2nd session. April 22-May 21, 1958. H.A.S.C. No. 83. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. 887 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Hearings, 85th Congress, 2nd session. June 17-July 9, 1958. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. 444 p. Reports U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; report to accompany H.R. 12541. May 22, 1958 (85th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report No. 1765). U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; report to accompany H.R. 12541. July 17, 1958 (85th Congress, 2nd session. Senate. Report No. 1845). U.S. Congress. Conference Committees. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; conference report to accompany H.R. 12541. July 23, 1958 (85th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report No. 2261). Floor Debates in the Congressional Record Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 [debate in the House] v. 104, June 12, 1958: 11020-21. Osmer, Representative. Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Remarks in the House, v. 104, June 12, 1958: 11029. Rogers, Representative. Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Remarks in the House, v. 104, June 12, 1958: 11044. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 [debate in the Senate] v. 104, July 18, 1958: 14249-50. Thurmond, Strom. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Remarks in the Senate, v. 104, July 18, 1958: 14267. Saltonstall, Leverett. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Remarks in the Senate, v. 104, July 18, 1958: 14254. Goldwater, Barry. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Remarks in the Senate, v. 104, July 18, 1958: 14266. Symington, Stuart. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Remarks in the Senate, v. 104, July 18, 1958: 14256–60. Recent Legislative Developments, 1982-1985 Hearings U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hearings, 97th Congress, 2nd session. April 21-August 5, 1982. H.A.S.C. 97-47. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 1002 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hearings, 98th Congress, 1st session. June 14-29, 1983. H.A.S.C. 98-8. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 137 p. Reports U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982; report to accompany H.R. 6954. August 12, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982 (98th Congress, 1st session. House. Report No. 97-744) 14 p. Floor Debates in the Congressional Record Skelton, Ike. Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Extensions of Remarks [daily ed.], June 13, 1985: E2768-70. CHAPTER 5 UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS A. INTRODUCTION This chapter deals with the unified and specified commands which were established to control operations whenever military forces are employed. Commanders of the unified and specified commands report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. These commands and their Service components represent one of the two distinct organizational levels of the Department of Defense: the operational level. The other is the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations. Unified and specified commands are, by definition, those with a broad and continuing mission. Unified commands have forces assigned from two or more Services; specified commands consist of forces from a single Service. Today, there are six unified commands and three specified commands in existence: Unified Commands: U.S. Atlantic Command (Norfolk, Virginia) U.S. Central Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida) U.S. European Command (Stuttgart, Germany) U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii) U.S. Readiness Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida) U.S. Southern Command (Quarry Heights, Panama) Specified Commands: Aerospace Defense Command (Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado) Military Airlift Command (Scott Air Force Base, Illinois) Strategic Air Command (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska) In addition, on November 20, 1984, President Reagan approved the establishment of a seventh unified command: the U.S. Space Command. This new command is to be formally established on September 23, 1985. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the unified and specified command system as it has evolved since World War II and to see, in the context of the overall DoD organization, if this system best serves U.S. national security interests. For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this chapter the unified and specified commands will be referred to as "operational commands". Likewise, the unified and specified commanders will be referred to as "operational commanders." In certain quotes, however, the operational commanders will be referred to as "CINC's", an abbreviation for Commanders in Chief. B.EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDS 1. Prior to World War II Prior to World War II, the War Department and the Navy Department existed as essentially independent entities and rarely did Army and Navy units operate together. When they did so, command arrangements were ad hoc. Concerns about the lack of interservice relations first arose during the Spanish-American War when the Army and Navy failed to cooperate fully during the Cuban campaign. In fact, the interservice disputes were so great that the Army Commander refused to allow the Navy representative to sign the formal surrender document. As a result of these problems, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed a common order which created the Joint Army and Navy Board, whose charge was to address "all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services." The Joint Army and Navy Board continued to handle interservice matters until the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created in 1942. In due time, one product of the work of the Joint Army and Navy Board became the agreements documented in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" (JAAN). The version of JAAN in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 described "mutual cooperation," not unified command, as the favored method in joint operations. 2. World War II World War II, with its numerous theaters, multiple-Service operations, and increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, proved that "mutual cooperation" between the Services was no longer adequate. General George C. Marshall, USA realized early in World War II that the complexity of modern warfare demanded unified command: I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater-air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this. (Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, 1948, page 455) The disastrous failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941 dictated that in each theater the operational forces of two or more Services be placed under the command of a single individual. Thus, during World War II, the first continuing multiservice commands were created. The newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff designated from among their members an "executive agent" for each of these operational commands. 3. The National Security Act of 1947 While the JCS had decided during World War II that unified command would continue to be employed in peacetime, public and congressional opinion, influenced by the findings of the Pearl Harbor investigation that laid blame for that disaster in large part on divided command, would accept no other arrangement. The Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, released in 1946, stated: It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster that the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed. (page 245) By World War II's end, the concept of unified command was accepted as sound in theory and practice. As a result, the National Security Act of 1947 provided for unified command and assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, for establishing "unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security." There was, however, no change in the executive agent arrangement in 1947. Thus, in the years after World War II, the pre-World War II idea that the Military Department that raised and supported the forces also employed the forces was perpetuated. This is an important aspect of the organizational history of the operational commands, because this approach still finds expression in the attitudes and actions of many Service personnel. 4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan In 1953, President Eisenhower by Executive Order revised the executive agent concept to provide that the Military Department rather than a Service Chief would serve as executive agent for each unified command. In his April 30, 1953 message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, President Eisenhower explained and justified this change as follows: Under this new arrangement the channel of responsibility and authority to a commander of a unified command will unmistakably be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the designated civilian Secretary of a military department. This arrangement will fix responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials as intended by the National Security Act. (The Department of Defense 1944-1978, page 152) 5. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act In 1958, as part of the Reorganization Act, a fundamental change in the operational commands took place. President Eisenhower, in proposing the legislative revisions to the National Security Act of 1947, stated: separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief. (Message to the Con |