Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential DemocraciesUniversity of Michigan, 1995 - 246 頁 n Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies political scientist Mark P. Jones addresses the conditions necessary for the survival of democratic presidential systems, arguing that the electoral laws employed by such systems are intricately linked to the longevity of democracy. Throughout the book Jones's focus is on the most realistic and feasible mechanism for facilitating the proper functioning and survival of democratic presidential systems: electoral law reform. In order to demonstrate the importance of a strong presidential legislative contingent for the successful functioning of democratic presidential government, Jones structures his argument into two parts. He first employs a review of the relevant literature plus a multitiered set of empirical analyses of Latin American presidential systems. Maintaining that certain electoral laws are more compatible with the successful functioning of democratic presidential systems than others, Jones then offers an examination of electoral data and examples from two separate populations: 16 Latin American presidential democracies and 23 Argentine provincial (gubernatorial) systems. Jones uses these data as evidence to support his argument that presidential systems that consistently fail to provide their president with adequate legislative support are inherently unstable and ineffective. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 65 筆
第 123 頁
... level of multipartism , the d'Hondt formula would be expected to be more likely to lead to larger presidential legislative contingents than the LR - Hare formula due to its stronger tendency to favor the larger parties in an electoral ...
... level of multipartism , the d'Hondt formula would be expected to be more likely to lead to larger presidential legislative contingents than the LR - Hare formula due to its stronger tendency to favor the larger parties in an electoral ...
第 149 頁
... level of multipartism which is 1.331 times the level of multipar- tism of a plurality system ( holding other factors constant ) , 10 For example , based on this model , in Honduras ( multipartism : 2.087 , with a plurality formula and ...
... level of multipartism which is 1.331 times the level of multipar- tism of a plurality system ( holding other factors constant ) , 10 For example , based on this model , in Honduras ( multipartism : 2.087 , with a plurality formula and ...
第 201 頁
... level of constitutional power distribution in the different systems . Even ... MULTIPARTISM AND PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 1. The distinction between ... level of multipartism is anything larger than this . In terms of the ...
... level of constitutional power distribution in the different systems . Even ... MULTIPARTISM AND PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 1. The distinction between ... level of multipartism is anything larger than this . In terms of the ...
常見字詞
analysis Argentine provincial average bicameral Bolivia Brazil candidate Chamber Chapter Chile Colombia concurrent consequences constitutional contest democracy democratic discussed districts divided government Ecuador effective magnitude elec electoral formula electoral laws electoral systems employed examined executive executive-legislative exists factors functioning governor held impact important included influence lack Latin American lead legislative contingent legislative elections legislative majority legislative multipartism legislature less level of legislative level of multipartism lower/single house majority or near-majority majority runoff formula measure method midterm negative nonconcurrent occurs parliamentary partial particularly Partido partisan percentage Peru plurality political parties popular population present president presidential and legislative presidential election presidential legislative presidential systems principal provincial systems received relationship representation represents round rules Salta seats Senate Shugart significant South Korea strong success Table tend term tion United utilize variable vote