhinelander, Rockwell, Rogers, Root, Rosebrugh, Sage, Sanders, N. Sanford, Seaman, Seely, Sharpe, I. Smith, R. Smith, Spencer, Stagg, I. Sutherland, Swift, Sylvester, Ten Eyck, Townley, Tripp, Van Buren, Van Fleet, Van Horne, Van Ness, J. R. Van Rensselaer, S. Van Rensse laer, Van Vechten, Verbryck, Ward, Wendover, Wheaton, E. Williams, Woods--74.

AYES.-Messrs. Beckwith, Brinkerhoff, Carver, Child, Cramer, Eastwood, Fenton, Ferris, Hogeboom, Howe, Hunt, Hunting, Huntington, Knowles, Lansing, Lefferts, A. Livingston, P. R. Livingston, Pike, Pitcher, Pumpelly, Richards, Ross, Russell, R. Sandford, Schenck, Starkweather, Steele, Tallmadge, Tayler, Townsend, Tuttle, E. Webster, Wheeler, N. Williams, Wooster, Young.-36.

MR. BRIGGS moved to strike out all that part of the section from the word "except," in the 4th line, to the word "appointed," in the 27th line, and insert a clause so as to give the appointment of sheriffs and clerks to the governor and

senate.