It would be much more useful to manage all military officers in OJCS under one system. Not only would this provide for improved personnel management practices, but it would also highlight the total number of personnel in the JCS system.

The argument raised against this option is that it would permit unconstrained growth in the size of the Joint Staff. To the contrary, this option would provide an opportunity to measure the growth in OJCS personnel resources without the artificial and confusing distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS staff.

• Option 2J-authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty

Given that problems in joint duty assignments are broader than just those in the Joint Staff or even the OJCS staff, it would be appropriate to implement management arrangements that would solve the larger concerns. Many of the options proposed in this subsection envision a more forceful role for the JCS Chairman in correcting joint duty problems. Some of these options address only the OJCS staff; others involve all joint duty assignments, but only address narrow solutions to one of many problem areas.

This option would authorize the JCS Chairman to address all personnel problem areas encountered in the joint duty community. The JCS Chairman would be responsible for ensuring that (1) highly qualified officers were selected; (2) they had the appropriate promotion and assignment incentives; (3) they had relevant education and experience; (4) they served sufficiently long tours to be effective; and (5) they could be reassigned to joint duty as necessary. This option could be implemented in conjunction with Option 2G (Joint Duty Career Specialty) or Option 2H (General Staff). Even if options to establish a joint duty career path were not implemented, the JCS Chairman could-with the authority proposed in this option-have a major impact on the quality and effectiveness of joint staffs.

Objections to this proposal are likely to center on the view that it would infringe upon Service prerogatives for management of their professional corps of officers. The JCS Chairman would have personnel management responsibility for 5 percent of military officers in grades of 0-3 (Captain or Navy Lieutenant) and higher. The Services may be especially troubled by the fact that the JCS Chairman would manage nearly 20 percent of all flag and general offi

cers.

Despite possible Service objections, it does not appear possible to obtain the necessary performance in joint duty assignments without substantial revision of current personnel management practices. Only the JCS Chairman can ensure that joint duty has the stature that it deserves, broaden the preparation of officers for joint duty, and reward them for effective work.

3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

• Option 3A -require that the Secretary of Defense annually promulgate a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning

This option would clearly be desirable. The absence of civilian guidance for contingency planning has been a major shortcoming. While it might be possible to provide such guidance without a formal document, it would appear to be more useful to transmit this important information in writing. Moreover, many of the users of this guidance would be located in operational command headquarters which are far removed from Washington.

In concluding that policy guidance for military crisis planning is needed, the National Security Policy Integration study states:

Effective military crisis planning requires higher government levels to select situations to be planned for, to provide the planners with realistic assumptions and objectives, and to conduct a critical review of the resulting plans. (page 36) The Chairman's Special Study Group also supports this concept:

...The important iterative process by which the civilian and military leadership settle on military objectives and on the political assumptions important to contingency planning should be enhanced. The JCS must be furnished clearly defined objectives by the civilian leadership. (page 61)

Besides providing a framework for contingency planning, promulgation of a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have numerous benefits: (1) result in increased attention to contingency planning; (2) lead to a useful questioning of assumptions; (3) help sharpen perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives; (4) ensure that political assumptions are consistent with national security policy; (5) highlight planning guidance issues that need attention; and (6) help connect the PPBS process and contingency planning. There are two possible problems with this option. First, the guidance may be overly specific and unnecessarily constrain or complicate the work of contingency planners. Second, this guidance document would contain extremely sensitive information which, if leaked, might cause serious political problems or embarrassment. These concerns relate to implementation of this option and not to the concept itself. Clearly, a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have to be carefully prepared and protected.

• Option 3B -develop a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans

While increased attention by civilians and the JCS system to the review of contingency plans would be beneficial, it cannot substitute for the actual exercising of plans. Only through such tests can the quality of the plans be assessed and important lessons learned. The National Security Policy Integration study supports this view:

...military plans should be exercised periodically. Nifty Nugget underscored the need for such exercises, with highlevel government participation, both to discover shortcomings in planning and to test the capabilities and resources needed to execute existing plans. (pages 36 and 37)

The disadvantage of this option is the cost of these exercises and the commitment of substantial time by senior civilian and military officials that is required to make the exercises effective. These financial and manpower costs are modest when compared to the sub

stantial benefits of such tests. While planning and preparing for the future are important, senior officials must not neglect preparation for today's and tomorrow's crises. As the Chairman's Special Study Group has stated:

One cannot overdramatize the fact that while the peacetime management of military activities is an important matter, preparedness for war management is the overriding imperative. That type of preparedness is the best possible deterrent to actual conflict, and provides the best assurance of success if deterrence fails. (page 65)

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).