Roman Republic, to the numerous Italian Republics of the middle ages, to Geneva, to the Swiss cantons, to the commonwealth of England, and to the revolutions of the French republic, as monitory lessons on this subject. I think it is Cicero who considers the struggles between factions in republics as a more certain cause of their ruin than foreign wars, or famine, or pestilence, or other calamities of the like kind; and Cicero had himself witnessed the last struggles of parties, and the dying agonies of the Roman republic. But why need I refer to ancient statesmen, when we have an authority at home of equal weight? It is admitted by General Hamilton in the Federalist, so often referred to in this house as a text book, that to secure the public good and private right against the enterprises of faction, was the great desideratum, the one thing needful, to rescue republican government from opprobrium, and recommend it to the esteem and adoption of mankind. We have, however, an authority still more commanding and more venerable, in the legacy left by the father of his country to the American people :

"The happiness of the people of the United States, may be made complete by so careful a preservation, and so prudent a use of liberty, as will recommend it to the applause, the affection, and adoption, of every other nation which is yet a stranger to it.

"You ought to resist, with care, the spirit of innovation upon the principles of the government, however specious the pretext.

"Time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions. Experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of the country; facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypotheses and opinion.

"Liberty is little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property."

"The spirit of party, in popular governments, is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy."

"The alternate dominion of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which, in different ages and countries, has perpetuated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his com petitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty."

“Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, (which, nevertheJess, ought not to be entirely out of sight,) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it."

"In governments purely elective, the spirit of party is not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of this spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume."

These precepts and admonitions ought to sink deep into our minds. They come from one who taught like a sage, and who never flattered to betray. If ever a trust was calculated to inspire awe and diffidence, it is that which we have to perform. The present question on the power of appointment seems to have awakened much sensibility. Selfish views ought to be discarded. Neither anger nor distrust ought to be indulged. We ought to exercise moderation, and candour, and mutual forbearance, and good-heartedness towards each other. We ought to withdraw our thoughts from ourselves, and fix them on our posterity. The attention of the public is anxiously fixed upon us. We are the constant object of their hopes and their fears. Our ambition should be as elevated as the anticipated destiny of our country. We ought to wish that

this Convention may have no ephemeral reputation: we are all equally con cerned in the result, and must share in the honour or the shame. Let us endeavour to raise our minds above the mists of narrow views, and selfish purposes, and temporary calculations, into some higher region of serenity and sunshine. Then may we hope that the spirit of wisdom will guide us. Then, indeed, our ways will be ways of pleasantness, and all our paths be peace.

MR. VAN BUREN said, there was a variety of opinions as to the proper place for the depository of the appointing power. Those who advocated the propriety of placing it in the governor and senate, did not appear to be satisfied with the system which they advocated. He was anxious, before the question was decided, to remove their embarrassment by designating the extent of power which was to be confided to this or that body-it was therefore his intention to submit a distinct proposition; and before he proceeded to do that, he would remark, that he most cordially concurred in opinion with the honourable gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Kent) as to the importance of proceeding with harmony and good feeling. It had been to him a matter of surprize, that on a subject in which all were so deeply interested, and where individual interest could not be subserved, they should not be willing to preserve such feelings. A contrary course would undoubtedly have a direct tendency to weaken public confidence in the proceedings of the Convention; if not generally, it would in the minds of the more enlightened parts of the community.

It was not to be disguised, that that part of the report before the committee, relating to the appointment of justices of the peace, was by far the most important feature in the report--if that was settled, the remaining part of it would be got along with very easily. Some had thought these magistrates ought to be elected; but he had at all times been opposed to their election; and if he did not deceive himself, the force of the remarks of gentlemen in favour of their election, had excited doubts in the mind of every man, as to the propriety of such a measure. He concurred in the opinion which had been expressed as to the impropriety of electing the higher officers of state, because their duties were important; and it was to be feared that it would have a tendency to render their judgment subservient to their desire for a continuance in office. This was the principal argument which had been used. If there were other reasons he did not know what they were.

The amount of business before the justices of the peace in this state, was five times as great, as all the business before the other courts-on this point, it appeared to him there was no room for a diversity of opinion-the truth of this statement could be ascertained by a reference to their proceedings. They were equally important as it respected criminal justice.

As to the probable effect upon their independence, there is no room for a comparison. The judges of the supreme court are elected for a long term of time; should the people become dissatisfied, even whole counties, these officers might not feel the effects of their displeasure till after a long time had elapsed; but apply this to justices of the peace, who administer justice in the immediate presence of their constituents, and are exposed to the daily scrutiny of those upon whom they are dependant; who are cognisant of all they do; and have the power of passing judgment on them. If they are not satisfied with them, they must forfeit their offices.

What could the single arm of a chief magistrate of the state do towards suppressing a rebellion? It must be effected through the interposition of this inferior magistracy. He was willing to go as far as any man, in endeavouring to curtail dangerous patronage in distinct bodies of men; but he would not go so far as to cut every cord that binds together the people to the government.

It was at first thought advisable by the committee, to have them appointed by the court of common pleas; but on more mature deliberation, it was concluded that it would be making political engines of them, and therefore it was abandoned, and the principle adopted which is contained in the report now before the committee. There are different propositions before the committee, viz: for having them elective, for having them appointed by the governor and senate, and for having them appointed by the governor and a council of six.

Mr. V. B. said he would not pretend to raise any new argument, but apply those which had been urged with so much force by the gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Spencer) who had first spoken this morning. His first objection was, that these men who are to be chosen as a council, are to be chosen by corrupt and intriguing men, in their respective districts. If this be the case in these extensive districts, how much more so will it be in individual counties? And again, these men are to be elected by a party, and therefore represent that party; consequently, all their acts will be characterised by party wiews; and again, no decent man will undertake to perform a duty, which will be sure to lead him into difficulty.

Every man would be in favour of his friend, and would therefore give rise to all the hard feelings which have been so sorely felt in the method heretofore practised by our present council. We have had some experience on this subject-I think, therefore, we ought not to proceed without serious deliberation.

We have reported a project for the city of New-York, but we are informed that it does not meet with the approbation of that city; and is it reasonable to suppose that a similar plan would meet the feelings of the different counties ? Mr. V. B. would refer the committee, though with reluctance, to the proceedings of the past council of appointment-particularly to one act. During the last winter, apprehensions were abroad in this good city, that certain individuals would have too much influence in the council; and, to shut the door against this evil, the people took it into their own hands, called ward meetings to make arrangements for the selection of officers in the city; and it is known that it caused more difficulty than any other circumstance.

He did not believe it would be benefiting the people, to extinguish one great fire and enkindle fifty-two smaller ones. The further this power could be removed from the people, the better. He could not therefore consent to the proposition of the gentleman from Oneida, (Mr. Platt,) and would ask the liberty of submitting to the consideration of the committee a project of his own. He submitted it under a full conviction of its practical utility, although it might not go so far towards meeting the views of the gentleman from Albany as would be desirable. His proposition is this: "to amend the second section of the report, by adding thereto, at the conclusion of the same, the following words:

"Who shall be appointed in the manner following, viz :

"That the board of supervisors in every county in this state shall, once in ev ery years, at such time as the legislature may direct, recommend to the governor a list of persons equal in number to the justices of the peace by law authorized to be appointed for said county; and the respective courts of common pleas of the several counties shall also recommend a list of the like number, and as often as any vacancies shall happen, the boards of supervisors and courts of common pleas of the counties in which such vacancies may happen, shall recommend lists of persons equal to the number of vacancies in such county; and from the lists so recommended, the governor shall appoint and commission the justices of the peace for the respective counties-that the said justices shall hold their offices for years, but may be removed by the governor on the address of the body which recommended their appointment, stating in writing the grounds of such removal."

This proposition, in the first place, meets the views of the gentlemen who are desirous of removing this power from the seat of government, as the nominations must originate in the counties.-No man will suppose that the governor will go into the different counties of the state to influence the nominations; he will merely have the right of discriminating between the individuals nominated in the counties where they reside. This, then, is the first advantagethe second will be, that the nominations will be respectable.

He could not agree in opinion with his honourable friend from Albany, as to the merits of the magistrates in this state; he considered them a very respectable body. The supervisors of a county, coming from the different towns in that county, will be acquainted with the merits of the individuals in

their respective towns-there will be a rivalship for the most respectable candidates; they will be selected for their respectability and responsibility; and instead of depending for favouritism on the executive, as has heretofore been the case under the former council, they will consider it their interest to send to the governor the most respectable names that they can select. The governor may obtain any additional information which he may require from the representatives of the people in the legislature. Should there be distinct parties in these counties, one in favour and the other opposed to the governor, from both of which candidates should be nominated, he would undoubtedly, knowing his own responsibility to the people, select from both political classes with due attention to their qualifications and standing in society. It is unreasonable and rash to suppose that he would be confined to one particular class, when an indulgence in such a course, must be at his own expense-he cannot do it from ignorance, or in the dark.

The judges of the common pleas will be anxious to recommend the safest and best men, as they will have frequent occasion to sit with them in criminal cases. These were a few of the advantages arising from the plan which he proposed, although gentlemen may say it does not answer the public expectation in bringing home to the doors of the people this power of appointment. It will be seen that out of fourteen thousand officers which were heretofore dependant on this general appointing power, about eight thousand militia officers have been taken and thrown home to the people, leaving but a small number dependant on this general appointing power. It has been said that military appointments never excited great interest; although it may be true in part, it is not to the full extent ;--it has been carried so far that you could scarce meet a man who was not a colonel, whilst almost every man has felt a deep interest in the subject, either directly or indirectly. An attempt was once made in the senate of this state to vary the features of our militia system: it is well known that it excited great alarm. Instead of fourteen thousand appointments, there are now but six thousand to account for-three thousand are proposed to be provided for by the legislature as they may think proper-these are coroners, acknowledgers of deeds, examiners in chancery, &c. &c. leaving but about two thousand five hundred upon which the governor will have a right to discriminate. District attorneys, clerks of courts, mayors, and recorders, are already provided for, and are to be appointed by the courts and common councils. Compare the number of officers now under consideration with the number heretofore originating in the general power-it leaves but a small proportion.

