網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

ment, brought together at this place, a numerous body of office seekers, and an experienced corps of men, employed in the procuring and distribution of offices; whereby not only the proper duties of the council were corruptly neglected, but the business of the legislature was often misdirected, and made subservient to the bad views which guided the suitors who assembled here.

After the unanimous decision as to the impolicy and danger of this system, how is it that another council should be recommended? If all we have heard be true, there must be something which is kept back, something to excuse the past, or to justify the plan now offered; light and information beyond what are communicated, are reasonably desired.

How is the new council to be distinguished from the old one, if the old council was pernicious? What reason have we to believe that the new one will be beneficial! The old one consists of five members-the new one will consist of seven-Will the increase of numbers give safety? In all the great offices of state the governor is to nominate, and with the consent of the council, to appoint. In respect to the local, district, county, or town officers, each member of the council are to nominate for their respective districts. Will they not be liable to pursue, and in fact, will they not adopt the same disgraceful course as their predecessors? They, also, are to convene as their predecessors did, at the seat of government, where they may be approached in like manner, and influenced by similar motives. If, as we hear it stated, the justices of the peace, amounting to two thousand five hundred magistrates, adjudicate on more property annually than all the judges, including the chancellor, this branch of the appointments is in itself of the highest consequence, and the just and impartial selection of these men, of the greatest concern to the welfare of the people.

Each of these justices employs his constables or marshals, and is attended by the small lawyers who excite and sustain the suits which are tried before the justices. There being on an average four justices in each town, the justices, the constables, the suitors, the pettifoggers, and the idle attendants, make together a great collection of the people. Indeed, so important is this magistracy and its associates in this state, that it has been said in relation to their offices, that he who can control or dispose of their appointments, would possess greater political influence, than were he able to dispose of all the other offices throughout the state.

How, after our experience of the mal administration of the old council, and our conviction of the enormous and dangerous power of a corrupt appointment of this body of magistrates, can we, with fidelity to the people, consent to establish a new council of appointment in the same place, and open to the same temptations and corruptions as are ascribed to the old council?

What is the plan of the report of the select committee? What is public expectation on this point? Does any one suppose that the same accumulation of appointments is to occur at the seat of government? Certainly not. It is recommended by the committee that a few offices, such as comptroller and treasurer should be made by law-that the great judiciary and other analogous state officers should be made by the nomination of the governor, with the consent of the senate; and it is the public hope, that the great, the numerous mass of officers, including justices of the peace, should be distributed through the counties and towns, and their appointments made by a body that should be free from influence, and competent to the important trust. Whether this should be done by election, or in the mode proposed by the member from Oneida, (Mr. Platt,) remains to be considered-but by carrying these appointments into the counties or smaller associations, the guilty practices which have prevailed at the seat of government will be broken up.

Some inconvenience may, in particular scenes, be experienced; but these will be nothing in comparison with the vices which have been perpetrated elsewhere.

In lieu, therefore, of the proposed amendment, we are bound to prefer the report of the committee, which proposes to give to the legislature the appointment of a few persons entrusted with the custody and disbursement of the public money and the settlement of the public accounts; to confide to the governor and senate the appointment of the great judiciary, and a limited number of

other great state officers, and to restore to, and distribute among, the people, in the several counties, the appointment of the great mass of civil offices.

This system will ensure as much peace, and justice in the execution thereof, as we have any reasonable hope can be obtained.

Faction will thereby be discountenanced, honest men will be delivered from temptation, bad men will be driven from their evil practices, and the appointment of a most important portion of the magistracy will be confided to the towns and counties, which can more safely be trusted, than any central council that may be devised to execute this duty.

If this breaking up of the powers of the council, and the distribution of its innocent fragments among the people, are safe and desirable-is not the grant to the governor and senate, of the power to appoint the high judicial, and other great officers of state, equally so?

It is objected that the using of the senate as a check on the governor's nomination, confounds two great departments, and is therefore condemned by great authorities. May it not be answered, that the maxim which requires the sepa ration of the executive and legislative departments, is misapplied in this instance? The maxim wisely prohibits the entire union of any two departments in one; but this is only making use of a branch of the legislature, and in a limited and not extensive manner, to check the executive, and does not fall within the spirit of the prohibition. It is not in this instance, but in another connexion-that of the legislative and judicial departments-that serious difficul ties are to be encountered. The senate are not only an equal branch of the legislature, but they are to be constituted the supreme branch of the judiciary, This violates the maxim which has been named, and in itself, independently or the prohibition of the union of the great departments, is the subject of many doubts. The court that in the last resort is to re-examine and determine questions of law and equity, ought, we naturally conclude, to possess a sufficient knowledge of law and equity to perform this office; will this be matter of fact or of presumption?

But the model which the committee have followed, in calling in the senate to pass on the governor's nomination, is well known to us; and we have had such experience of the constitution of the United States in this respect, that considerable hope may be indulged that the plan will prove safe and beneficial in this state. The senate, it is apprehended, will form parties among themselves, and in connexion with the assemblymen, so to exercise the power given to them in the appointments, as to act over again the proceedings of the council of appointment. This, however, cannot happen, if the power of the governor is wisely and firmly exercised. The governor alone can nominate the person to be appointed-this will be done by written message. The senate can only consent to, or dissent from the nomination-in doing this, the only question will be, is the candidate nominated duly qualified? They are not to enquire whether a better man could not be found: this power is exclusively confided to the governor; they are to ascertain, not whether he is the best man, but whether he is a qualified man for the office. If he is so, they must consent: if not, dissent. Were the senate to conclude that another man is better quali fied, and for this reason were they to negative the nomination, they have no means, and if the governor be an independent man, ought to have no hope, of success, because their object in this would be to deprive the governor of a power given to him. It is in this mode that the constitution of the United States is found to operate; the power of selection and nomination is cautiously exercised and maintained by the president; the senate confine their duty to an inquiry into the qualifications of the persons nominated to office-their comparative worth is laid out of the question; is he honest, is he intelligent, is he quali fied for the office? If doubts on any of these points occur, they ask of the president information respecting the character and qualifications of the person nominated; this request produces the recommendations, and other information, on which the president has made the nomination, and these, together with such other information as the senate can obtain, enable them to decide on the nominated.

As the plan has worked well in the general government, may we not hope,

by an able governor and a virtuous and enlightened senate, each holding the other within their respective spheres, that the same system will also work well here?

Pursue the report of the committee; give a few monied appointments to the legislature;-impart the appointments of the great judicial and other state offices to the governor and senate :-you have already given to the militia the appointment of its officers, with a small, but important exception;-go on, and give to the counties and towns the appointment of the residue, being the great mass of appointments, which have heretofore created so much dissatisfaction ad mischief throughout the state;-bring the question to a trial; can the people be trusted? are they the safe keepers of their own liberties?

As I mean what I profess, I am prepared to distribute the local appointments throughout the counties; and I feel confident that more peace and order, less intrigue, and a greater share of the good fruits expected from these appointments will be obtained in this, than in any other mode of appointment. On the immediate question, we are called upon, by our unanimous vote to abolish the council of appointment, to go forward; and instead of putting down one council in order to introduce what seems to me to be an equally, or more odious one, to break up, and distribute the enormous mass of appointments: and to confide to the governor and senate, the small number of them, that, from the nature of the offices, are of a general character.

I would prefer this plan to the proposed amendment, and am therefore against its adoption.

COL. YOUNG Supported the proposition of the gentleman from Erie (Mr. Russell) in a speech of considerable length, when on motion, the committee rose, reported, and obtained leave to sit again.

On motion of GEN. J. R. VAN RENSSELAER, the several propositions to-day offered were laid on the table, and ordered to be printed. Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1821.

The Convention assembled at the usual hour, and after prayers by the Rev. MR. MAYER, the minutes of yesterday were then read and approved.

THE APPOINTING POWER.

On motion of GEN. COLLINS, the Convention resolved itself into a committee of the whole on the unfinished business of yesterday. MR. LAWRENCE in the chair.

:

CHIEF JUSTICE SPENCER remarked, that he had yesterday, on the spur of the occasion, observed that he considered this proposition as the ghost of the old council of appointment. It was with no disposition to detract from the motives of the mover, or the merits of the proposition, that he had hazarded the observation and perhaps it was due to his respectable and venerable friend, (Mr. Russell,) that he should retract it-especially so far as it was susceptible of any improper construction. It had come upon him by surprize; but although he would recall the expression he had used in relation to it, yet, he verily believed, that the proposition contained all the evils (and many more) of the old council of appointment.

Why had that council been abolished? Because it was not only badly organized in itself, but it had a tendency to keep the state in faction and collision. It would not, therefore, be a performance of the duty which the members of that body owed to themselves and to their constituents, if they did not eradicate, so far as was practicable, this poison from the body politic.

Three principal objections against the old council of appointment had obtained,-1st, its privacy; 2d, its irresponsibility: and 3dly, its tendency to afford aliment to party spirit, by the immense patronage it commanded.

The same combinations which were produced by the old council would, in the opinion of Mr. Spencer, be produced by the new one. The same privacy and irresponsibility would subsist, and the same party spirit would be fomented.

But this was worse than the old council.-When senators were chosen, they had been hitherto selected more for their fitness and competency in relation to other qualifications, than the appointing power; but under this system, they would be selected merely as they were the pliant tools of the intriguing persons who had elected them. And what man of honour, he would ask; what man, who regarded purity of conscience, or the value of an unspotted character, would accept the trust and office contemplated by this proposition? an office that must be beset from morn till eve with every sort of importunity and stratagem that cunning could suggest, or impudence could execute? What man of honour would assume a station, unrequited, that should disturb his repose, call down upon his head the maledictions of one half of the community, the contempt of a secondary portion, and only the cold thanks of the remainder? None but the factious: none but those who hold themselves so cheap in their own estimation, and in that of the public, as to be willing to become the slaves, and drudges, and panders of party, would ever condescend to accept so humiliated an employment. If it were the object (as he knew it could not be with the honoura. ble mover) to perpetuate faction in the state, this, in his opinion, was the mode most perfectly calculated to retain and preserve it.

Mr. S. proceeded at some length in detail to point out the mischievous tendency of appointing justices of the peace by direct and immediate election by the people, which would grow out of the proposition of the honourable gentleman from Erie.

MR. RUSSELL. I did not anticipate, when I brought forward this motion, that I was about to agitate or aların any members of this committee. My only object was, to introduce a substitute for the governor and senate. I was aware that there was a necessity that there should be a general appointing power. And in the proposition that this power should be lodged with the governor and senate, it is said that the responsibility will rest on the governor alone; but will it not rest also on six members of the proposed council? My object is to disconnect, entirely, the appointing power from the legislature, which I consider would be a great improvement in our political system. I wish to bring home as far as is practicable all appointments to the direction of the people.

JUDGE VAN NESS wished further explanation, relative to the general and sweeping clause in the last sentence in the second section of the amendment. It would seem to include sheriffs and many other officers, who are not specifically designated.

MR. RUSSELL, replied.

CHANCELLOR KENT was opposed to the proposition of the honourable member from Erie (Mr. Russell) because he considered it, in all essential respects, a restoration, with more exceptionable features of the old council of appointment, which had been abolished by the unanimous voice of the Convention. I would rather, he observed, repose the power of appointment in the governor and four senators, chosen annually by the assembly, than in the governor and six councillors, chosen in great districts, according to the scheme proposed, because the senators would be less likely to be unduly influenced, Their trust would be only incidental to other duties of a purer and graver character.

But the great and fundamental objection to this new, as well as to the old council, is, that it concentrates in one spot, and upon a small and not very responsible body, the whole action of the combined struggles and competition for office throughout the state. Such an action or power, operates with irresistible force, and no body like the one proposed could sustain it. It would inevit ably lose its integrity or its independence. It would be guided by faction and assailed by corruption. We have tried the experiment in the old council, and we have seen and felt its mischiefs. The public voice has been loud and unanimous in the condemnation of such an institution, and in the necessity of a more general distribution and separation into distinct parcels, of the appointing power.

But he did not think it necessary to enter into a particular examination of the defects of this new plan. This task had already been ably performed. His object was to express his decided objection to any plan that placed the appointment of the local officers of the counties in one general and central power. How

these local officers were to be appointed within the counties, was a distinct question, not necessarily involved in the proposition for which he contended, and which was, that the power of appointment must be local. To select local magistrates with discretion, required local information. How could several thousand justices of the peace, dispersed in every town throughout this state, be well selected at the seat of government? The appointing power would be exposed to be continually misled by interested and designing individuals. It must, of necessity, rely wholly upon the information of others. A councillor representing one-sixth of the whole population of the state, according to the plan now before the committee, must be nearly as destitute of the requisite local information of characters, as a senator representing one-fourth of that population. There would be no material difference in the competency of these two officers to select with discretion. The local officers of the county must generally be selected at home, and this must either be by the people, or by some power to be created within the county. There is, upon the whole, less danger of abuse in that mode than in any that can be devised. It is, probably, the only way in which we may expect to collect the fair and honest sense of the people of each county, without disguise or imposition.

The great value of these local appointments is, that they weaken by dividing the force of party. They will break down the scheme of one great, uniform, organized system of party domination throughout the state, and they will give to the minor party in each county, some chance for some participation in the local affairs of the county. They will disperse a great deal of the aliment of party spirit, and diminish its action, and consequently its intensity and its bitterness at the seat of government. This consideration cannot be too deeply impressed upon the minds of the committee. The future happiness, and, I might almost say, the future destiny of the people of this state, turn upon such an arrangement.

What have we to fear in future? We have no reason to apprehend subjugation by foreign arms, nor conflicts between the states. We have no standing armies to menace our liberties. We have no hereditary aristocracy, nor privileged orders, nor established church to press upon our rights or our income: our liberties are to be assailed from other quarters and by other means. It is not to be disguised that our governments are becoming downright democracies, with all their good, and all their evil. The principle of universal suffrage, which is now running a triumphant career from Maine to Louisiana, is an awful power, which, like gunpowder, or the steam engine, or the press itself, may be rendered mighty in mischief as well as in blessings. We have to fear the corrupting influence of constant struggles for office and power. We have to fear inflammatory appeals to the worst passions of the worst men in society; and we have greatly to dread the disciplined force of fierce and vindictive majorities, headed by leaders flattering their weaknesses and passions, and turning their vengeance upon the heads and fortunes of minorities, under the forms of law. It requires all our wisdom, and all our patriotism, to surround our institutions with a rampart against the corruption and violence of party spirit. We must ingraft something like quarantine laws into our constitution, to prevent the introduction and rage of this great moral pestilence. If we do not, then, take my word for it, we may expect to encounter the same disasters which have corrupted and shaken to the foundation so many popular states. What we have already done, will, as I greatly fear, give a freer operation and an increased impetus to the power of the evil genius of democracy. I need not surely inform this wise assembly, that all unchecked democracies are better calculated for man as he ought to be, than for man as he is, and as he has always appeared to be in the faithful page of history, and as he is declared to be in the volume of divine inspiration.

I hope, sir, I do not press this subject too far. I believe in my conscience, that unless we remove the means of concentrating, at the seat of government, or at any other given place, the elements of faction and the struggles for office, and unless we scatter them in fragments among the counties, our future career will be exceedingly tempestuous and corrupt. I appeal to our own experience, and to the evidence of history for the grounds of my belief. I may refer to the

« 上一頁繼續 »