E. CONCLUSIONS

This section presents the conclusions of this chapter relating to the operational dimension of civilian control of the military.

1. Throughout the course of American history, the lack of consensus on a definition of civilian control has not undermined its effectiveness as one of the governing tenets of the American republic. 2. The concept of civilian control of the military is unquestioned throughout the Department of Defense today; accordingly, fears that the U.S. military might threaten American political democracy are misplaced.

3. As long as American civil and military leaders continue to exercise respect for civilian control, there should be strong confidence in the ability of American political institutions to control the military under a range of possible structures for the Nation's highest military command.

4. As the world becomes more complex and demands on U.S. civilian and military establishments increase accordingly, the United States cannot afford to become complacent about the apparent balance in civil-military relations.

5. Any changes contemplated to the U.S. military establishment must be carefully assessed for their impact on civil-military relations.

6. No changes can be accepted which diminish civilian control over the military; the recommendations of this study either strengthen civilian control over the military or leave the balance as it currently exists.

APPENDIX A

TRENDS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

There are a number of significant trends in American civil-military relations, which have primarily emerged in the post-World War II era. They reflect an expansion of the military as an institution in American society.

A. EXPANDING PUBLIC CONTACT OF THE U.S. MILITARY

Traditionally, the small standing military forces of the United States stayed so removed from the mainstream of American life, save in time of war, that the vast majority of the American public had very little knowledge of who they were or what they did. The first significant break with this tradition came after World War I when the Army, instead of retreating into its customary isolation, instituted the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program. From this beginning, all military Services have increased their contact with the public, developing a variety of institutions to disseminate information about themselves. Examples of these organizational devices include: public information and education programs conducted by the National War College and similar institutions across the country; the military associations -Association of the U.S. Army, Navy League, Air Force Association who, though technically independent of the Services whose names they bear, represent a significant force for promoting the views held by the Services, not only to the public at large but to Members of Congress and other policymakers; and finally, the substantial public and congressional relations efforts of the military Services and the Department of Defense itself.

B. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

In his farewell speech, President Eisenhower warned of the growing influence of the "military industrial complex." That warning was not directed at the highly unlikely event that military officers and industrialists would conspire to take over the government of the United States. Rather, it was a recognition that the sheer size and economic power of the defense establishment give a relatively few men enormous influence. The defense budget is so large, and so many dollars and jobs are at stake, that political power and influence are also at stake. As such, when the interests of the armed Services and the defense contractors coincide, they form a very powerful political force. This poses no immediate threat, but one should not lose sight of this potential threat to the ability of the civilians, both in the Executive and Legislative Branches, to control the whole defense establishment.

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C. CONTROL OVER RESOURCES AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Effective control of defense expenditures is one of the major modern challenges to civilian control. More than a budgetary matter, it involves the fundamental issues of who in fact, not theory, establishes national security policy and determines the allocation of finite resources to fulfill security needs.

It is in this area that the Congress exercises the greater part of its responsibilities for civilian control of the military. To the Congress, the Constitution gives the powers of appropriation of funds, and raising and supporting a military establishment. The extent to which the Congress is responsible and effective in executing these powers represents the extent to which it has played a role in maintaining effective civilian control over the vast and complex defense establishment. Thus, when critics speak of the undue influence which individual programs, parochial interests, or institutions, such as the National Guard, have upon the allocation of defense resources, they are not addressing a problem created by an inherent flaw in our system of civilian control, but a problem created by the Congress' decision to exercise its control in a particular fashion. Of course, the Congress is not alone in being susceptible to these sorts of influence, but by the very nature of its institutional structure, it is more vulnerable to them.

D. APPOINTMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS TO CIVILIAN POSITIONS

A less dramatic theme concerning civil-military relationships has to do with the gradual encroachment of the military on civilian authority through the appointment of military officers to civilian_positions. As discussed previously, the Congress required that the Secretary of Defense be appointed "from civilian life" and forbade anyone serving as Secretary within 10 years after leaving active duty as a commissioned officer. The principal historical example of this separation of civilian and military roles was the appointment in 1950 of General George C. Marshall, USA (Retired) to be Secretary of Defense. For Marshall to be confirmed, the Congress had to waive section 202(a) of title 10, United States Code, which stipulated that the Secretary of Defense be a civilian who has not been on active duty in the armed Services within the previous ten years. The Congress approved the waiver in Marshall's case, but not without debate over the dangers inherent in the blending of the two roles. This ingrained suspicion of military influence notwithstanding, where not specifically prohibited by law, military officers do occasionally fill less senior, traditionally civilian, positions in government without doing noticeable harm to civilian control.

A variation on this theme is the increasing service of retired military officers on presidential commissions whose work may have significant influence on U.S. policy. A prime example of this trend was the appointment of General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Retired) to be Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. The Scowcroft Commission's mission was to present the MX missile in a framework which would make it acceptable to the Congress. The commission succeeded not only in keeping the MX alive, but also in instigating the creation of the small mobile ICBM program.

CHAPTER 3

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A. EVOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Introduction

The first proposal to establish a single executive department for the U.S. military establishment was published in March 1921. This proposal was among an extensive series of recommendations for Federal administrative reorganization written by Frank Willoughby of the Institute for Government Research (now the Brookings Institution). Willoughby wanted to place the two existing military departments-Department of War and Department of the Navy-and a supply department in a single executive agency, to be entitled the Department of National Defense.

Willoughby's proposal received wide attention and became the basis for unification proposals considered by the Congress from 1921 until 1926. Both the War and Navy Departments opposed these unification proposals and continued to argue against unification throughout the 20-year period leading up to World War II.

Between 1921 and 1945, Congress looked at some 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. In his book on the early history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, entitled The Formative Years 1947-1950, Steven L. Rearden discusses these legislative proposals:

Proponents of these measures included advocates of "scientific management" and governmental reform, legislators who sympathized with the movement for increased autonomy of military aviation, and economy-minded congressmen in search of cures for the Great Depression. (page 17)

Given the opposition of the War and Navy Departments, only one of these bills reached the floor of the House of Representatives, where it was defeated in 1932 by a vote of 153 to 135. In general, prior to World War II, the idea of unification of U.S. armed forces rarely received serious consideration.

During World War II, however, it became increasingly evident that the nature of warfare was undergoing radical change. World War II demonstrated that modern warfare required combined operations by land, sea, and air forces. This, in turn, required not only a unity of operational command of these forces, but also a coordinated process for achieving the most effective force mixture and structure. As President Eisenhower was to express it in his Message to Congress on April 3, 1958, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever".