Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential DemocraciesUniversity of Michigan, 1995 - 246 頁 n Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies political scientist Mark P. Jones addresses the conditions necessary for the survival of democratic presidential systems, arguing that the electoral laws employed by such systems are intricately linked to the longevity of democracy. Throughout the book Jones's focus is on the most realistic and feasible mechanism for facilitating the proper functioning and survival of democratic presidential systems: electoral law reform. In order to demonstrate the importance of a strong presidential legislative contingent for the successful functioning of democratic presidential government, Jones structures his argument into two parts. He first employs a review of the relevant literature plus a multitiered set of empirical analyses of Latin American presidential systems. Maintaining that certain electoral laws are more compatible with the successful functioning of democratic presidential systems than others, Jones then offers an examination of electoral data and examples from two separate populations: 16 Latin American presidential democracies and 23 Argentine provincial (gubernatorial) systems. Jones uses these data as evidence to support his argument that presidential systems that consistently fail to provide their president with adequate legislative support are inherently unstable and ineffective. |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 42 筆
第 47 頁
... variable focuses on one specific aspect of these relations . Hence , it is better seen as a type of control variable than a general measure of non - legislative constitutional power . An additional word of caution regarding this variable ...
... variable focuses on one specific aspect of these relations . Hence , it is better seen as a type of control variable than a general measure of non - legislative constitutional power . An additional word of caution regarding this variable ...
第 52 頁
... variable based on them will be reduced . Greater discussion of these two points is provided in Chapter Four . Legislative Power - Censure . The results from both regressions show that the legislature's possession of the power to censure ...
... variable based on them will be reduced . Greater discussion of these two points is provided in Chapter Four . Legislative Power - Censure . The results from both regressions show that the legislature's possession of the power to censure ...
第 151 頁
... variable multipartism ) when the binary variable ( i.e. , presidential formula , election timing , or legislative formula ) equals one to the expected value of Y when the binary variable equals zero . The effective magnitude variable ...
... variable multipartism ) when the binary variable ( i.e. , presidential formula , election timing , or legislative formula ) equals one to the expected value of Y when the binary variable equals zero . The effective magnitude variable ...
常見字詞
analysis Argentine provincial average bicameral Bolivia Brazil candidate Chamber Chapter Chile Colombia concurrent consequences constitutional contest democracy democratic discussed districts divided government Ecuador effective magnitude elec electoral formula electoral laws electoral systems employed examined executive executive-legislative exists factors functioning governor held impact important included influence lack Latin American lead legislative contingent legislative elections legislative majority legislative multipartism legislature less level of legislative level of multipartism lower/single house majority or near-majority majority runoff formula measure method midterm negative nonconcurrent occurs parliamentary partial particularly Partido partisan percentage Peru plurality political parties popular population present president presidential and legislative presidential election presidential legislative presidential systems principal provincial systems received relationship representation represents round rules Salta seats Senate Shugart significant South Korea strong success Table tend term tion United utilize variable vote