Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential DemocraciesUniversity of Michigan, 1995 - 246 頁 n Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies political scientist Mark P. Jones addresses the conditions necessary for the survival of democratic presidential systems, arguing that the electoral laws employed by such systems are intricately linked to the longevity of democracy. Throughout the book Jones's focus is on the most realistic and feasible mechanism for facilitating the proper functioning and survival of democratic presidential systems: electoral law reform. In order to demonstrate the importance of a strong presidential legislative contingent for the successful functioning of democratic presidential government, Jones structures his argument into two parts. He first employs a review of the relevant literature plus a multitiered set of empirical analyses of Latin American presidential systems. Maintaining that certain electoral laws are more compatible with the successful functioning of democratic presidential systems than others, Jones then offers an examination of electoral data and examples from two separate populations: 16 Latin American presidential democracies and 23 Argentine provincial (gubernatorial) systems. Jones uses these data as evidence to support his argument that presidential systems that consistently fail to provide their president with adequate legislative support are inherently unstable and ineffective. |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 40 筆
第 45 頁
... Shugart and Carey ( 1992 ) have hypothesized that the greater the legislative power of the president , the more likely democratic instability . An extension of their theory can be offered as a constitutional - based explanation for ...
... Shugart and Carey ( 1992 ) have hypothesized that the greater the legislative power of the president , the more likely democratic instability . An extension of their theory can be offered as a constitutional - based explanation for ...
第 72 頁
... Shugart and Carey find that for the systems included in this study , the presidential power scores on these two indices vary considerably . However , the true extent of these differences is cur- rently very difficult to measure . The ...
... Shugart and Carey find that for the systems included in this study , the presidential power scores on these two indices vary considerably . However , the true extent of these differences is cur- rently very difficult to measure . The ...
第 92 頁
... Shugart and Carey as being linked to strategic decisions of political elites in response to the electoral formula used to select the executive . In plurality systems there exists a tendency among party elites to both " form a broad ...
... Shugart and Carey as being linked to strategic decisions of political elites in response to the electoral formula used to select the executive . In plurality systems there exists a tendency among party elites to both " form a broad ...
常見字詞
analysis Argentine provincial average bicameral Bolivia Brazil candidate Chamber Chapter Chile Colombia concurrent consequences constitutional contest democracy democratic discussed districts divided government Ecuador effective magnitude elec electoral formula electoral laws electoral systems employed examined executive executive-legislative exists factors functioning governor held impact important included influence lack Latin American lead legislative contingent legislative elections legislative majority legislative multipartism legislature less level of legislative level of multipartism lower/single house majority or near-majority majority runoff formula measure method midterm negative nonconcurrent occurs parliamentary partial particularly Partido partisan percentage Peru plurality political parties popular population present president presidential and legislative presidential election presidential legislative presidential systems principal provincial systems received relationship representation represents round rules Salta seats Senate Shugart significant South Korea strong success Table tend term tion United utilize variable vote