MR. VAN BUREN thereupon moved to pass over the second, third, and fourth sections of the report, in order to take up the fifth. A question of order arose thereupon, in which Messrs. Spencer, Young, Briggs, Burroughs, Sharpe, Van Ness, Buel, Tallmadge, N. Williams, and Dodge, took part; when the motion for postponement was put and lost.

Whereupon a debate ensued upon the motion of Mr. Russell, (inserted in the proceedings of yesterday,) which was discussed by Messrs. Root, Briggs, Spencer, Young, Sheldon, Russell, Tompkins, Wheeler, and Fairlie.

GEN. BROOKS also observed, that it was with no small degree of embarrassment that he should offer his opinion on this important subject. In the formation of the appointing power, much depends upon the extent of that power, as to its particular organization. It was his choice to give to the people a part of the appointing power, leaving to the governor and senate the appointment of those denominated state officers. But from the sentiments recently expressed from various parts of this house, it seems that the people are not to be trusted with this power, and are considered incapable of exercising it. If such were the feelings of this committee, he should be compelled to vote somewhat against his inclinations. The amendment offered by the honourable gentleman from Erie, (Mr. Russell,) proposes the establishment of a council of appointment for the state. There are other propositions to create councils of appointment in each of the counties of this state. Mr. B. preferred the one proposed by the gentleman from Erie. The probable result seemed to be, that a consolidated appointing power for civil offices, would be established, either in a council of

appointment, or in the governor and senate and odious as is the term council of appointment, he should give it his vote rather than contaminate the legislative body, and involve them in all the whirlpools of party strife which have heretofore agitated this state.

It was his desire that some of the smaller offices may yet be given to the people; still there is little hope of removing the evils we suffer in this course. The purity of our legislative body seems to be the only alternative.

It was with much pleasure that he perceived in the report of the committee on the legislative department, the principle introduced of divesting the members of future legislatures of all lucrative offices. He hoped that that principle would prevail. A legislature thus pure, and freed from pecuniary considerations of this sort, would, in justice to itself and to the people of this state, reduce the fees and salaries of the officers, which far exceed those of any other state in the union, and, as he believed, of any other government on earth. This being done, peace and harmony would be restored to the people of the state.

MR. CRAMER said, that neither of the plans before the committee were satisfactory to him; but he should prefer that of the gentleman from Erie, (Mr. Russell.) He was not afraid of the ghost of the old council of appointment. Let those stand aghast who had led the way to its destruction. He was in favour of a council of appointment in a proper shape; but if gentlemen were in favour of the Georgia system, he hoped they would be consistent, and adopt it in full. He was not to be frightened by the language of the gentleman from Queens. He wished to see all judiciary officers on one footing, and to see them independent. He considered the functions of a justice of the peace as important as those of any other class of officers in the state.

This subject had been discussed when it was not before the house. A gentleman from New-York (Mr. Edwards) had addressed the house three times, and had delivered nearly the same speech each time. But nobody, as he could learn, understood his speech after all, and he would propose that the gentleman get up and deliver it over again, that they might, if possible, ascertain what he would be at. It had been deemed important that a council should be provided for the city of New-York, but little care was taken for the country. He was for determining, in the first place, who should be appointed by this power. The gentleman from New-York (Mr. E.) finds fault with every system, and yet points out nothing. He should vote for the proposition of the gentleman from Erie.

MR. EDWARDS. In answer to the observations of the gentleman from Saratoga, (Mr. Cramer,) I have but one remark to make. Perhaps I ought to beg pardon of the Convention for taking any notice of his highly indecorous speech. It is true, sir, that I have upon three different occasions expressed my sentiments very freely upon the subject of undue influences and of the fraud and corruption which have prevailed in consequence of the appointing power being centred in Albany. I made no personal allusions to any gentleman. There appears, however, to have been something in those remarks, which has crossed the sensibilities of the gentleman very unpleasantly; and he appears to have imagined that he was personally alluded to. If the gentleman will take these remarks to himself, I cannot help it. If the cap fits, let him wearit. Sancho Panza used to say, that if it rained mitres, he should never be able to find one which would fit his head. The honourable gentleman from Saratoga is more fortunate. Every cap appears to fit him; and he seems to imagine that it was made on purpose for him.

MR. DODGE. There are evils in every system which has been introduced, and our only anxiety should be to select that one which shall embrace the most advantages with the fewest defects:

Nothing could be more beautiful in theory than the formation of the old council of appointment-The members of assembly, chosen annually by the people, selected each year from the body of senators who are chosen once in four years, one senator to represent each of the four great districts of the state-these four senators together with the governor, formed the council of appointment, which we yesterday, by an unanimous vote agreed to abolish.

Our ancestors in framing the constitution, justly supposed that the system